Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

The petitioner, K.S., sought certiorari review of orders issued by the Circuit Court in proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C. K.S. argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including denying her access to information she claimed she had a right to, relying on a "reasonable efforts" standard instead of the child's best interest, not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in a residential treatment program, denying her request to be placed with her father, and denying her request to involve her grandmother in family therapy and other meetings.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had filed petitions alleging neglect by K.S.'s parents, leading to K.S. being placed in various out-of-home settings. Eventually, the court granted DCYF legal custody of K.S. and issued a dispositional order finding that returning K.S. to her parents was not in her best interest. K.S. was hospitalized and later placed in a residential treatment program. The court approved these placements and denied K.S.'s requests for reunification with her father and for additional discovery.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that many of K.S.'s arguments were moot due to changes in her circumstances, such as her father's surrender of parental rights and her subsequent placements. The court also held that the trial court did not violate K.S.'s due process rights by not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in an institutional setting, as the established procedures provided sufficient safeguards. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, concluding that it did not act illegally or unsustainably exercise its discretion. View "Petition of K.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding between Gregory Landgraf (husband) and Natasha Landgraf (wife), who have two minor children. The wife challenges the Circuit Court's determination of the husband's temporary child support obligation, specifically regarding whether the husband's irregular income should be considered for child support purposes. The husband receives irregular income from New England Industries (NEI), a subchapter S corporation, to offset his shareholder tax liability and for succession insurance premiums.Initially, the trial court issued a final divorce decree in 2018, which included a child support award. The wife appealed, and the higher court vacated and remanded the trial court's determination regarding the husband's irregular income. On remand in 2020, the circuit court issued a new temporary child support order, requiring the husband to pay a percentage of his irregular income, which was less than the applicable percentage set forth in the child support formula. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The court treated NEI's distributions to the husband as "gross income" and invited the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court addressed two questions: whether cash distributions received by a corporate shareholder to pay personal tax liability and distributions for succession insurance premiums are available for child support purposes. The court answered both questions affirmatively, concluding that these distributions are dividends and bonuses, respectively, and are available for child support purposes. The court also clarified that "net income" for child support purposes is calculated using standard deductions published by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, regardless of actual employer withholding.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Landgraf" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorced couple, Bradley Carter (father) and Rachel Carter (mother), who have two children. Following their divorce, the mother, who had an alcohol use disorder, was granted supervised visits with her children twice a month. After two years of sobriety and the impending closure of their visitation center, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with her children, which the father opposed.The Circuit Court initially sent the parties to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. At the final hearing, the mother requested two modifications of her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an expansion of her parenting time. The Circuit Court denied her request, maintaining the schedule of two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually agreeable supervisor. The mother appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The mother argued that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their mother. The Supreme Court agreed with the mother, stating that the children’s “present environment” is determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children now exist, which includes their daily activities, mental and emotional states, and their needs.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the mother’s request for a modification of parenting time and remanded for the trial court to reconsider her request. The Supreme Court also vacated the court’s denial of her request for unsupervised visitation, allowing the parties to clarify the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting on remand. View "In the Matter of Carter & Carter" on Justia Law

In this case, Alexandra Gamble (Mother) and Sean Rourke (Father) are divorced and have three children. They had a final parenting plan approved by the 10th Circuit Court-Portsmouth Family Division, which considered Father's residence in Costa Rica and Mother's in New Hampshire. However, Father later decided to reside in New Hampshire. As a result, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, arguing that due to the change in residences, it would be in the children’s best interests to modify the parenting schedule.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the decision of the lower court to modify the parenting plan, citing that the lower court exercised its discretion sustainably. The Court held that the trial court correctly interpreted the parenting plan when it ruled that modification was appropriate under RSA 461-A:11, I(g). This statute allows for modification of a parenting plan if changes in the distances between the parents' residences affect the children's best interest.Mother's argument that her due process rights were violated because the trial court considered grounds not raised by Father was rejected. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not base its decision on these factors. Instead, it found that Father met his burden to modify the parenting plan under RSA 461-A:11, I(g), which was the ground Father had indeed raised.The Supreme Court also rejected Mother's argument that the trial court violated her procedural due process rights by making changes to the parenting plan that were not sought in Father's petition. The Court concluded that the trial court had statutory authority to make these modifications once it found that a statutory predicate circumstance is satisfied, as per RSA 461-A:11, I. View "In re Rourke & Rourke" on Justia Law

In this case, Alden Satas, the petitioner, sought parenting rights for his ex-wife's biological child from a previous relationship. The couple, Satas and Courtney Crabtree-Satas, the respondent, had married when the child was about two and a half years old. They divorced in 2017 and Satas never adopted the child, but the child continued to live with him for some time after the divorce. In December 2020, Satas filed a petition seeking a parenting plan concerning the child. Crabtree-Satas moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Satas' status as the child's stepparent ended when the parties divorced. The trial court found that Satas had standing to request parenting rights and responsibilities.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to consider three questions in this case. The first question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas was the stepparent of the child, given that the definition of a stepparent implies a current marital relationship, and Satas and Crabtree-Satas had been divorced since 2017. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed that Satas is not a stepparent for the purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because he was no longer married to the child's mother at the time he filed his petition for visitation privileges. The court thus found that the trial court had erred in ruling to the contrary.The second question asked whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas had standing to bring a petition for parenting rights and responsibilities on the basis that he had established an in loco parentis status with respect to the child. However, since the court had already found that Satas was not a stepparent, it did not need to address this question.The third question concerned whether the trial court violated the respondent's constitutional rights. However, the court did not need to answer this question as it had already resolved the appeal on statutory grounds.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petitioner's petition. View "In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor, J.H., whose father is in jail and whose mother passed away when he was less than three years old. The child's maternal grandmother was appointed as his guardian. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to review an order by the Circuit Court, which prohibited the grandmother from testifying against the father's release from prison at any parole or similar hearings without first obtaining permission from the Circuit Court.The grandmother appealed this order, arguing that it violated her right to freedom of speech. The Circuit Court denied her motion, reasoning that J.H.'s best interests outweighed the grandmother's free speech rights.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Circuit Court's decision in part. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court exceeded its statutory authority by restricting the grandmother's ability to testify at the father's parole hearing. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute, RSA chapter 463, and determined that while it does grant the Circuit Court the authority to limit or restrict the powers of a guardian or impose additional duties in the best interests of the minor, it does not permit the court to restrict the guardian from speaking at a parole hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that this restriction was unrelated to the grandmother's role as guardian and was therefore not within the scope of the court's authority. As a result, the case was remanded back to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of J.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of J.H. (Mother), appealed a circuit court order finding that she neglected her son, J.H. On appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred because, as a matter of law, she could not be found neglectful when another person was the legal guardian of J.H. In the alternative, she contended the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of H.C., appealed a circuit court order that terminated her parental rights after the court found that she had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to H.C.’s sibling. The issues this case presented to the New Hampshire Supreme Court were: (1) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied in this case when H.C. was born after the date of the felony assault; (2) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied to convictions obtained outside the State of New Hampshire; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. Because the Supreme Court concluded RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied and that the trial court did not err in ruling that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest, the Court affirmed its decision. View "In re H.C." on Justia Law