Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Metro Treatment of New Hampshire, L.P. operates outpatient opioid treatment clinics licensed by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire is a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) responsible for arranging healthcare services for Medicaid-eligible patients, including some treated by Metro. The parties’ relationship was governed by an ancillary services agreement. Following an audit of Metro’s patient records, AmeriHealth determined that Metro had violated certain state administrative rules and sought to recoup $36,722.27 in alleged Medicaid overpayments. After Metro appealed through the contractual process, AmeriHealth reduced the recoupment amount and advised Metro it could seek further review through a State Fair Hearing as provided by statute.Metro then filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of DHHS, but argued that the AAU lacked jurisdiction over payment disputes between MCOs and providers. The AAU issued a written decision concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII to hear appeals arising from determinations that Medicaid payments were inappropriately made and should be recouped. The AAU denied Metro’s motion for reconsideration and stayed further proceedings pending Metro’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the AAU has jurisdiction in this dispute. The court held that the AAU does possess jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII because Metro is a provider licensed by DHHS and the statute provides for appeals by such providers. The court rejected Metro’s argument that the statute or administrative rules limited jurisdiction only to disputes involving direct departmental actions. The decision of the AAU was affirmed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of Metro Treatment of N.H." on Justia Law

The defendant, a patient at a community mental health center, was informed by his career counselor that he had been dismissed from classes at UNH Manchester and would be removed by security if he returned to campus. Distressed by this news, he insisted he would still attend his evening class. In communications with his counselor and later his therapist, he reiterated his plan to attend, culminating in a statement asking if “doing a mass shooting” would be required for him to get what he wanted. When told his statement would be reported, he claimed it was a figure of speech. The counselor reported his comments to the treatment team and local police, in accordance with center policy. Law enforcement notified UNH Manchester, which took security precautions, and later apprehended the defendant. He was indicted for criminal threatening based on his statements.Prior to trial in the Superior Court, the defendant sought to exclude the testimony of his counselor and therapist regarding his statements, asserting the therapist-patient privilege, and also moved to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. The Superior Court denied both motions, finding an “essential need” for the privileged communications and concluding that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The jury convicted the defendant of criminal threatening.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the privileged communications and whether the evidence was sufficient for conviction. The court held that the State demonstrated an “essential need” to pierce the therapist-patient privilege due to the centrality of the communications to the charged offense and the compelling public safety interest in investigating threats of mass violence. The court also found the evidence sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for causing fear, terror, or public inconvenience. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The defendant, a visiting nurse, was charged with two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and four counts of misdemeanor sexual assault (MSA) based on events that allegedly occurred while he was providing care to the victim. The charges included allegations under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) (sexual assault by medical provider) and I(i) (sexual assault by surprise). The victim was over the age of 13 at the time of the alleged assaults.The defendant notified the court of his intention to assert a consent defense under RSA 626:6, I. The State moved to preclude this defense, leading to substantial pre-trial litigation. The trial court directed the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement, which was approved and transferred to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed three questions: whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1); whether RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The court held that consent is not a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) because the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) prohibits sexual conduct between nurses and patients, making such conduct professionally unethical or unacceptable. The court also found that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.Regarding RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the court concluded that consent cannot be a legal defense because if the defendant admitted to causing sexual contact through concealment or surprise, it would inherently mean the victim did not consent. However, the defendant may present evidence of the victim's consent to support his theory of the case, allowing the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.The court answered all three questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allore" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Gene L. Zarella, who is charged with four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Following his indictment, Zarella sought the production of the complainant's confidential counseling and hospitalization records for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court granted these motions and reviewed the records, finding them discoverable. Zarella then moved for in camera review of additional records from various private counseling, mental health, and medical care providers. The trial court granted these motions as well.The complainant, joined by one of the counseling providers, moved to intervene and quash the orders for production, citing statutory privileges and the complainant's constitutional right to privacy under Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution. The Superior Court (Ignatius, J.) granted the motion to intervene but denied the motion to quash, applying the standard from State v. Gagne, which allows in camera review if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the records contain material and relevant information.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Part I, Article 2-b of the State Constitution abrogates the application of the Gagne standard to records held by private organizations, as established in State v. Cressey. The court held that to obtain in camera review and disclosure of confidential or privileged records held by private organizations, the defendant must follow the procedures outlined in RSA 173-C:5 for records privileged under RSA chapter 173-C or demonstrate an essential need for the records for those privileged under RSA 329-B:26 and RSA 330-A:32. The court also mandated that notice and an opportunity to object must be provided to the individual whose records are sought. The court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Zarella" on Justia Law

The case involves five severely developmentally disabled men who require intensive care in a residential treatment setting and receive services through New Hampshire’s developmental services system. These services were provided by the Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. (JRC) in Massachusetts, funded by federal Medicaid home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver funding. In 2022, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) informed the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that JRC was not an approved HCBS provider, and funding for services at JRC would cease. DHHS committed to funding the services with state funds temporarily, but this was not extended beyond September 2, 2022.The petitioners appealed to the DHHS Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU), arguing that the termination of funding without an alternative placement amounted to a termination of their services. The Commissioner initially ordered DHHS to continue funding during the appeals. However, in March 2023, the Commissioner granted summary judgment to DHHS, ruling that the services were not terminated but required to be provided in a qualified facility. The Commissioner also ruled that RSA chapter 171-A prohibits DHHS from using state funds for services that do not comply with the federal Settings Rule.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners had a right to appeal the termination and non-renewal of their service contracts with JRC. However, the court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that RSA chapter 171-A prohibits DHHS from using state funds for services provided by a provider that does not comply with the federal Settings Rule. Thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of DHHS. View "Petition of Mason" on Justia Law

The case revolves around John Doyle, who was charged with crimes stemming from a domestic dispute. In August 2019, the trial court ordered Doyle to undergo a competency evaluation, and his mental health and medical records were provided to the Office of the Forensic Examiner (OFE). The court specified that these records could only be used to determine competency and not for any other proceeding without a court order. The OFE concluded that Doyle was not competent to stand trial but could be restored to competence with appropriate treatment. However, an independent examiner concluded that Doyle was unlikely to be restored to competency. In August 2021, the OFE re-evaluated Doyle and concluded that he had not been restored to competency and was dangerous to himself or others.The trial court had previously ruled that Doyle's medical and mental health records were exempt from the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges, allowing the State to release these records to a physician designated by the State for assessing the appropriateness of involuntary commitment. Doyle appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in ruling that his records were exempt from these privileges.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in determining that Doyle's medical and mental health records were exempt from statutory privileges under RSA 135:17-a, V. The court concluded that these records were privileged under RSA 329:26 and RSA 330-A:32, and the trial court erred in determining that they were exempt from these privileges. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether there were grounds for disclosing the privileged information. View "State v. Doyle" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, multiple hotel operators challenged a superior court’s orders in a suit against defendants, multiple insurance underwriters, all relating to the denial of coverage during the COVID-19 world health pandemic. Plaintiffs owned and operated twenty-three hotels: four in New Hampshire, eighteen in Massachusetts, and one in New Jersey. Plaintiffs purchased $600 million of insurance coverage from defendants for the policy period from November 1, 2019 to November 1, 2020. With the exception of certain addenda, the relevant language of the policies was identical, stating in part that it “insures against risks of direct physical loss of or damage to property described herein . . . except as hereinafter excluded.” For periods of time, pursuant to governors’ orders, hotels in each of the three states were permitted to provide lodging only to vulnerable populations and to essential workers. These essential workers included healthcare workers, the COVID-19 essential workforce, and other workers responding to the COVID-19 public health emergency. Beginning in June 2020, plaintiffs’ hotels were permitted to reopen with a number of restrictions on their business operations. Plaintiffs, through their insurance broker, provided notice to defendants they were submitting claims in connection with losses stemming from COVID-19. Plaintiffs sued when these claims denied, arguing that the potential presence of the virus triggered business loss provisions in their respective policies. To this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed, finding that “[w]hile the presence of the virus might affect how people interact with one another, and interact with the property, it does not render the property useless or uninhabitable, nor distinctly and demonstrably altered.” View "Schleicher & Stebbins Hotels, LLC, et al. v. Starr Surplus Lines Insurance Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. Plaintiffs, individuals who presently or formerly lived in the Merrimack area, brought tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and negligent failure to warn, alleging that defendants’ manufacturing process at its facility in the Town of Merrimack used chemicals that included perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). They alleged PFOA was a toxic chemical that was released into the air from the Merrimack facility and has contaminated the air, ground, and water in Merrimack and nearby towns. As a result, plaintiffs alleged the wells and other drinking water sources in those places were contaminated, exposing them to PFOA, placing them at risk of developing health problems, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, immunotoxicity, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy induced hypertension. The first question from the federal circuit court asked whether New Hampshire recognized “a claim for the costs of medical monitoring as a remedy or as a cause of action” in plaintiffs' context. Depending on the answer to the first question, the second question asked, “what are the requirements and elements of a remedy or cause of action for medical monitoring” under New Hampshire law. Because the Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not address the second question. View "Brown, et al. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent K.C. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her to involuntary admission to the New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) for a two-year period, to be discharged when clinically appropriate. On appeal, respondent contended NHH presented insufficient evidence at the hearing to support the circuit court’s order. Respondent was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder with manic, psychotic features. She had contacted police in the previous year 300-400 times, believing someone was hacking her phone and “rerouting her to people in black ops.” She had two active protective orders preventing her from contacting her ex-husband and another man, and there was outstanding criminal complaints from her violating those orders. Respondent was admitted to NHH, whereupon she was evaluated by psychiatrists, and the decision was ultimately made to have her committed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence presented at respondent’s hearing was sufficient on which to have her involuntarily committed. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law