Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Respondent Alexander Nizhnikov appealed a final order in his divorce from petitioner Marianna Nizhnikov. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to enforce the parties’ prenuptial agreement; (2) awarding alimony to the petitioner; (3) ordering him to pay for the petitioner’s health insurance; (4) ordering him to pay for the lease of the petitioner’s vehicle; (5) issuing a mutual restraining order; (6) issuing a parenting plan that allowed the petitioner to eventually have “near equal” parenting time; (7) ordering him to pay 100 percent of the children’s uninsured medical expenses and co-parenting counseling; (8) refusing to require the parties to live a certain geographical distance from one another; and (9) admitting into evidence a New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) administrative appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and not the product of duress or obtained through non-disclosure of material fact. Additionally, the Court declined to consider petitioner’s argument that respondent still “got a fair deal” despite the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was unenforceable: Respondent was entitled to enforce the terms of a valid agreement. Given this conclusion, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s property distribution and remanded for the court to distribute the property consistent with the parties’ agreement. Because the case was remanded on this issue, the Court did not address respondent’s specific arguments regarding alimony, payment of the petitioner’s health insurance, or the leased vehicle. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Nizhnikov" on Justia Law

Judith Mortner, temporary administrator of the estate of respondent Theodore Mortner (Husband), appealed, and petitioner, Lynn Mortner (Wife), cross-appealed a circuit court order abating the Wife’s divorce action and vacating its prior final divorce decree. Husband and Wife were married in July 1987. In October 2013, Wife filed a petition for divorce when she was 70 years old and still working and Husband was approximately 90 years old and still working. In July 2014, Husband, Wife, and their counsel signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) purporting to settle the divorce action. The MOU was filed with the court in September with a cover letter reminding the court that the divorce decree was not to issue until counsel notified the court that it could issue. On October 29, Husband’s counsel hand-delivered to the court a letter advising that the decree could now issue. On October 30, the court signed an order that decreed the parties divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, approved the MOU, and incorporated it as part of the divorce decree. Unbeknownst to the court, Husband died on either one or two days prior to its order. Also unbeknownst to the court, the parties on October 29, through their counsel, entered into an amendment to their proposed final decree of divorce and their MOU. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the issuance of the divorce decree, requesting the court to vacate the decree on the ground that, before the court had signed its October 30 order, Husband had died. In its appeal, the Estate argued that the trial court erred by abating the divorce action. In her cross-appeal, Wife argued that the Estate lacked standing to contest the abatement and that its appeal should therefore be dismissed. She also argued that the trial court erred when it allowed Husband’s counsel to appear at the hearing on her motion to abate the divorce. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Lynn Mortner and Theodore Mortner" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terrie Harman appealed a circuit court order denying her and her ex-husband Thomas McCarron's request to un-do their divorce. The parties were married in 1989. In July 2014, they were granted an uncontested decree of divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences that caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In March 2015, they jointly filed a “Petition to Change Court Order,” stating that they have “reconciled and therefore request the [trial court] to approve the attached agreement to vacate the July 1, 2014 divorce decree.” The attached agreement, signed by both parties, stated that they “agree that the . . . 2014 divorce decree shall be vacated in full and in all respects.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that because New Hampshire courts “have authority to set aside, vacate, modify or amend their orders,” and have vacated final divorce decrees upon the request of one of the parties, the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to vacate the parties’ divorce decree. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute authorizing the trial court to vacate a final divorce decree on the ground of the parties’ reconciliation, the trial court did not err in concluding that it had no such authority. View "In the Matter of Harman & McCarron" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioner Diana Wolters, and respondent John Wolters, appealed circuit court orders pertaining to their divorce proceeding. Diana argued the original trial judge erred by denying her motion to recuse the trial judge and that all orders issued by that judge should have been vacated; and erred by considering tax consequences when determining the value of the parties' property. John argued the subsequent trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petitioner's motion to correct property distribution and by awarding a certain percentage of eminent domain litigation proceeds to Diana. Diana cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not awarding her a greater percentage of the eminent domain litigation proceeds. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded that because sale or transfer of the properties at issue was neither required by the trial court's order, nor certain to occur within a short time after the divorce decree, the trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the properties for distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a sale or transfer of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court's distribution order was vacated and the case remanded for distribution of assets consistent with the Court's opinion. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's entire property distribution, it did not address other arguments made about the eminent domain proceeds. View "In the Matter of Diana Wolters & John Wolters" on Justia Law

Respondent Frank Ball appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to terminate his child support obligation as to his and Glenda Ball's eldest child. Respondent argued as grounds for termination the child having turned 18 and graduating from high school. In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring respondent to pay petitioner weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. Under the agreement, respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and . . . principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." According to respondent (and not disputed by petitioner), the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008, and the Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation modifying their Massachusetts decree. In the modification, they agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in the Massachusetts decree was "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law . . . until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." In her argument before the Supreme Court, petitioner relied upon RSA 546-B:49, III, which provided in pertinent part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state." Petitioner contended that, pursuant to this provision, because Massachusetts law would not shorten the duration of the respondent's child support obligation under these circumstances, the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that petitioner waived the alleged error by entering into the 2008 stipulation and by not arguing in the 2008 proceedings that applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation was error. Because the 2008 New Hampshire order was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because the petitioner waived any legal error in the 2008 order approving the parties' stipulation, the trial court erred by not extinguishing respondent's obligation to support the parties' eldest child as required by the court's 2008 order. View "In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball " on Justia Law

Respondent Shane Rokowski appealed the final decree in his divorce from petitioner Tammy Rokowski. On appeal, he argued that the Circuit Court erred by: (1) conducting its own internet research to ascertain the value of the marital home; (2) inequitably distributing the parties' assets and debts; (3) awarding the petitioner permanent lifetime alimony of $750 monthly; and (4) requiring him to pay certain expenses while the divorce was pending. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying upon internet research to ascertain the marital home's value. The Court found that the accuracy of the trial court's sources in this regard could have reasonably been questioned, and as such, failed to meet the standard for judicial notice. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's distribution of marital property, it declined to address respondent's arguments that the trial court improperly: (1) referred to, and allegedly considered when distributing the property, his drinking, hiding income, domestic violence, and alienation of the parties' children; (2) divided the parties' debts unequally; and (3) awarded the petitioner any interest in his businesses. For the same reason, the Court also declined to address respondent's arguments about the alimony award. Because the trial court based its alimony award in part upon 'the asset distribution,' and because that distribution was vacated, the alimony award was also vacated. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings on valuation and distribution of the marital property. View "In the Matter of Rokowski" on Justia Law

The parties were married in August 2005 and were divorced by a New Hampshire court in 2009. When they divorced, both parties lived and worked in New Hampshire. The parties had two children. The parenting plan entered with their divorce decree gave the parties joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who resided primarily with petitioner Mary Sheys. In January 2013, petitioner notified respondent Eric Blackburn that she had to relocate from Manchester to Natick, Massachusetts, because she had been unemployed since November 2012 and had obtained a new job in Natick. After petitioner moved to Natick, respondent filed a motion in which he argued that he should be awarded primary residential responsibility for the children and that petitioner should have been found in contempt for having relocated in violation of the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court denied this relief, finding that although petitioner did not provide respondent with the 60-day notice required by the parties’ parenting plan, she provided him “at least 40-45 days” notice before relocating, which afforded him “ample time to . . . request . . . a hearing as provided by statute.” The court entered a new parenting plan, pursuant to which the parties again had joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who again were to reside primarily with petitioner. Respondent again asked the court to modify the parenting plan and to hold petitioner in contempt. At a scheduled hearing on the contempt allegation, petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that because she and the children had been Massachusetts residents for a year, and because she had a motion pending in a Massachusetts court regarding the divorce decree and parenting plan, the New Hampshire court lacked jurisdiction. The New Hampshire court dismissed respondent's motion. Respondent appealed the New Hampshire trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss, arguing the trial court’s order was contrary to RSA 458-A:13, I (Supp. 2014), a provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Because the Supreme Court agreed with respondent, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Kempton appealed, and respondent Peggy Kempton cross-appealed their final divorce decree. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a fault-based divorce. He also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In her cross-appeal, respondent also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In addition, she argued that the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process by denying her request for a continuance and "forc[ing] her to appear at the parties' two[-]day divorce trial by telephone." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Robert Kempton & Peggy Kempton" on Justia Law