Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A student, E.A., resided in the Pittsfield School District, which operates its own middle and high school. E.A. applied to and was accepted by Prospect Mountain School, an open enrollment public school located outside the district. When Prospect Mountain requested tuition payment from the Pittsfield School District for E.A.’s attendance, the district refused, asserting that because it had not adopted the provisions of RSA chapter 194-D, it was not obligated to pay tuition for students attending open enrollment schools outside its district.E.A.’s parents appealed the superintendent’s decision to the Pittsfield School Board, which denied their request. They then appealed to the New Hampshire State Board of Education. After a hearing, a hearing officer recommended upholding the school board’s decision, reasoning that the district was not required to pay tuition unless it had formally adopted an open enrollment program. However, after oral argument, the State Board rejected this recommendation. The State Board interpreted the statute to require a resident district to pay tuition for students attending an open enrollment school in another district, regardless of whether the sending district had adopted the statute. The Pittsfield School District’s motion for rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and recent legislative amendments. The court held that under RSA chapter 194-D, a sending school district must pay tuition to an open enrollment receiving school in another district, even if the sending district has not adopted an open enrollment program. The court found that the statutory scheme and recent clarifying amendments support this interpretation. The court affirmed the State Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Pittsfield Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the State of New Hampshire's funding for public education. The plaintiffs, which include several school districts and individuals, argue that the amount of base adequacy aid provided under RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is insufficient to cover the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate education as defined by RSA 193-E:2-a. They seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to increase the funding.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring RSA 198:40-a, II(a) unconstitutional on its face. The court found that the current funding level of $4,100 per pupil was significantly below the amount necessary to provide an adequate education. The court determined a conservative minimum threshold of $7,356.01 per pupil, which it found to be the minimum amount that base adequacy aid must exceed. The court also directed the State to immediately increase base adequacy aid payments to this threshold amount pending further legislative action.The State appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, arguing that the trial court erred in its findings and that the immediate payment directive violated the separation of powers doctrine. The State contended that the trial court should have considered the total funding provided under RSA 198:40-a, including differentiated aid, rather than focusing solely on base adequacy aid.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony, the declaration that RSA 198:40-a, II(a) is facially unconstitutional, and the determination of a conservative minimum threshold for base adequacy aid. However, the court reversed the trial court's immediate payment directive, finding that it failed to properly weigh separation of powers concerns and the history of school funding litigation. The court emphasized the need for the legislative and executive branches to act expeditiously to remedy the constitutional deficiency in funding public education. View "Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant, Nicholas H. Brooks, was convicted of two counts of simple assault following a jury trial. The incident occurred on February 17, 2022, when Brooks, working as a substitute educator, attempted to take a toy from a student who was causing a disturbance in the classroom. The student refused to comply, swore at Brooks, and allegedly lunged at him. Brooks then grabbed the student's sweatshirt and pushed him against a wall. The jury saw video evidence of the incident and heard testimony from multiple witnesses.The Superior Court (Bornstein, J.) denied Brooks' request to instruct the jury on the "special responsibilities" defense for the charges on which he was convicted. The court allowed the instruction only for the charge related to grabbing the student's hand. Brooks was acquitted of the second-degree assault charge and the first simple assault charge but was convicted of the second and third simple assault charges. Brooks appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions, admission and exclusion of certain testimonies, and handling of the complainant's school records.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in not providing the special responsibilities defense instruction for all charges. The court clarified that the correct standard of review for such a denial is de novo, not an unsustainable exercise of discretion. The court determined that there was "some evidence" to support a rational finding that Brooks was acting as a person with special responsibilities throughout the incident. Consequently, the court reversed Brooks' simple assault convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also addressed other evidentiary issues, finding errors in the trial court's admission of certain testimonies and exclusion of a student's statement. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, challenged the Manchester School District's policy regarding transgender and gender non-conforming students. The policy allowed students to keep their transgender status private and required school personnel to use a student's preferred name and pronouns, without disclosing this information to parents unless legally required or authorized by the student. Jane Doe, the parent of a minor child (M.C.) in the district, discovered that M.C. had asked to be called by a different name and pronouns. She requested the school to use M.C.'s birth name and pronouns, but the school adhered to the district policy.The Superior Court dismissed Jane Doe's claims, finding that the policy did not infringe upon a fundamental right and thus did not warrant strict scrutiny. The court applied the rational basis test and concluded that the policy was constitutional. The court also found that the policy was not ultra vires and did not violate federal laws such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or the Protection of Pupil Rights Act (PPRA).The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the policy did not directly interfere with the fundamental right to parent, as it did not prevent parents from obtaining information from other sources or restrict their ability to parent their child. The court agreed that the policy did not infringe on a fundamental right and thus was subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court did not find it necessary to address the plaintiff's facial and as-applied challenges separately, as the policy was found to be constitutional under the rational basis test. View "Doe v. Manchester School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Larissa Troy appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Bishop Guertin High School (BGHS) and Brothers of the Sacred Heart of New England, Inc. (BSHNE), based upon the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In 1998, Shawn McEnany was convicted in Main of unlawful sexual conduct with a fifteen-year-old female student while McEnany was teaching at another school BSHNE owned and operated. Despite knowledge of this conviction, in 1990, BSHNE hired McEnany to each at BGHS. Plaintiff attended BGHS from 1992 to 1996. In 1995, when plaintiff was seventeen years old and a high school senior, plaintiff alleged McEnany sexually assaulted her on two occasions on the BGHS campus. Despite reporting the second incident to the BGHS Dean of Students, no action was taken on plaintiff’s report. In 1997, McEnany was charged in New Hampshire with “teaching as a convicted sex offender and failing to register as a sex offender.” The headmaster of the school notified parents of McEnany’s conviction, but plaintiff alleged she first became aware of McEnany’s conviction in 2017. That year, McEnany passed away. In May 2018, plaintiff brought two common-law claims alleging defendants were: (1) negligent in hiring, retaining and supervising McEnany; and (2) negligent in failing to protect her when she was a student at BGHS. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded there was a material factual dispute as to when plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known, that her injury was proximately caused by defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Troy v. Bishop Guertin High School, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Granite State Trade School, LLC (GSTS) was a gas training school providing fuel gas fitting training courses and licensing exams in New Hampshire since 2007. GSTS was approved as a gas training school prior to the adoption of the current gas fitting regulatory framework. In 2020, defendant New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board (Board) directed GSTS to submit to an audit by producing its curriculum, instructor information, and exam materials. In response, GSTS brought suit seeking a declaration that “GSTS training and testing is grandfathered and exempt from compliance” with the audit request because its programs predated the current regulations. Alternatively, GSTS asked the trial court to find Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 “arbitrary and capricious” because the rules failed to protect the “integrity and security of the program education materials, and exams,” and were “overburdensome.” GSTS sought to enjoin the Board from: (1) requiring the production of proprietary materials created by GSTS; (2) terminating its training program; and (3) declining to accept certification from GSTS. The Board moved to dismiss; the trial court granted the Board’s motion. The court ruled that the plain and ordinary meaning of the language contained in Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 did not “relieve prior approved programs from their continuing obligations” to comply with the regulatory scheme. The trial court also ruled that Saf-Mec 610 “is a valid exercise of the state’s police power and not arbitrary or capricious” and dismissed GSTS’s claim that Saf-Mec 308 was arbitrary and capricious. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Granite State Trade School, LLC v. New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire petitioned for original jurisdiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge a circuit court order that granted respondent’s motion to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition. The trial court ruled that the State failed to comply with RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) (2022) because no “manifestation review” had occurred prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. The Supreme Count found the term “manifestation review,” in the context of a juvenile delinquency petition resulting from conduct in a school setting by a student with a disability, referred to a process whereby a school, the student’s parents, and other parties review the student’s individualized education plan (IEP) and other relevant information to determine whether the alleged misconduct stemmed from the student’s disability or the school’s failure to implement the student’s IEP. The Court affirmed and held that whenever a delinquency petition is to be filed pursuant to RSA 169-B:6, IV(b) and the legally liable school district has determined that the child is a child with a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I, then a manifestation review must be performed prior to the filing of the delinquency petition. "Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction of RSA 169-B:6, IV, it is free, within constitutional limits, to amend the statute accordingly." View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Donovan appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU), based upon the court’s finding that no public policy considerations supported plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. From December 2016 until her resignation in November 2018, she served as Associate Dean of Faculty for Mathematics. In this role, her primary focus was oversight of faculty assignments and support for mathematics courses. In March 2018, faculty reviewed a mathematics course, MAT 136, due to concerns about the course’s design. That review revealed that instructors applied different grading schemes for the course, and that those differences were not being communicated to students. Specifically, some sections of MAT 136 employed a grading scheme that SNHU intended to phase out beginning in September 2018. In July 2018, plaintiff's supervisor emailed plaintiff identifying two students from a semester of MAT 136 who received failing grades, but, given the supervisor's assessment of certain irregularities in grading schemes, “had a case for passing.” Plaintiff refused to modify the students' grades, feeling the changes requests violated the school's grading policy and were unethical. In her claim for wrongful termination, plaintiff alleged she was admonished for declining to alter the grades, and subsequently retaliated against by the creation of a hostile work environment. On appeal of the summary judgment motion, plaintiff argued that the question as to whether public policy concerns supported her wrongful termination claim, which alleged that she was constructively discharged as a result of her refusal to alter the students' grades, should have been resolved by a jury and not the trial court, as a matter of law. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the court did not err because complaints about the application of internal grading decisions by a private university do not implicate public policy considerations necessary to support a wrongful termination claim. View "Donovan v. Southern New Hampshire University" on Justia Law

Defendants, the State of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Department of Education (DOE), Governor Christopher Sununu, and the Commissioner of DOE, Frank Edelblut (collectively, the State), appealed a superior court decision denying, in part, the State’s motion to dismiss and denying its cross-motion for summary judgment, granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that the amount of per- pupil base adequacy aid set forth in RSA 198:40-a, II(a) (Supp. 2020) to fund an adequate education was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff school districts, and awarding plaintiffs attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs, Contoocook Valley School District, Myron Steere, III, Richard Cahoon, Richard Dunning, Winchester School District, Mascenic Regional School District, and Monadnock Regional School District, cross-appealed the trial court’s failure to find RSA 198:40-a, II(a) facially unconstitutional; its determinations regarding the sufficiency of the State’s funding of transportation, teacher benefits, facilities operations and maintenance, and certain services; its failure to find that the State’s system of funding education violates Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution; and its denial of their request for injunctive relief; and its dismissal of their claims against the Governor and the Commissioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Governor and the Commissioner in their individual capacities, and its denials of the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. However, the Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and awarding attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Contoocook Valley School District v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law