Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners P.B. and S.B. appealed a Circuit Court order approving a Judicial Referee’s recommendation that their petition for visitation with their grandson C.W. be denied. Respondents T.W. and S.W. cross-appealed the order denying an earlier motion to dismiss the petition. C.W. was born to M.M. and K.B. in 2011. His birth parents died tragically on January 11, 2012. Since then, respondents, M.M.’s sister and brother-in-law, have cared for C.W., initially as guardians and, since June 24, 2013, as adoptive parents. Petitioners, K.B.’s mother and father, had "consistent - but not extensive - contact" with C.W. before his birth parents died and approximately 16 visits between January 17, 2012, and September 1, 2012, after C.W. began residing with respondents. On appeal, petitioners argued that the trial court erred in balancing the factors regarding the best interests of the child. In their cross-appeal, respondents argued that the trial court erred in interpreting RSA 461-A:13 (Supp. 2014) to permit petitioners to maintain their petition for grandparent visitation after the respondents adopted C.W. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of P.B. & T.W." on Justia Law

Petitioner Valentina Conant appealed, and respondent William Faller, cross-appealed, the final parenting plan issued by the Circuit Court. Respondent also cross-appealed the trial court’s order concerning child support arrearages and other expenses. The parties were the unmarried parents of a daughter born in March 2012. Petitioner lived in Nashua with her teenage son from a prior marriage, and respondent lived in Massachusetts. In March 2013, the court issued a temporary parenting plan, directing that: (1) petitioner had sole decision-making responsibility for the child; (2) the child would reside primarily with petitioner; (3) respondent would have regularly scheduled parenting time; and (4) the exchanges of the child would take place in Nashua. After the final hearing in October 2013, the court issued the final parenting plan. Because both parties were “mature, well-educated, financially stable . . . [and] capable of providing nurturing support and opportunities to [the child],” the court awarded them joint decision-making responsibilities, as this would “only serve to assure that the child’s best interests are met.” The court awarded petitioner primary residential responsibility, and provided respondent with parenting time during the first, second, and fourth weekends of each month. Respondent argued on appeal of that order that the trial court violated RSA 168-A:1 and :3-a by ordering him to pay petitioner: (1) $4,587 in child support arrearages, accrued from the date of the child’s birth to June 2012 (two months before petitioner filed a motion to establish paternity); and (2) $2,303 for petitioner’s lost time from work because of prenatal care and illness and delivery of the child. The Supreme Court agreed with the respondent that the trial court erred by requiring him to pay child support arrearages dating from the child’s birth to June 2012. The Court reversed with regard to the support arrearages, and affirmed in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Conant & Faller" on Justia Law

Respondent-father G. B., II appealed a Circuit Court order terminating his parental rights over his son, G. B., III. In September 2008, the father was arrested after making arrangements with an undercover state trooper to pay to have the child’s mother, Michelle H., murdered. The father pleaded guilty to a class A felony indictment for criminal solicitation to commit murder as principal and/or accomplice. His sentence carried an early-release date of August, 2016. In 2009, Michelle H. died. It appears that at that point, guardianship over the child was granted to either his maternal grandfather, or both of his maternal grandparents, although no certificate of appointment appeared in the record. In February 2012, petitioners, Robert H. (Michelle's cousin) and his wife Carolyn H., petitioned for guardianship over the child. Furthermore, they filed a petition against G.B., III for termination of his parental rights on grounds of abandonment, failure to support, educate or care for the child, and because of his conviction for soliciting the murder of G.B., III's mother. The trial court granted the petition and terminate G.B., II's parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination. View "In re: G.B., III" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ismail Yaman, a Turkish citizen, and respondent Linda Yaman, a United States citizen, were married in Turkey in August 2000, and respondent became a Turkish citizen in October 2000. Their first child, K.Y., was born in March 2002, in the United States. In January 2003, the family moved to Turkey. The couple’s second child, E.Y., was born in Turkey in August 2003. In early to mid-2004, the respondent became suspicious that petitioner was sexually abusing their older child. In December 2004, the parties separated, and early the next year, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Turkish Family Court. On March 13, 2006, after conducting six hearings in which the court considered evidence from both parties and from the independent experts, the Turkish court rejected respondent’s claim that petitioner had abused the children, and issued an order granting sole legal custody of the children to petitioner and granting respondent visitation. Respondent appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey on two occasions, and both times the appellate court affirmed the family court’s order. The family court finalized its order in 2007. Within weeks after the family court’s order became final, and without notice to petitioner, respondent fled Turkey with the children by engaging the services of a self-proclaimed “snatch back” specialist. After years of searching, petitioner, who remained in Turkey, was informed in December 2011 that respondent and the children were living in New Hampshire. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) with the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the return of the children to Turkey would not pose a grave risk of harm to them because respondent had not established that petitioner abused them. The court also found, however, that the respondent had established that the children were “settled” in New Hampshire within the meaning of Article 12 of the Hague Convention; in light of this finding, the court ruled that it lacked the authority to order the children’s return to Turkey. Alternatively, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, even if it did have the authority to do so, it would not order the return of the children to Turkey. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which determined that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to order the return of “settled” children, but affirmed the trial court’s alternative ruling denying return of the children on equitable grounds as a sustainable exercise of discretion. After its review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting enforcement of the Turkish custody order. View "In the Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Susan Spenard appealed the final circuit court orders in her divorce from respondent David Spenard. She argued that the trial court erred by: (1) imputing income to her of $4,000 per month for purposes of child support and alimony; (2) denying her request to reopen the case based upon newly-discovered medical evidence; (3) not accounting for two promissory notes, one of which the respondent sold prior to the final hearing, in dividing the marital estate; and (4) misidentifying two investment accounts, and awarding the respondent an interest in one of the accounts. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found "ample support" in the record that petitioner's income was $4,000 per month; the trial court did not err in denying petitioner's request to reopen the case (because petitioner was at fault for failing to obtain a medical diagnosis prior to trial); the trial court erred by denying petitioner's request for a property division modification based on the undisclosed promissory notes; and in light of the property distribution modification, the trial court did not address the misidentified investment accounts ("petitioner may raise these issues on remand"). View "In the Matter of Susan Spenard and David Spenard " on Justia Law

Respondents, Larry M. and Sonia M. appealed a Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights over their children, A.M. and C.M. On appeal, Larry argued that the trial court erred by: (1) proceeding with the termination case based on an underlying neglect case in which he was improperly denied counsel; and (2) finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Sonia argues that the court erred because: (3) the trial judge did not recuse himself despite the fact that he presided over the underlying neglect case in the circuit court. Both respondents argue that the court erred by: (4) failing to afford them twelve months from the superior court's de novo finding of neglect within which to correct the conditions which led to the finding of neglect; and (5) finding that the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), made reasonable efforts to assist them in correcting the conditions that led to the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

The parties married in 1988. In 2010, petitioner Cheryl Serodio filed for divorce. In October 2011, respondent Arthur Perkins moved to have a prenuptial agreement enforced. The copy of the agreement accompanying respondent's motion was signed only by him, though he alleged both parties signed it, and petitioner kept the original. In his motion, respondent claimed petitioner was unable to locate the original, and that he possessed a copy to be admitted as evidence. Petitioner objected, stating she did not recall signing the agreement, and that she never held an original signed document. Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's motion to enforce, and the trial court granted it. On appeal, the respondent argues "[t]hat the trial court overlooked the standard of review for a motion to dismiss when it failed to assume the truth of the facts alleged by the [respondent], including the truth of the allegation that a written, executed [prenuptial] agreement was entered into by the Parties." The respondent also argues that the trial court erred because the threshold issue is whether the signed Agreement, in fact, had existed, not, as the trial court ruled, whether the signed Agreement presently exists. The petitioner responds that, since the respondent did not produce a prenuptial agreement signed by the petitioner, the trial court properly concluded that it had no statutory authority to enforce the terms of the Agreement. The Supreme Court observed, "petitioner's arguments regarding the enforcement of an oral or unsigned prenuptial agreement focus on the wrong issue. The respondent is not requesting that the trial court enforce an oral or unsigned agreement; rather, he is seeking to enforce the terms of a written, signed prenuptial agreement, notwithstanding the fact that neither a signed original nor a copy thereof has been produced in court. Accordingly, we turn to the question before us: whether the factual allegations in the respondent's pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery." Respondent's motion to enforce the Agreement alleged that a written prenuptial agreement existed, and that both parties signed it. Assuming the truth of the respondent's allegations, the Court concluded that the allegations in the respondent's motion are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery, and as such, reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Serodio & Perkins" on Justia Law

The parties were divorced in 2004 and had a son, who was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing on petitioner's motion to modify child support. As part of the property settlement in the parties' divorce, respondent was awarded Squam Lakeside Farm, Inc. (SLF), a campground consisting of 119 sites with trailer hook-ups for water, electricity, and sewer. SLF was a S-corporation; respondent was the sole shareholder. SLF's profits, losses, and capital gains were reported on respondent's personal federal income tax returns as shareholder. In 2010, respondent altered his business plan and, after expending almost $400,000 in legal bills and surveying costs and obtaining the necessary permits from the State, began marketing the campsites as condominiums, rather than as seasonal rentals. Based upon the sale of many of the condominiums, respondent reported capital gains on his 2011 personal tax return. Furthermore, respondent restructured a loan that he owed to SLF, converting it to a line of credit. Since that time, he used the line of credit for various expenses, both personal and business-related. Respondent never made any payments toward the outstanding principal or interest. In November 2011, petitioner moved to modify child support, asserting that three years had passed since the previous support order and that circumstances had materially changed, warranting a new support order. At the hearing, the parties disagreed about what comprised respondent's "gross income" for the purpose of determining child support. The trial court determined that the capital gains generated by the sale of the condominium units were "irregular" income that should be considered as part of the respondent's gross income for the purpose of establishing his child support obligation. Petitioner argued that the net profits from the sales of SLF condominium units were "gross income" for purposes of calculating child support. Respondent countered that, because several neighboring states include capital gains in the definition of "gross income," but New Hampshire did not, the legislature intended to exclude capital gains from "gross income" when calculating child support. The New Hampshire Supreme Court was not persuaded by respondent's argument that, because some states included capital gains in the definition of "gross income" the New Hampshire legislature specifically intended to exclude them. "Our task here is to interpret our child support statute, RSA chapter 458-C; the definition of "gross income" in other states' statutes does not control our analysis." The Court concluded that capital gains from SLF were "gross income" for the purpose of determining child support. Because the trial court erroneously relied upon respondent's adjusted gross income, the Court vacated and remanded for a redetermination of his child support obligation. View "In the Matter of Maves and Moore" on Justia Law

Appellant Susan B. and appellee Melissa D. became romantically involved in 1997 and "considered [them]selves to be as fully committed to one another as any married couple." Melissa took Susan's last name as her own (at that time, same-sex marriage became legal until 2010). Melissa became pregnant by sperm donor in 2002, and gave birth to Madelyn. When Madelyn was six years old, Susan and Melissa's relationship ended. Melissa and Madelyn moved in with Eugene D., who Melissa later married. Susan and Melissa agreed upon a schedule for regular visitation. Susan continued to be actively involved in Madelyn's life. Susan paid weekly child support and, in addition, helped with the cost of Madelyn's extracurricular activities. She also provided Madelyn with food, clothing, and gifts. In February 2013, Melissa stopped cashing Susan's child support checks. Susan averred that she nevertheless continued to send them. When Susan attempted to pick up Madelyn for her weekly visitation, she was informed that Madelyn no longer wanted a relationship with her. Melissa did not return Susan's subsequent phone calls, and Susan was unable to contact Madelyn directly through online social media because Madelyn's settings had been changed. Melissa filed a motion to terminate Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, asserting that the guardianship was "no longer necessary because Madelyn no longer wishe[ed] to have a relationship with Susan." Represented by counsel, Susan moved for an immediate hearing. Melissa objected, noting, "We have begun the process of my husband, Madelyn[']s stepfather, adopting her." The court denied the motion and Susan's subsequent motion to reconsider. On appeal, Susan argued, in part, that the family division erred by: (1) terminating the guardianship without a hearing or opportunity to conduct discovery; (2) ruling that the legal standard for termination of a guardianship had been satisfied; (3) dismissing her parenting petition; and (4) denying her motion to intervene in the adoption case. Melissa counters that the guardianship was created to allow Susan to provide health insurance for Madelyn and to further "the daily practicalities of child-rearing." She argued that since "Madelyn's sustenance is being adequately met by her new family," the guardianship was no longer necessary. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's termination of Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, and reversed the dismissal of Susan's parenting petition. The Court vacated the trial court's motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings, and stayed the adoption proceedings until the matter of guardianship was resolved. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of Madelyn B." on Justia Law

Husband Marcus Hampers and Wife Kristin Hampers challenged a post-divorce circuit court on the husband’s motion to modify his child support and alimony obligations and on the wife’s petition for contempt. The husband asserted the trial court erred by: (1) applying a standing order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the wife for any proceeding or matter related to the divorce decree and subsequent amendments; and (2) failing to calculate "gross income" for child support purposes under RSA chapter 458-C by using "net" figures for investment income to account for losses and expenses as well as gains. Wife asserted the trial court erred by: (1) calculating child support based upon the husband’s 2009 income and tax return when his 2010 income information and tax return were available; and (2) ordering her to repay sums that she had received in excess child support. Because "[i]t is for the trial judge to determine whether claimed expenses meet [established] criteria," and the trial court did not address the claimed expenses in this case, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to make that determination. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred by using the husband’s 2009 income for purposes of calculating his "present income." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Marcus Hampers & Kristin Hampers " on Justia Law