Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Judith Mortner, temporary administrator of the estate of respondent Theodore Mortner (Husband), appealed, and petitioner, Lynn Mortner (Wife), cross-appealed a circuit court order abating the Wife’s divorce action and vacating its prior final divorce decree. Husband and Wife were married in July 1987. In October 2013, Wife filed a petition for divorce when she was 70 years old and still working and Husband was approximately 90 years old and still working. In July 2014, Husband, Wife, and their counsel signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) purporting to settle the divorce action. The MOU was filed with the court in September with a cover letter reminding the court that the divorce decree was not to issue until counsel notified the court that it could issue. On October 29, Husband’s counsel hand-delivered to the court a letter advising that the decree could now issue. On October 30, the court signed an order that decreed the parties divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, approved the MOU, and incorporated it as part of the divorce decree. Unbeknownst to the court, Husband died on either one or two days prior to its order. Also unbeknownst to the court, the parties on October 29, through their counsel, entered into an amendment to their proposed final decree of divorce and their MOU. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the issuance of the divorce decree, requesting the court to vacate the decree on the ground that, before the court had signed its October 30 order, Husband had died. In its appeal, the Estate argued that the trial court erred by abating the divorce action. In her cross-appeal, Wife argued that the Estate lacked standing to contest the abatement and that its appeal should therefore be dismissed. She also argued that the trial court erred when it allowed Husband’s counsel to appear at the hearing on her motion to abate the divorce. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Lynn Mortner and Theodore Mortner" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terrie Harman appealed a circuit court order denying her and her ex-husband Thomas McCarron's request to un-do their divorce. The parties were married in 1989. In July 2014, they were granted an uncontested decree of divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences that caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In March 2015, they jointly filed a “Petition to Change Court Order,” stating that they have “reconciled and therefore request the [trial court] to approve the attached agreement to vacate the July 1, 2014 divorce decree.” The attached agreement, signed by both parties, stated that they “agree that the . . . 2014 divorce decree shall be vacated in full and in all respects.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that because New Hampshire courts “have authority to set aside, vacate, modify or amend their orders,” and have vacated final divorce decrees upon the request of one of the parties, the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to vacate the parties’ divorce decree. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute authorizing the trial court to vacate a final divorce decree on the ground of the parties’ reconciliation, the trial court did not err in concluding that it had no such authority. View "In the Matter of Harman & McCarron" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioner Diana Wolters, and respondent John Wolters, appealed circuit court orders pertaining to their divorce proceeding. Diana argued the original trial judge erred by denying her motion to recuse the trial judge and that all orders issued by that judge should have been vacated; and erred by considering tax consequences when determining the value of the parties' property. John argued the subsequent trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petitioner's motion to correct property distribution and by awarding a certain percentage of eminent domain litigation proceeds to Diana. Diana cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not awarding her a greater percentage of the eminent domain litigation proceeds. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded that because sale or transfer of the properties at issue was neither required by the trial court's order, nor certain to occur within a short time after the divorce decree, the trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the properties for distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a sale or transfer of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court's distribution order was vacated and the case remanded for distribution of assets consistent with the Court's opinion. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's entire property distribution, it did not address other arguments made about the eminent domain proceeds. View "In the Matter of Diana Wolters & John Wolters" on Justia Law

Respondent Frank Ball appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to terminate his child support obligation as to his and Glenda Ball's eldest child. Respondent argued as grounds for termination the child having turned 18 and graduating from high school. In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring respondent to pay petitioner weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. Under the agreement, respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and . . . principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." According to respondent (and not disputed by petitioner), the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008, and the Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation modifying their Massachusetts decree. In the modification, they agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in the Massachusetts decree was "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law . . . until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." In her argument before the Supreme Court, petitioner relied upon RSA 546-B:49, III, which provided in pertinent part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state." Petitioner contended that, pursuant to this provision, because Massachusetts law would not shorten the duration of the respondent's child support obligation under these circumstances, the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that petitioner waived the alleged error by entering into the 2008 stipulation and by not arguing in the 2008 proceedings that applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation was error. Because the 2008 New Hampshire order was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because the petitioner waived any legal error in the 2008 order approving the parties' stipulation, the trial court erred by not extinguishing respondent's obligation to support the parties' eldest child as required by the court's 2008 order. View "In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball " on Justia Law

Respondent Shane Rokowski appealed the final decree in his divorce from petitioner Tammy Rokowski. On appeal, he argued that the Circuit Court erred by: (1) conducting its own internet research to ascertain the value of the marital home; (2) inequitably distributing the parties' assets and debts; (3) awarding the petitioner permanent lifetime alimony of $750 monthly; and (4) requiring him to pay certain expenses while the divorce was pending. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying upon internet research to ascertain the marital home's value. The Court found that the accuracy of the trial court's sources in this regard could have reasonably been questioned, and as such, failed to meet the standard for judicial notice. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's distribution of marital property, it declined to address respondent's arguments that the trial court improperly: (1) referred to, and allegedly considered when distributing the property, his drinking, hiding income, domestic violence, and alienation of the parties' children; (2) divided the parties' debts unequally; and (3) awarded the petitioner any interest in his businesses. For the same reason, the Court also declined to address respondent's arguments about the alimony award. Because the trial court based its alimony award in part upon 'the asset distribution,' and because that distribution was vacated, the alimony award was also vacated. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings on valuation and distribution of the marital property. View "In the Matter of Rokowski" on Justia Law

The parties were married in August 2005 and were divorced by a New Hampshire court in 2009. When they divorced, both parties lived and worked in New Hampshire. The parties had two children. The parenting plan entered with their divorce decree gave the parties joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who resided primarily with petitioner Mary Sheys. In January 2013, petitioner notified respondent Eric Blackburn that she had to relocate from Manchester to Natick, Massachusetts, because she had been unemployed since November 2012 and had obtained a new job in Natick. After petitioner moved to Natick, respondent filed a motion in which he argued that he should be awarded primary residential responsibility for the children and that petitioner should have been found in contempt for having relocated in violation of the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court denied this relief, finding that although petitioner did not provide respondent with the 60-day notice required by the parties’ parenting plan, she provided him “at least 40-45 days” notice before relocating, which afforded him “ample time to . . . request . . . a hearing as provided by statute.” The court entered a new parenting plan, pursuant to which the parties again had joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who again were to reside primarily with petitioner. Respondent again asked the court to modify the parenting plan and to hold petitioner in contempt. At a scheduled hearing on the contempt allegation, petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that because she and the children had been Massachusetts residents for a year, and because she had a motion pending in a Massachusetts court regarding the divorce decree and parenting plan, the New Hampshire court lacked jurisdiction. The New Hampshire court dismissed respondent's motion. Respondent appealed the New Hampshire trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss, arguing the trial court’s order was contrary to RSA 458-A:13, I (Supp. 2014), a provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Because the Supreme Court agreed with respondent, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Kempton appealed, and respondent Peggy Kempton cross-appealed their final divorce decree. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a fault-based divorce. He also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In her cross-appeal, respondent also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In addition, she argued that the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process by denying her request for a continuance and "forc[ing] her to appear at the parties' two[-]day divorce trial by telephone." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Robert Kempton & Peggy Kempton" on Justia Law

Respondent D.H. appealed a circuit court order that granted the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families' petition (DCYF) to terminate his parental rights over his son, K.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions leading to a finding of neglect. On appeal, respondent argued that: (1) the trial court admitted hearsay evidence in violation of RSA 170-C:10 (2014); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he failed to correct the conditions leading to the original neglect finding and its determination that terminating his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re K.H. " on Justia Law

In June 2012, after the parties had been married for more than 30 years, petitioner Susan Achille filed for a no-fault divorce. At the time, the parties lived in separate residences at the same address. One night in early 2012, respondent George Achille, Jr. went to petitioner's home with a box that contained a gun and told her that he was going to use it. Respondent yelled at petitioner, pursued her through the home, grabbed her by the hair, threw her against a counter, choked her, slammed a door on her, and pushed her to the floor. According to petitioner, respondent had also “hit [her] plenty of times” in the past, including in June 2012 when the respondent had “hit [her] across the face and dislocated [her] jaw.” Respondent denied that the abuse occurred, and testified that, on December 4, the petitioner hit him with an umbrella and fell after tripping over a pair of boots. The next day, petitioner reported the incident to the police. At that time, she did not tell the police about the gun, press criminal charges against the respondent, or seek a protective order. Later that day, the parties had dinner together at a restaurant. On December 6, they drove together to Manchester for mediation regarding the divorce. On December 7, petitioner filed a domestic violence petition in which she described the incident that occurred in her home days earlier. The court issued a temporary domestic violence protective order and scheduled a final hearing for later that month. On December 27, petitioner wrote to police seeking to press charges against respondent arising out of the early December incident. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against respondent. During the next year, at respondent's request, the trial court repeatedly continued the final hearing in the domestic violence case. In December 2013, the trial court ordered that the hearing be rescheduled for “after October 1, 2014” when “[respondent's] criminal matters have been resolved.” Nonetheless, on January 24, 2014, sua sponte, the trial court vacated its earlier scheduling order and ordered that the matter be set for a final hearing, which happened to be the same day as the hearing on the merits in the parties' divorce. Respondent appealed several orders the domestic violence court made, specifically: (1) when the court vacated its earlier order continuing the final hearing in the domestic violence proceeding; (2) when the court denied respondent's motion to recuse the presiding judge from the proceeding, despite having granted the respondent's motion to recuse in the parties' divorce proceeding; and (3) when the court entered a final domestic violence protective order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Achille v. Achille" on Justia Law