Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents Northridge Environmental, LLC and Arch Insurance Company (carrier), appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) granting a request by petitioner John Nicholson for reimbursement for home health care services provided to him by his wife, Angela Nicholson. Petitioner was seriously injured on the job while working for Northridge. After a period of hospitalization, petitioner was discharged but prescribed medication and follow-up care, which included home health services. Following the petitioner’s release from the hospital, he had multiple open wounds that required daily cleaning, and he “needed 24/7 care, due to balance problems, short term memory loss, and inability to perform certain regular activities of daily living.” Although petitioner’s wife did not have any formal medical training, she provided the required care, including cleaning his wounds, bathing him, dressing him, aiding him in the use of the bathroom, helping him move around, and constantly supervising him. Petitioner sought reimbursement at a rate of $15 per hour, 16 hours per day, between the date of his release from the hospital, and June 4, 2012, the date of the Department of Labor (DOL) hearing. The DOL denied the request for reimbursement. On remand to the CAB, respondents argued that because petitioner’s wife did not fall within the definition of a “health care provider” as used in RSA 281-A:2, XII-b (2010), her services were not reimbursable. Petitioner conceded that his wife was not a “doctor, chiropractor, or rehabilitation provider” as listed in RSA 281-A:2, XII-b, but he still asserted that her services were, nonetheless, reimbursable. The CAB first concluded that petitioner was entitled to reimbursement for his wife’s services. Regarding the amount of reimbursement, the CAB observed that petitioner’s wife offered inexact dates, times, and durations of various treatments that she provided and also lacked written records of her care. Nonetheless, the CAB concluded that it was reasonable to reimburse the petitioner for 12 hours per day at $15 per hour for the period between August 25, 2010, and June 4, 2012. The parties filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied. Finding no reversible error in the CAB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Northridge Environmental, LLC" on Justia Law

Pro-se plaintiff Deborah Sumner appealed a superior court order denying her Right-to-Know Law request put to the New Hampshire Secretary of State. The order also granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Sumner sought to inspect ballots cast in the town of Jaffrey during the 2012 general election. The Secretary denied her request, citing RSA 659:95, II (Supp. 2015), which exempted ballots which have been cast from the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, Sumner argued that RSA 659:95, II, along with RSA 660:16, II (2008) and RSA 669:33, II (2008) (collectively, “the ballot exemption statutes”), violated several articles of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court held that the ballot exemption statutes did not violate the State constitution, and, therefore, affirmed. View "Deborah Sumner v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond Cover appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board order denying his request for reinstatement to his former part-time position with the respondent, the New Hampshire Liquor Commission (Commission). Cover was a part-time employee of the Commission. In late May 2013, he sustained a work-related injury. The Commission sent him workers’ compensation forms on June 5 and warned him that he faced termination if he did not provide medical documentation by June 14 to justify his absence from work. On June 6, Cover gave the forms to his physician, who submitted them to the Commission on June 17, three days after the Commission’s deadline. Cover acknowledged that he did not submit any medical documentation to the Commission by June 14. On June 13, the Commission’s insurance carrier denied Cover’s workers’ compensation claim, stating that it had not received medical documentation concerning his injury. On June 17, the Commission terminated Cover’s employment. The board based its denial upon New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 504.05(b)(3), which stated that part-time employees were ineligible for reinstatement under the Workers’ Compensation Law. On appeal, Cover argued that Lab 504.05(b)(3) conflicted with RSA 281-A:25-a and was therefore invalid. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of RSA 281-A:25-a supported Cover’s argument that the right of reinstatement extended to part-time employees. "By stripping part-time employees of the right to reinstatement provided by RSA 281-A:25-a, the rule cannot be characterized as a rule that merely 'fill[s] in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.' Rather, the rule impermissibly modifies the statute and is therefore invalid." The Court vacated the board’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Raymond Cover" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Towns of Salem, Temple, Auburn, Bennington, Meredith, Northfield, Peterborough, and Plainfield (the Towns) appealed an order of the presiding officer of the New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation (Bureau) denying their motion to share in the distribution of approximately $17.1 million in excess earnings and surplus by one of the respondents, Health Trust, Inc. (Health Trust), in an administrative action brought by the Bureau against: Health Trust; Local Government Center, Inc. and several other entities (collectively, the administrative respondents). The Towns and the City of Concord (collectively, plaintiffs) appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss filed by, among others, defendants Local Government Center, Inc. and additional parties (collectively, the civil action defendants). The plaintiffs were municipalities that were members of pooled risk management programs run by several of the defendants. In 2011, the secretary of state commenced an adjudicative proceeding prompted by a petition filed by the Bureau alleging that the administrative respondents had violated RSA chapters 5-B and 421-B. The resulting Order required that Health Trust and Property Liability Trust return excess funds of $33.2 million and $3.1 million, respectively, to those political subdivisions that were members of those programs. The Order also directed the Bureau and the administrative respondents to enter into an “agreed-upon plan” to distribute excess funds to members that had participated in the program at any time after June 10, 2010; however, if those parties failed to reach an agreement, the order required distribution only to Health Trust’s and Property Liability Trust’s current members. The parties failed to reach agreement, and the excess funds were ordered to be distributed to current members. The administrative respondents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated portions of the order not relevant here, and remanded for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Bureau filed a motion for entry of default order against the administrative respondents alleging noncompliance with the Order. The issues related to that motion were resolved by a consent decree incorporated into the presiding officer’s order. Their motion proposing distribution was denied, and the Towns appealed. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed suit against the civil action defendants in superior court. The civil action defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court found, in resolution of these appeals, that a common law contractual claim for the return of surplus funds as alleged by the plaintiffs was inextricably entwined with RSA chapter 5-B and could not exist alongside the administrative mechanism created in that chapter. Thus, to the extent the presiding officer concluded that he lacked the authority to penalize a violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c) by ordering payment to former members of a pooled risk management program as either restitution or disgorgement, he committed an error of law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the presiding officer’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The case was affirmed in all other respects and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Salem" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Town of Grafton's three-member selectboard reviewed and discussed the 36 warrant articles to be placed on the ballot for the annual Town meeting scheduled for March 10, including 20 articles that plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. At the January 20 meeting, one selectboard member moved that the ballot include the phrase “the Selectmen do not recommend this article” relative to each of the plaintiffs’ warrant articles. The motion passed unanimously. On March 5, the plaintiffs filed their petition for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court held a final hearing on offers of proof and, on March 9, denied the petition, concluding that RSA 32:5, V-a authorized the Town to place recommendations on any warrant article. Plaintiff Jeremy Olson appealed a superior court order denying a petition he and co-plaintiffs, Thomas Ploszaj, Christopher Kairnes, and Howard Boucher filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Town. On appeal, Olson argued that the trial court erroneously determined that it was lawful for the Town to include on the official ballot for the annual Town meeting the phrase, “The Selectmen do not recommend this article,” below each of the plaintiffs’ 20 warrant articles, which the plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olson v. Town of Grafton" on Justia Law

THI is a subsidiary of THI of New Hampshire, LLC, itself a subsidiary of a parent company that owns nursing home operators throughout the country. In approximately 2003, THI purchased and began operating a nursing home, Pleasant Valley Nursing Center (Pleasant Valley), in Derry. In 2012, THI had an opportunity to expand when Exeter Healthcare, Inc. closed its nursing home in Exeter and offered to sell its 109 licensed nursing beds. THI and Exeter Healthcare entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the beds in 2013, and THI made deposit payments to Exeter Healthcare in accordance with the agreement. The following month, THI requested that the Board grant approval for the transfer of the beds from Exeter Healthcare to THI. Because the Pleasant Valley building would not accommodate all of the beds to be transferred, THI also requested permission to apply for a Certificate of Need (CON) to construct a new building to house the beds in a different location. THI selected a site in Londonderry for the new building, which it planned to operate under the name Traditions at Londonderry. In its application, THI explained that the transfer would occur in the same nursing home region in Rockingham County, such that the number of beds in the region would not increase. THI also informed the Board that its contract conditioned its obligation to buy the beds from Exeter Healthcare upon the Board’s approval of the CON for Traditions at Londonderry. In this appeal of the Health Services Planning and Review Board's (Board) order, THI argued that the Board incorrectly interpreted RSA 151-C:4, III(a) as preventing the Board from granting a certificate of need (CON) to THI for the construction of the Pleasant Valley nursing home. Although the Board found that THI’s proposed facility would satisfy regulatory requirements for services offered, quality of care, and financial feasibility, among other criteria, the Board nevertheless denied THI’s application because the Pleasant Valley facility was not an “existing facility.” Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Appeal of THI of New Hampshire at Derry, LLC " on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioners Deere & Company, CNH America LLC (CNH), AGCO Corporation (AGCO), Kubota Tractor Corporation (Kubota), and Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (Husqvarna), all appealed superior court orders that granted summary judgment to the State on their constitutional challenges to Senate Bill (SB) 126. SB 126 was enacted in 2013, amending RSA chapter 357-C to define "motor vehicle" as including "equipment," which "means farm and utility tractors, forestry equipment, industrial equipment, construction equipment, farm implements, farm machinery, yard and garden equipment, attachments, accessories, and repair parts." Like its federal counterpart and similar state statutes, RSA chapter 357-C, "the so-called ‘dealer bill of rights,''" was enacted "to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." RSA chapter 357-C regulated, among other things, a manufacturer's delivery and warranty obligations and termination of dealership agreements. RSA chapter 357-C also defines unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Violation of any provision of RSA chapter 357-C constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioners manufactured agricultural, construction, forestry, industrial, lawn, and garden equipment, including commercial mowers, wheel loaders, backhoes, and agricultural tractors. Their complaint alleged that: (1) retroactive application of SB 126 substantially impaired their existing dealership agreements in violation of the State and Federal Contract Clauses; and (2) SB 126 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it voided or otherwise rendered unenforceable mandatory binding arbitration clauses in existing dealership agreements, thereby conflicting with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld SB 126 against petitioners' claims that it violated the State and Federal Contract Clauses. The Court agreed with the trial court that the preempted provisions were severable from the remaining provisions of RSA chapter 357-C as applied to petitioners. The Court rejected Husqvarna's argument that SB 126 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court also rejected Husqvarna's contention that SB 126 had either a discriminatory purpose or effect within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State on Husqvarna's dormant Commerce Clause claim and remanded for the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether SB 126 was unconstitutional under the "Pike" balancing test. View "Deere & Co. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Respondents Mesiti Development, Inc., JVL Construction Company, Inc., and Brook Hollow Corporation, appealed a superior court order dismissing their counterclaims against petitioner Town of Londonderry. In 2012, the Town filed a bill of interpleader to determine whether $264,517.02 in surplus impact fees collected under the Town’s impact fee ordinance should have been refunded to the developers who paid the impact fees or to the current owners of the properties for which the fees had been paid. Although the Town’s impact fee ordinance specifies that the current owners are entitled to the refunds, the Town sought to confirm that the ordinance is consistent with the impact fee statute. The bill listed seventeen properties and their respective impact fee payors and current owners. Additional parties intervened thereafter. Several parties, including the respondents, moved to add counterclaims alleging, among other things: (1) violations of RSA 674:21, V; (2) negligence; (3) violation of fiduciary duties owed to impact fee payors; (4) violation of the public trust in government; and (5) violation of the municipal budget law. The Town filed a motion to dismiss these counterclaims, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the order dismissing these claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal and cross-appeal arose out of a civil action by plaintiffs, Jeffrey Frost, Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family), and Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), against Michael Delaney, individually and as former attorney general, and multiple other former and current State officials, for their actions in the investigation and prosecution of Frost for alleged violations of RSA chapter 397-A. Plaintiffs appealed only orders of the Superior Court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Kathleen Sheehan (bank examiner for the New Hampshire Banking Department) on the ground that she was entitled to qualified immunity, and dismissing their negligent supervision claims against Peter Hildreth (former commissioner of the Department) and Maryam Desfosses (Department hearings examiner) on the ground that they were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Defendants the State of New Hampshire, the Department, and Sheehan cross-appealed. Chretien and Frost Family were New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. Frost was a member and designated manager of Chretien and a member of Frost Family. Chretien sold one of its properties to Robert Recio and his housemate in a seller-financed real estate transaction. In late December 2009, Recio filed a complaint against Chretien with the Consumer Protection Bureau of the Attorney General’s Office alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs had fraudulently induced him to enter into the sale. The complaint was forwarded to the Department, which assigned investigation of the complaint to Sheehan. Sheehan, Gorham, and Manchester Police Department officials drafted an application for a warrant to search Frost’s residence, which also served as the business address for Chretien, for evidence that the plaintiffs had participated in unlicensed mortgage lending in violation of RSA chapter 397-A. The supporting affidavit averred that Frost, as a member of Chretien, “had acted as a Mortgage Banker” with regard to the conduct complained of in Recio’s complaint. Frost was arrested and charged with four class A misdemeanors alleging violations of RSA chapter 397-A. The district court later granted Frost’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search. The court found that Sheehan misrepresented that Chretien was listed as the “Mortgage Banker” in the Recio transaction and that her misrepresentation was material. The court, therefore, determined that the warrant application lacked probable cause. Thereafter, the court granted Frost’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges. Upon review of the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error as to the grant of summary judgment, and affirmed. View "Frost v. Delaney" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the State appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff STIHL Incorporated (individually, and d/b/a Northeast STIHL). STIHL is a corporation that manufactures, distributes, and sells an array of handheld power and non-power tools such as chain saws, leaf blowers, hedge trimmers, axes, pruners, and mauls. Although many of its products have engines, none has wheels, engine and transmission, or is capable of transporting a person from one location to another. In 1981, the legislature enacted RSA chapter 357-C, the so-called “dealer bill of rights,” to regulate, among others, automotive manufacturers and dealers. the legislature increased the level of regulation it imposed. As the legislature expanded RSA chapter 357-C, it also enacted RSA chapter 347-A, a similar but less comprehensive regulatory scheme providing protections to equipment dealers. After the enactment of SB 126, STIHL sought a declaratory judgment that RSA chapter 357-C, as amended, did not apply to it. The State countered that, as a “forestry” and “yard and garden” equipment manufacturer, STIHL was subject to regulation under RSA chapter 357-C. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that RSA chapter 347-A, before it was repealed, regulated STIHL’s agreements with its dealers because, under that statutory scheme, the legislature chose to broadly define the term “equipment.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that because STIHL produces only handheld, not ground-supported or wheeled, equipment, it falls outside of the purview of amended RSA chapter 357-C. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "STIHL, Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law