Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required that owners of underground storage tanks demonstrate their ability to pay cleanup costs and compensate third parties for bodily injury and property damage arising out of releases of petroleum products from their tanks. New Hampshire’s Oil Discharge and Disposal Cleanup Fund (ODD Fund) was an EPA-approved program that complied with the federal requirement. In 2003, the State sued several gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In 2012, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the State. Each petitioner was a “distributor” of oil under RSA chapter 146-D and paid fees into the ODD Fund. They alleged that “[t]o date, the costs of MTBE remediation in the State of New Hampshire has been paid for primarily through” the ODD Fund, and that that fund was financed, in part, through fees that they paid. Petitioners sought a declaration that those fees “are unconstitutional as the [State] has recovered and/or will recover funds from the MTBE Lawsuit for the cost of MTBE remediation,” and that those fees should be reimbursed to them from: (1) “the settlement proceeds the [State] has received and will receive through the MTBE Litigation”; (2) “any future recovery the [State] receives through the MTBE Litigation”; and (3) “[a]dditionally, or in the alternative, . . . from the funds recovered, and/or to be recovered in the future in the MTBE Litigation, . . . under principles of equitable subrogation and/or unjust enrichment.” On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they lacked standing to seek reimbursement of their fees from the settlement funds. They also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that their equitable claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Find View "Aranosian Oil Co., Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court decision dismissing its appeal of a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision of the respondent, Town of Surry (Town), on the basis that the appeal was barred by claim preclusion. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, to build on its property, petitioner had to establish that the property has at least 200 feet of frontage on a public street, which was defined, in pertinent part, as a Class V or better road. In 2009, petitioner applied to the Town's selectboard for a building permit to construct a single-family home on its property. The selectboard denied the application because the property lacked frontage on a Class V or better road. In 2013, petitioner applied to the ZBA for a variance from the frontage requirement in the Town's zoning ordinance in order to build a single-family residence on the property. The ZBA denied the application. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, the petitioner appealed to the trial court. The Town asserted, among other things, that petitioner's application for a variance was barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and preemption. Petitioner argued, among other things, that the Town waived its claim preclusion argument and that the ZBA improperly applied the statutory criteria governing variances under RSA 674:33, I(b). "If, based upon res judicata, we were to bar a subsequent application for a variance after the denial of a building permit application, we would, as the petitioner notes, effectively require landowners to simultaneously apply for all potentially necessary land use permits, variances, and exceptions. Such would be costly and inefficient, and burden the zoning process by adding complexity to an already complicated process." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial of petitioner's application for a building permit gave rise to a cause of action different from the denial of its variance application, and, thus, res judicata did not preclude petitioner's variance application. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry " on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Boisvert appealed his conviction for welfare fraud. Defendant was the father of Carrie Gray's two children. He and Gray moved into a Bristol apartment in 2009 or 2010. Defendant's name was removed from the lease at some point prior to late 2010. On December 31, 2010, defendant filed an application for public assistance. On January 14, 2011, he met with a department of health and human services representative and stated that he was homeless and had no resources; he was certified to receive benefits. Defendant was recertified for benefits at six-month intervals, and again reported in June 2011 and December 2011 that he was homeless. Between December 2010 and March 2012, Gray received medical, food stamp, and cash public assistance. The total amount of assistance that she received was calculated based upon a household consisting only of Gray and her children. She would not have been eligible for the same level of benefits if defendant had disclosed that he was living in the apartment. At some point, the special investigations unit of the department of health and human services received an allegation of welfare fraud concerning Gray. After interviewing witnesses and reviewing records provided by Gray and defendant, the investigator concluded that the case should be referred to the county attorney's office. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of welfare fraud. Because it was alleged that the value of the fraudulently obtained payments exceeded $1,000, the offense was classified as a class A felony. The case went to trial, and at the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence that he was living with Gray during the relevant time period. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found defendant guilty. This appeal followed. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) defendant's motion to dismiss that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) his request to give an accomplice liability jury instruction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boisvert" on Justia Law

While riding on a school bus, Morgan Graveline was involved in an altercation with a another student, A.M. A.M. punched Morgan in the face. The bus driver reported the incident three days later. The school principal, Barry Albert, downloaded the bus driver’s report on February 8 and met with Morgan the next day. Morgan minimized the incident, told Albert she did not know the name of the other student involved in the altercation, and asked Albert not to notify her mother. Although Albert informed Morgan that he would have to notify her mother, he did not do so. Albert met with A.M. ten days after the incident whereby A.M. admitted to hitting Morgan. A.M. received a three-day suspension. Meanwhile, Morgan received threatening Facebook messages from another student, A.A., days before A.M.'s suspension. On the day Albert learned about the messages, he went to the cafeteria to ask A.A. to see him after lunch. After Albert left the cafeteria, a fight broke out. Morgan was hit several times, sustaining injuries to her head, face, and mouth. She was transported to the emergency room. Albert met with Morgan’s mother, plaintiff Danielle (Graveline) Gauthier, in the emergency room and, for the first time, told her about the bus incident and the threatening Facebook messages. Plaintiff brought suit to recover for Morgan's injuries. The trial court granted Albert's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff argued that Albert was negligent for failing to notify plaintiff on the alleged bullying. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gauthier v. Manchester School District, SAU #37" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

The City of Laconia owned and maintained Opechee Park. In May 2012, plaintiff Margaret Dolbeare was enjoying the playground equipment at the park with her granddaughter. As plaintiff approached the park swings, her foot caught under the edge of a mat. She fell and suffered injuries. This case was an interlocutory appeal by the City when the Superior Court denied its motion to dismiss negligence and nuisance claims. The trial court transferred two questions for the Supreme Court's review: (1) did the trial court err in finding that the City owed Plaintiff a duty, despite RSA 212:34, II; and (2) did the trial court err in holding that the City was not immune from suit under RSA 508:14, I, because “using playground equipment is not . . . recreation within the meaning of RSA 508:14”? After review, the Court answered both questions in the affirmative as they related to plaintiff’s negligence claim. Plaintiff argued that, notwithstanding either RSA 212:34, II or RSA 508:14, I, the City was liable for its alleged negligence under RSA 507-B:2 (2010). Because the trial court did not address this argument, the Supreme Court declined to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim. View "Dolbeare v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Logan Lamb, a student at a school operated by defendant, the Shaker Regional School District, was playing football on the playground during the lunch recess when another student tackled him and “slammed him to the ground,” causing injury to his head. Logan did not return to class after lunch, and none of the school’s staff reported the incident on the playground or that Logan was missing from class. Logan was later found wandering the halls, disoriented. He was taken to the nurse’s office, where he remained for approximately fifty minutes, at which point the nurse contacted plaintiff to pick him up. The nurse did not call for an ambulance. Plaintiff took Logan to the emergency room, where she learned that he had possibly suffered a concussion. In 2014, plaintiff filed her complaint alleging defendant “acted in a special relationship to [Logan], taking responsibility for [his] health, safety, and [well-being] while he was under its care, custody, and control,” and that it had breached its duty leading to Logan’s injuries. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that RSA 507-B:5 immunized it from plaintiff’s negligence claims and that those claims did not fall within the exception to immunity created by RSA 507-B:2. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply the exception to general immunity pursuant to RSA 507-B:2 (2010). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lamb v. Shaker Regional Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Keene appealed a superior court order dismissing its claims of tortious interference with contractual relations, negligence, and civil conspiracy, and denying its request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The City filed suit against respondents James Cleaveland, Garrett Ean, Kate Ager, Ian Bernard (a/k/a Ian Freeman), Graham Colson, and Pete Eyre, because they followed closely behind the City’s parking enforcement officers (PEOs) on their daily patrols through downtown Keene, videotaping them, criticizing their work, and "saving" cars by putting money into expired parking meters before a parking ticket was issued. Respondents testified that they engaged in these activities to protest parking enforcement because they believed that parking was not a criminal act, and that parking tickets were a "threat against [the] people." After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the action, ruling that the City’s claims were barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; the trial court also denied the City’s petition for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, the City does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the content of the respondents’ speech is protected by the First Amendment because it relates to a matter of public concern, and that the respondents’ activities take place in a traditional public forum. The City nonetheless asserts that specific aspects of the respondents’ conduct — “following closely, chasing, running after, approaching quickly from behind, lurking outside bathrooms, yelling loudly, and filming from close proximity” — is not protected by the First Amendment, and had a tortious impact on the PEOs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court erred when, solely because it had dismissed the underlying tortious interference claim, it denied injunctive relief without considering all the factual circumstances of the case. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Keene v. Cleaveland" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Nashua appealed a Superior Court order ruling that it could properly consider a tax abatement for the 2012 tax year for petitioner-taxpayer Nashua Coliseum, LLC. On appeal, the parties proposed contrary interpretations of RSA 76:17-c, II (2012), the statutory provision that addressed the effect of a successful abatement appeal on subsequently assessed taxes. The City argued that, under the plain language of the statute, Coliseum had not satisfied all of the prerequisites for the statute to apply. The City further argued that the statute was inapplicable because of the parties’ settlement agreement, which stated that the abated value would not be deemed to be the correct assessment value for purposes of the statute. Based upon a plain reading of the statutory language, the Supreme Court agreed with the City that the statute required the superior court to find that the assessment value was incorrect in order for the taxpayer to be excused from complying with the filing deadlines otherwise applicable to tax abatement requests. Accordingly, the trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Nashua Coliseum, LLC v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law