Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Paul McDonald appealed his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain lay opinion testimony, declining to give his requested self-defense jury instruction, and prohibiting the defense from referring to the aggravated felonious sexual assault statute in its closing argument. Finding that the trial court did not err in its decisions in Defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. McDonald " on Justia Law

Defendant Dickens Etinenne appealed his conviction for the first degree murder of Larry Lemieux. On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred by: (1) incorrectly defining the elements of self-defense or defense of another in its jury instructions; (2) permitting hearsay testimony; (3) failing to order a new trial based upon perjured testimony of a State’s witness and the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (4) failing to order the State to immunize a witness for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of his perjured testimony. Upon careful consideration of each of Defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in its decisions. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Etienne" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Smith appealed a superior court order that imposed previously suspended sentences for felony convictions. In February 2008, Defendant was charged with six class A misdemeanors. Subsequently, in March and April 2008, Defendant was indicted on six felony charges. In January 2010, Defendant pled guilty to the six misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in jail, these sentences also running concurrently with his felony sentences. On three of the felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and seven years at the state prison, with six months of the minimum and all of the maximum terms suspended for seven years. On the other three felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and five years at the state prison, all suspended for a period of five years from release from his stand-committed prison sentences. While incarcerated, Defedant attempted to contact a woman whom he was forbidden to contact under the terms of his misdemeanor sentence. Although the prison’s system blocked his call, the State moved to impose the suspended sentences of all six felony convictions, arguing that the attempted call violated the condition of good behavior in those sentences. The superior court agreed that the call violated the good behavior condition, and imposed six months of the minimum and one year of the maximum sentences leaving the other sentences suspended. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the superior court's decision and affirmed it. View "New Hampshire v. Smith " on Justia Law

Defendant, Robert Towle, appealed his conviction on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and and four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another all stemming from inappropriate and illegal contact between he and his wife with their minor son. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se. Defendant believed his counsel and he had a conflict of interest because his counsel was a candidate for municipal office. In the middle of a pre-trial conference, Defendant asked, when the court gave the opportuity, to proceed pro se. The court denied this request, and Defendant "moved" to correct the court's understanding of his request. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the superior court indeed disregarded Defendant's constitutional right when he "knowingly, intelligently" and with "awareness of the dangers of self-representation" requested to represent himself. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Towle " on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Mentus appealed his conviction on manslaughter charges. In 2008, he took a Lorcin handgun home to show his brother. In the car, he placed a full clip of ammuitio in the gun, and placed it in his pocket. Reaching in to move the gun from him pocket to underneath the car seat, it discharged, puncturing front-seat passenger Diedre Bydzyna's lung through the back of the seat. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by providing him with only $1,200 of the $3,000 he requested to hire a firearms expert, and (2) by overruling his objection to the State's closing argument. At a hearing, the trial judge said, "[T]hese are hard economic times. I’m not going to just easily approve $3,000 for a firearms expert." Based upon this statement, Defendant argued the judge denied his “request solely because of concerns about the source of funding" and that this amounted to reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of funds did not substantially prejudice him at trial. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecutor made no impermissible statements. Accordingly, the Cout held that the trial judge's overruling of Defendant's objections was not an abuse of discretion, and affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Mentus " on Justia Law

Defendant Jon French appealed a superior court order that suspended his deferred sentence. In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious sexual assault. Deferral of Defendant's sentence was conditioned upon his compliance "with a structured, residential program with 24 hour per day supervision." In 2010, Defendant moved to terminate his deferred sentence. The court held a hearing, at which the State presented the testimony of a clinical consultant to Defendant's treatment facility, who had been providing services to Defendant since he was in high school. The expert testified that while Defendant had the "potential" to be a danger to himself or to society "[t]he real issue here [was] his impulse to drift off that ... course of treatment, to do things that he knows that should be considered to be inappropriate." The trial court issued an order suspending Defendant's deferred sentence for a period of seven years "subject to the terms and conditions set out in the original mittimus of 1996." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's decision to suspend his sentence for an additional seven years violated his right to due process. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the language of the 1996 sentencing order the court retained only the authority to impose or terminate Defendant's deferred sentence. Thus, the court lacked authority to suspend sua sponte Defendant's deferred sentence. The Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. French " on Justia Law

Defendant Ivonne Hernandez was convicted by a jury for second degree murder, second degree assault and reckless conduct. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements she made to the police.On the evening of May 1, 2008, a drunken dispute between Defendant and four others ended when Defendant "turned her car around and drove directly towards the group." At trial, one witness testified that Defendant then revved her engine and accelerated towards the group. One attempted to jump out of the way, but the car hit her knee, causing a minor injury. The car also struck and severely injured another. Defendant argued at trial that the statement she gave to police recounting her version of events was involuntary and should have been suppressed. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Defendant's statements were the product of a free and unconstrained choice. "Based upon this evidence, [the court could not] say that the trial court's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "New Hampshire v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Soto appealed his conviction for being an accomplice to first degree murder. Defendant's conviction arose out of the fatal shooting of Aaron Kay in 2007. A man named Bill threatened Roney White's young cousins with a knife at a 7-Eleven store close to Roney's home. In retaliation, Roney tried to run over Bill and his companions with his car. Bill and another person then attacked Roney with a baseball bat. Defendant and his brother Sergio, met up with Roney and several of his companions, smoked marijuana, and settled on a plan to find Roney’s attackers and confront them. After one of the group confirmed that Defendant had brought a gun, the six men set out to find Roney's attackers. A short time later, they found a group of people whom they suspected had been involved in Roney's attack gathered near a dumpster. After driving past the group once or twice, they parked their car around the corner and discussed who would do the shooting. They settled on Roney's cousin as the shooter. Defendant then wiped the gun with his shirt, racked the slide to cock it, and handed it to the would-be shooter who left with a mask on, and shot Kay in the leg and abdomen. The men drove away. Kay later died from his wounds. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider whether the defendant acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation, thereby reducing his criminal liability from murder to manslaughter. The Supreme Court "never treated provocation manslaughter ...as a true 'defense' under the Criminal Code ...and we decline to do so today." The Court concluded that the undisputed facts culminating in Kar’s death revealed "no evidence upon which a provocation instruction was warranted." The Court concluded the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury, and upheld Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant William Ploof appealed a superior court order that committed him to the custody of the state Department of Corrections as a sexually violent predator. He argued on appeal that on its face, the statute under which he was committed violated his right to procedural due process, the state constitution's separation of powers provision, and his right to equal protection. Following a seven-day trial, the jury unanimously found that Defendant was a sexually violent predator and the trial court entered an order committing him to the custody of the department of corrections for a period of five years. Upon careful review of the process by which the state commits persons as a sexually violent predator, the governing statute and the pertinent case law, the Supreme Court remained unpersuaded by Defendant's arguments, and affirmed the superior court order. View "New Hampshire v. Ploof " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Horace King was convicted on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his supplemental motion for in camera review of the victim's medical and counseling records. The trial court found that Defendant "failed to articulate how the requested medical records would be material to his defense." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's record did not support its conclusion that the records were not material to Defendant's defense: "Defendant presented specific arguments to carry his burden... [the victim's] prior false allegation of sexual assault, her 'tendency to lie,' and the potential effects her ADD and ODD medical and counseling records may have on her competency as a witness." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law