Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Carlos Marti appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to dismiss his claim for reinstatement to his job with respondent Nashua Foundries, Inc. Petitioner injured his elbow at work. He informed respondent’s president of his injury, was given an over-the-counter medication, and returned to work. Petitioner’s pain grew worse and, after approximately thirty minutes, he asked the president for permission to go to the local emergency room. The president refused the request, referring petitioner to an occupational health clinic pursuant to company policy and the collective bargaining agreement governing petitioner’s employment. Against the president’s directive, petitioner clocked out of work and went to the emergency room. He returned later with a doctor’s note for a four-day work absence, but was instead terminated for insubordination. Petitioner did not grieve his termination under the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurer accepted the claim and paid petitioner’s medical bills. Petitioner requested a hearing on his claims for reinstatement and back pay; respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The CAB found that petitioner failed to challenge his termination by grieving it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent contended that because petitioner failed to grieve his termination, he could not challenge its legitimacy. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with respondent's contention: "[i]f this were correct, the petitioner would be considered to have been legitimately terminated for cause, and, under our interpretation of the statute herein, would not be an “employee” eligible for reinstatement under RSA 281-A:25-a, I. We cannot determine, however, whether the petitioner’s failure to grieve forecloses a challenge to his termination because the collective bargaining agreement is not contained in the record before us." Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded for a determination on that issue and for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Carlos Marti" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs New Hampshire Right to Life and Jackie Pelletier, appealed superior court orders granting in part and denying in part their petition for an order requiring defendants the Director, Charitable Trusts Unit (CTU), the Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General (AG), the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy (Board of Pharmacy), and the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), collectively referred to as “the State,” to produce, under the Right-to-Know Law, without redaction, all documents and other materials responsive to plaintiffs’ prior requests. The trial court ordered the State to produce certain documents, but upheld the State’s withholding or redactions of other documents because it determined that they were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that in so deciding and in denying their associated requests for attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court erred. At issue were three Right-to-Know requests that plaintiffs made of the State in July 2014 and September 2014 for documents and materials related to Planned Parenthood of Northern New England (PPNNE) and/or its New Hampshire clinics. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order upholding the State's decision to withhold certain DVDs from disclosure, and remanded for the trial court to conduct additional fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "New Hampshire Right to Life v. Director, New Hampshire Charitable Trusts Unit" on Justia Law

Petitioners Scott Bach and the Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. (ANJRPC), appealed a superior court decision entering summary judgment in favor of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Petitioners had challenged, as ultra vires and invalid, Department administrative rules that required nonresidents applying for a concealed-carry license in New Hampshire to provide proof of a “resident state license” to carry a concealed weapon. The trial court concluded that the administrative rules were valid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the rules at issue were indeed ultra vires, it reversed and remanded. View "Bach v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

Respondent Loreto Publications, Inc. appealed a circuit court order ruling that Loreto failed to establish that it was statutorily exempt from filing annual reports with the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office, and requiring it to file reports for fiscal years 2010 to 2014. Loreto was a nonprofit corporation organized under RSA chapter 292. Its stated purpose was “the promotion, and propagation of the Roman Catholic religion through the publication, sale, or distribution of books, magazines, pamphlets or [tracts], and the use of any other communications media, whether electronic, audio, visual, printed, written or oral.” In or around 2003, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted Loreto a tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 2008, the Charitable Trust Unit of the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office learned that Loreto was operating as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization in New Hampshire and advised Loreto that New Hampshire law required it to register with and submit annual reports. In 2009, Loreto registered with the Charitable Trust Unit but did not file an annual report for fiscal year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year. In 2013, Loreto’s 501(c)(3) status was “automatically revoked [by the IRS] for its failure to file a Form 990-series return or notice for three consecutive years.” The Interim Director of Charitable Trusts sought an order in the circuit court requiring Loreto to file its delinquent reports. Loreto moved to dismiss, arguing that “[s]ince [it] . . . is NOT a Charitable Trust, but rather a church/religious organization, [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under [RSA 547:3, II(a)] to hear this matter.” The court denied the motion. Finding no reversible error in that denial, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Attorney General, Director of Charitable Trusts v. Loreto Publications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Dunbarton School District (appealed a Board of Education decision which determined that Dunbarton was liable to the Goffstown School District for its proportional share of Goffstown’s obligation on a 20-year construction bond approved in 2001 for renovations to the Goffstown High School. The hearing officer reasoned that, “[b]y initiating the withdrawal study, Dunbarton would have put Goffstown on notice prior to the bond as to the potential additional financial risk on the bond without Dunbarton remaining part of the [Authorized Regional Enrollment Area] AREA.” Although the 2004 AREA plan expired June 30, 2014, “Dunbarton was clearly on notice back in 2001 that there was a twenty (20) year bond, and had the opportunity to initiate a withdrawal study at that point in time so that Goffstown would be on notice of the possible financial ramifications of Dunbarton withdrawing from the AREA.” Accordingly, the hearing officer recommended that the Board find that Dunbarton remained financially obligated with respect to the high school construction bond. The Board voted to accept the hearing officer’s report and adopted his recommendation. On appeal, Dunbarton argued that RSA chapter 195-A “envisions two possible endings to an area relationship: (1) withdrawal by one party; and (2) expiration of the area agreement. [. . .] only where an area relationship terminates . . . before the end of its term through ‘withdrawal’ that the statute imposes liability for payments on outstanding bond issues” pursuant to statute. Consequently, “[t]he Board unlawfully and unreasonably categorized Dunbarton as a ‘withdrawing’ sending district because Dunbarton never withdrew; instead, the 2004 Contract expired by its terms and with it, any further obligation for Dunbarton to pay Goffstown.” The Supreme Court agreed with Dunbarton's interpretation of RSA 195-A:14, reversed the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Dunbarton School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathan Wolfgram appealed a superior court order affirming a decision by respondent the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS), to retain notations on petitioner’s motor vehicle record referring to his certification and decertification as a habitual offender, despite the fact that the convictions that led to his habitual offender certification had been annulled. Petitioner argued that, because the habitual offender notations revealed the fact of his annulled criminal convictions, allowing DOS to retain the notations on his motor vehicle record defeated the purpose of the annulment statute. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, reversed and remanded. View "Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Concord (City) appealed a Superior Court order requiring it to issue demolition permits to plaintiff Everett Ashton, Inc. so that Everett Ashton could remove three abandoned, valueless manufactured homes from its manufactured housing park. The court also ruled that the City could not place a lien on Everett Ashton’s park for the unpaid water bills of the former residents of the abandoned homes, and that, by withholding demolition permits, the City engaged in a regulatory taking, entitling Everett Ashton to compensation and attorney’s fees. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the court’s ruling that the City had to issue the demolition permits, reversed its rulings concerning the unpaid bills and the regulatory taking, vacated the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Everett Ashton, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Green appealed a superior court decision to enter judgment in favor of defendants School Administrative Unit #55 (SAU), Timberlane Regional School District, Nancy Steenson, and Earl F. Metzler, II. This matter arose out of Green's request for documents under the Right to Know law; the trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to receive electronic copies of documents that she had requested from defendants. Responding to her request for documents, Steenson, the chair of the school board, told plaintiff could make an appointment to “see the documents” that she had requested. Plaintiff replied, “in that case, give me the file electronically and we will all save money and time”; in response to this communication, the SAU stated that it had already responded to plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff noted that her “request is for an electronic file . . . or a paper report, whichever suits the district,” and she declined to make an appointment to view the documents. Plaintiff explained that “[a]ll of the documents requested could have been emailed or copied in the time it has taken to answer these excuses for not providing [them]. . . . This isn’t that difficult.” In response, the SAU stated that the documents that she requested were immediately “available for public inspection.” After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found that both proffered interpretations of RSA 91-A:4, V were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Right-to-Know statute was ambiguous. "In light of the purpose of the Right-to-Know Law, and our broad construction of it, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. Although the SAU notified the plaintiff that the documents that she requested were available for inspection, there is no evidence in the record that the paper documents made available constituted 'original records' as contemplated by RSA 91-A:4, V." Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff was entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. View "Green v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Plaintiff CBDA Development, LLC (CBDA) appealed a superior court order affirming a decision of the Planning Board (Board) of defendant, Town of Thornton not to consider CBDA’s second site plan application for a proposed recreational campground. The Board decided that it could not consider CBDA’s second application because it did not materially differ in nature and degree from CBDA’s initial application. CBDA argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) upheld the Board’s decision to apply the "Fisher v. City of Dover" doctrine to applications before a planning board; and (2) found that the Board reasonably concluded that CBDA’s second application did not materially differ from its first application. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBDA Development, LLC v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law

Farmington School District appealed a Board of Education (state board) decision reversing the decision of the Farmington School Board (local board) not to renew the employment contract of Demetria McKaig, a guidance counselor at Farmington High School. In November 2012, a student (Student A) and her boyfriend told McKaig and another guidance counselor that Student A was pregnant and that she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. Student A was fifteen years old at the time. McKaig suggested that Student A tell her mother about the pregnancy, but Student A refused. The principal expressed his view that the school should inform Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. McKaig disagreed, asserting that Student A had a right to keep the pregnancy confidential. McKaig spoke with Attorney Barbara Keshen of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union about Student A’s situation. Keshen’s opinion was that the judicial bypass law protected the confidentiality of Student A’s pregnancy and the fact that she was contemplating an abortion. McKaig relayed this opinion to Student A, and Student A made an appointment with a health center and another attorney to assist her with the judicial bypass proceedings. Meanwhile, the principal instructed the school nurse to meet with Student A to tell her that the school would inform her mother about her pregnancy. McKaig told the principal about her conversation with Keshen and urged him to contact Keshen to discuss Student A’s rights. The principal did not contact Keshen; however, Keshen contacted him. He told Keshen that the parental notification and judicial bypass laws did not prevent him from telling Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. Keshen instituted a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the principal to prevent him from contacting Student A’s mother. McKaig was named as the petitioner “ON BEHALF OF [Student A]”; she was not named in her individual capacity. The TRO was ultimately granted. Months later, McKaig received a notice of nonrenewal from the superintendent; in the written statement of the reasons for non-renewal, the superintendent listed three reasons: insubordination, breach of student confidentiality, and neglect of duties. After the hearing, the local board upheld McKaig’s nonrenewal on those grounds. McKaig appealed to the state board, which found, pursuant that the local board’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” The state board reversed the local board’s decision to uphold McKaig’s nonrenewal, but it did not order McKaig’s reinstatement or any other remedy. McKaig cross-appealed the state board’s decision and argued that she was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the state board’s reversal of the local board’s decision, and ordered that McKaig be reinstated to her former job. The case was remanded to the state board for further proceedings to determine whether she was entitled to additional remedies. View "Appeal of Farmington School District" on Justia Law