Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

Respondent Kenneth Geraghty appealed a final Circuit Court order in his divorce from petitioner Paula Geraghty. He argued that the trial court erred in: (1) applying New Hampshire law to his petition for annulment of the marriage; (2) denying his petition; (3) finding certain testimony proffered by the petitioner credible without explanation; (4) equally dividing the marital estate; and (5) ordering him to transfer to the petitioner one-half of a certain retirement account without affording him the opportunity to address possible adverse tax consequences of that transfer. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In the Matter of Paula & Kenneth Geraghty" on Justia Law

Respondent Christopher Ross appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition for a fault-based divorce and the final divorce order from petitioner Danielle Ross. He argued that the trial court erred: (1) in granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss based upon the defense of recrimination; (2) in failing to award him more than half of the marital estate; and (3) in failing to retroactively modify temporary support orders based upon petitioner’s allegedly understated income. Because the Supreme Court held that a party’s actions after the divorce petition has been filed could be used as a basis for the defense of recrimination, and that respondent withdrew his request to modify the temporary support orders, the Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Ross" on Justia Law

Respondent Coralee Beal appealed a circuit court order awarding petitioner Deborah Munson what Beal contended to be eighty-eight percent of the value of the marital estate. The court awarded Beal the remaining twelve percent and alimony. Beal argued that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the parties’ approximately fifteen-year period of premarital cohabitation when it determined the provisions of the decree. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court could consider premarital cohabitation when formulating an equitable distribution of marital property. Accordingly, the Court vacated both the property distribution and alimony award and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Munson and Beal" on Justia Law

Appellant Tammy Cole was the biological grandmother of N.B. and J.B. In May 2012, DCYF filed a petition alleging that N.B. and J.B. had been neglected by their biological parents. The court appointed CASA to serve as the children’s guardian ad litem. After the court made a finding of neglect and awarded DCYF legal custody, DCYF removed N.B. and J.B. from their parents’ home and placed them in Cole’s physical custody. In November 2013, the biological parents sexually abused N.B. and J.B. during an unsupervised visit. The court subsequently terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, and the abuse and neglect case was closed. In May 2014, Cole and her husband adopted the children. In July, Cole filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to copy the court’s records relating to the children’s abuse and neglect case. Cole also notified DCYF and CASA that N.B. and J.B. had potential negligence claims against these agencies based upon the abuse that occurred while the children were in the legal custody of DCYF. DCYF and CASA objected to Cole’s motion and each requested a protective order. DCYF and CASA argued that Cole was not entitled to make a copy of the court record, and CASA requested that the court grant a protective order limiting Cole’s inspection of the records to review at the courthouse and limiting disclosure of the court file. After a hearing, the court granted Cole’s motion to copy records and also granted CASA’s request for a protective order, in part. Cole only appealed the part of the circuit court's order required that any future case be filed as confidential and the pleadings filed under seal. She argued that this constituted a prior restraint on free speech that violated her rights under the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions because it was neither narrowly tailored nor did it serve a compelling State interest. Further, she asserted that it impermissibly placed the burden upon her, instead of on the parties seeking nondisclosure, and that it unfairly restricted her disclosure while allowing others to disclose the same information. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the court’s ruling constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, it reversed this part of the order. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Allen appealed a superior court order granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by petitioner Renee Brooks, and denying respondent’s cross-petition to partition. Petitioner and respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18-month period of separation in 2006-2007. From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in a home in Atkinson. In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in respondent’s name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. Respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire. Respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2013, petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from respondent’s attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that petitioner could not access those funds. In March 2013, petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties. In count two, petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court “[e]quitably determine” each party’s interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party’s liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party’s liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent “individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate.” Respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of petitioner’s petition. After review of the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Brooks v. Allen" on Justia Law

The parties divorced in January 2010. They had two minor children at that time. They entered into a stipulation, which was incorporated into the divorce decree that the trial court approved; in the stipulation, they agreed upon, among other things, the amount of monthly alimony and child support to be paid by Husband. Husband and Wife both appealed after the trial court issued orders modifying Husband's child support obligation. Wife argued that the trial court erred by: (1) including foster care payments that she received in her gross income for the purpose of modifying Husband’s child support and alimony obligations; (2) terminating Husband’s ongoing alimony obligation; and (3) concluding that it, a family division court, lacked jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ agreement to share equally in certain litigation costs. After review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's determination of Wife's gross income figure. Because the Court vacated for redetermination of Wife’s gross income for child support purposes, and because the trial court relied, in part, upon that gross income figure when deciding to eliminate Husband’s ongoing alimony obligation, the Court also vacated the alimony award and remand for redetermination of whether and to what extent ongoing alimony is warranted. The Court found the family division court had jurisdiction to enforce the parties' litigation cost agreement. The case was affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Holly & William Doherty" on Justia Law

Petitioners Pamela and Robert Lundquist appealed a circuit court order that approved a Judicial Referee's recommendation that their petition for visitation with their grandchildren be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are the parents of respondent, and the natural grandparents of respondent’s three minor children. Respondent’s husband, and natural father of the minor children, died in August 2010. In June 2014, petitioners filed a petition for grandparent visitation in the trial court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute “contemplates grandparent visitation rights when a child’s nuclear family is absent due to ‘divorce, death, relinquishment or termination of parental rights, or other cause,’” but that “[t]he nuclear family here is intact” because “[t]he Mother is entirely capable of raising her three boys and has done so.” Respondent asserted that “[t]he Paternal grandparents may have standing since the death of their son in 2010 but maternal grandparents have no standing to bring forth this petition.” Petitioners objected, arguing, among other things, that they “have stated a claim for relief based upon the death of Respondent’s husband as well as ‘other cause.’” On appeal, petitioners argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because “the Grandparents are the natural grandparents of the minor children and the nuclear family was not intact." The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, that petitioners lacked standing to petition for grandparent visitation rights. View "Petition of Pamela & Robert Lundquist" on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Respondent Alexander Nizhnikov appealed a final order in his divorce from petitioner Marianna Nizhnikov. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to enforce the parties’ prenuptial agreement; (2) awarding alimony to the petitioner; (3) ordering him to pay for the petitioner’s health insurance; (4) ordering him to pay for the lease of the petitioner’s vehicle; (5) issuing a mutual restraining order; (6) issuing a parenting plan that allowed the petitioner to eventually have “near equal” parenting time; (7) ordering him to pay 100 percent of the children’s uninsured medical expenses and co-parenting counseling; (8) refusing to require the parties to live a certain geographical distance from one another; and (9) admitting into evidence a New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) administrative appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and not the product of duress or obtained through non-disclosure of material fact. Additionally, the Court declined to consider petitioner’s argument that respondent still “got a fair deal” despite the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was unenforceable: Respondent was entitled to enforce the terms of a valid agreement. Given this conclusion, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s property distribution and remanded for the court to distribute the property consistent with the parties’ agreement. Because the case was remanded on this issue, the Court did not address respondent’s specific arguments regarding alimony, payment of the petitioner’s health insurance, or the leased vehicle. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Nizhnikov" on Justia Law