Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kadle Properties Revocable Realty Trust (Trust), challenged the dismissal of the Trust’s appeal to the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA), filed after respondent, the City of Keene (City), denied the Trust’s application for an educational use tax exemption. The Trust owned property in Keene that included an office building. A separate, for-profit corporation, Config Systems, Incorporated (Config Systems), rented a portion of the Trust’s office building, where it offered computer classes. The Trust did not own or operate Config Systems, but Daniel Kadle, in addition to serving as trustee for the Trust, was a beneficiary of the Trust and the sole shareholder of Config Systems. The Trust sought the exemption based upon Config Systems’s use of part of the property as a school. The Trust appealed the City’s denial of its request to the BTLA. During the BTLA hearing on the Trust’s appeal, the City moved to dismiss the appeal. The BTLA granted the City’s motion, reasoning that the property owner, the Trust, was not a school, and that Config Systems, the entity operating the school which the Trust claims qualified the property for an exemption, did not own the property. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Kadle Properties Revocable Realty Trust" on Justia Law

Defendants, the City of Dover (City) and its city council, school board, school board superintendent search committee, ethics commission, and city council ethics sub-committee, appealed a Superior Court order requiring them to disclose to plaintiff Jeffrey Clay, the written rubric forms completed by members of the superintendent search committee when evaluating applicants for the superintendent position. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred when it determined that the completed rubrics were not exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed: the completed rubric forms pertained to “internal personnel practices” and were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. View "Clay v. City of Dover" on Justia Law

Petitioner-claimant Jason Malo appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision reducing the rate at which his indemnity benefits were paid from the temporary total disability rate to the diminished earning capacity rate. On appeal, he argued that the CAB erred by: (1) finding that his physical condition had improved since he sustained the original, compensable, work-related injury; (2) determining that the change in his physical condition affected his earning capacity; and (3) failing to make specific findings of fact and rulings of law sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Jason Malo" on Justia Law

On January 30, 2016, the Town of Deerfield held a deliberative session. During the session, two petitioned warrant articles, titled Article 16 and Article 17, were considered and amended. Following the amendment of the two articles, petitioner Harriet Cady filed a petition for injunctive relief against the Town requesting an immediate hearing on the grounds that the alterations violated RSA 40:13, IV(c). The Town objected and moved to dismiss. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, concluding that the amendments to Articles 16 and 17 did not “remove or eradicate the subject matter of the original articles” and thus did not violate RSA 40:13, IV(c). Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cady v. Town of Deerfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Hagenbuch challenged the termination of her food stamp benefits by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (department). The department terminated the benefits because it found that her income exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the program. In calculating petitioner’s income, the department included distributions from an irrevocable trust, of which petitioner was the sole beneficiary, that had been made by the trustee to third parties. These distributions included payments for trust expenses and for legal fees that the petitioner had incurred to obtain public benefits. This case presented an issue of first impression in New Hampshire: whether a distribution made by the trustee of an irrevocable trust to third parties counted as income to the trust beneficiary for the purpose of determining food stamp benefits. The narrow question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the trust distributions were “owed” to the petitioner. The Court did not decide the validity of the premise underlying the department’s argument—that because the money used to establish the Trust was derived from the settlement of the petitioner’s personal injury lawsuit, the Trust was established with the petitioner’s “own funds.” Even assuming that the premise was correct, the Court concluded that the vendor payment exclusion applied to the trust distributions because the regulations do not recognize the distinction that the department attempts to draw regarding trusts originally funded by the household. In this case, given that the distributions made by the trustee to third parties were not owed to the petitioner—and therefore, were excluded vendor payments—the department should have excluded the trust distributions from the petitioner’s income. Accordingly, the Court reversed the presiding officer’s decision that the department properly counted the trust distributions as income. View "Petition of Kelly Hagenbuch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Reid appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law, to compel defendant, New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster, to produce unredacted records of the Attorney General’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing by former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court’s ruling violated Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that the investigative records at issue were “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices,” because the attorney general’s investigation cannot be considered “internal”; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the attorney general’s investigation of Reams was “conducted jointly with Rockingham County.” “Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s second argument, which raised an issue of statutory interpretation. In it, plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contrary to the plain language of RSA 91-A:5[,] IV.” Fundamentally, plaintiff’s argument was that records of the defendant’s investigation of Reams did not “pertain[] to internal personnel practices,” because “[t]he Attorney General is simply not the County Attorney’s employer.” The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and, therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

The City of Rochester’s Department of Public Works owned and operated the Rochester Water System, which provided water to residents of the City. The City operated three water storage tanks, one of which is the Rochester Hill Water Storage Tank (the Tank). Whitman & Howard n/k/a AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) designed the Tank and oversaw its construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron n/k/a CB&I, Inc. (CB&I). CB&I completed the Tank in 1985, and it was placed into service that same year. In June 2009, the City contracted defendant Marcel A. Payeur, Inc. (Payeur) to service the Tank by recoating the Tank’s interior and exterior, installing a mixer, and modifying the Tank to accommodate the mixer. Defendant Wright-Pierce performed the engineering and design work for the modification project. Payeur substantially completed the modification, under Wright-Pierce’s supervision, in November 2009. In December 2011, the Tank developed a leak. The City had to evacuate nearby residents, drain the Tank, and remove it from service. The City inspected the Tank and discovered that Payeur had failed to properly construct the modifications in accordance with Wright-Pierce’s design. The City filed suit against Payeur in November 2012, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and unjust enrichment. In April 2014, the City named CB&I, AECOM, and Wright-Pierce as additional defendants. The City’s amended complaint alleged that Wright-Pierce had failed to properly supervise Payeur’s 2009 modification work; it also alleged that, in 1985, CB&I had failed to properly construct the Tank in accordance with AECOM’s design, and AECOM had failed to adequately monitor CB&I. CB&I and AECOM moved to dismiss the City’s claims against them, arguing that the claims were time-barred. The superior court dismissed the City’s claims against CB&I and AECOM pursuant to a six year statute of limitations in effect when CB&I and AECOM substantially completed their contract with the City. The City appealed, arguing the superior court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of “nullum tempus occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Katherine Streeter appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) order denying her request for attorney’s fees under New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(4). In 2013, Streeter injured her left shoulder at work. She notified her employer and the employer filed a First Report of Injury with its insurance carrier the next day. Streeter would ultimately be diagnosed with tendonitis and referred for physical therapy. She received a steroid injection and was unable to work for two weeks, during which time the employer’s insurance carrier paid indemnity benefits. Streeter was awarded “payment of her medical treatment associated with this case, including, but not limited to, her surgery and physical therapy treatment . . . [and] indemnity benefits at the temporary total disability rate” from May through August 2014. Streeter’s attorney was awarded 20% of the retroactive indemnity award, pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). Thereafter, her attorney requested additional fees. The hearing officer denied the request, finding that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to 20% of the retroactive award and, thus, her “request for legal fees relative to the award of medical benefits [was] inappropriate under these circumstances.” On appeal, Streeter argued that “by paying benefits voluntarily after 21 days after notification of the claim,” the employer’s insurance carrier made a “de facto” determination pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 506.02 that her injury was compensable. After review, the Supreme Court determined that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to “20% of the retroactive indemnity benefits payable out of the benefit received.” N.H. Admin. Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). View "Appeal of Katherine Streeter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, The Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire, A Corporation Sole, d/b/a St. George’s Episcopal Church (Church), appealed a superior court order denying its summary judgment motion and granting that of the defendant, Town of Durham (Town), based upon a finding that 24 spaces in the Church’s parking lot that are leased to University of New Hampshire (UNH) students were taxable. Until 2013, the Church received a religious tax exemption under RSA 72:23, III for its entire parking lot. In early 2013, the Town learned that the Church leased spaces to UNH students. At that time, the Town believed students leased 30 of the 37 parking spaces. Accordingly, after determining that the leased parking spaces were no longer exempt from taxation, the Town issued the Church a tax bill. After review of the Church’s arguments on appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Church did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the leased spaces were exempt. The Court affirmed the superior court order. View "Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire v. Town of Durham" on Justia Law

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law