Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a superior court’s grant of a motion to suppress statements made by defendant Caleb Marquis. Marquis was charged with several felonies relating t first- and second-degree burns to his girlfriend’s 16-month-old child in his care. The trial court ruled that defendant was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he gave the statements, and, because he was not given Miranda warnings, those statements were obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. The State contended that the entire interview should not be suppressed because, even if it became accusatory, it was not accusatory from start to end. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed after review of the record that the first few minutes of the interview were not accusatory and should not have been suppressed. Once an officer told defendant “it looks like you’re trying to be deceitful” and that “it potentially could be a criminal matter,” the interview became sufficiently accusatory that a reasonable person would believe himself to be in custody, and all subsequent statements should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order as to the statements made by the defendant prior to these two statements by the officer, but otherwise affirmed the court’s decision. View "New Hampshire v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Defendant LeeAnn O’Brien was convicted by jury of possession of a narcotic drug and control of a vehicle where a controlled drug was illegally kept. On appeal, she argued the superior court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of her vehicle following a motor vehicle stop. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the officer unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop for a defective license plate light by requesting the defendant’s consent to search her vehicle for drugs. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Lamontagne was convicted by jury on four counts of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Defendant and the victim were in a three-year romantic relationship. The relationship ended, but defendant and the victim stayed in contact. During the summer of 2019, defendant learned that the victim was in a relationship with another man. Defendant saw an image on the internet of a naked woman tied in ropes and hanging from a tree (the “bondage image”). The woman’s face was blurred and the image contained no information identifying her. Defendant believed the bondage image depicted the victim. Defendant sent the image to the victim through Facebook Messenger. This interaction led to a discussion of possible sexual activity in which defendant and the victim could engage, including making a video of them having sex. According to defendant, he and the victim formed an agreement whereby if the victim did not break up with her new boyfriend, defendant could send the video to whomever he wished. Defendant and the victim created the video, after this alleged agreement. According to the State, the sexual encounter and the filming of the video were consensual, but there was no agreement for the video’s release. Rather, the State contended that after making the video, defendant indicated that, amongst other things, the victim must see him once a week and end her relationship with her new boyfriend or defendant would release the video. The State contended that every time the victim tried to offer an excuse for why she could not see defendant, he would become angry and threaten to release the video. On August 4, 2019, defendant sent a video to four individuals. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony that he believed the bondage image depicted the victim. The trial court held, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, the proffered evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lamontagne" on Justia Law

Defendant David Tufano was convicted by jury for misdemeanor cruelty to animals. In 2019, Richard Roberge was working in his yard at his home in Somersworth. He heard a low, loud moaning noise coming from the defendant’s home across the street and went over to investigate. He saw the defendant with a hose in his hand spraying water into a plastic container. Inside the container was a “Havahart Trap” with a cat in it. He told the defendant to take the trap out of the bucket and open the trap, which the defendant did. The cat then ran off. Roberge did not immediately report the incident to police, but did so later, after other neighbors told him he should. Specifically, after his neighbor Sharon Barry told him about a prior incident in which defendant had placed a trap on his property, Roberge decided to contact the police. At trial, defendant objected to the trial court’s admission of any of Barry’s statements made about his cat trapping. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to allow him to impeach Barry with a prior conviction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an abuse of discretion. “While it was undisputed that the defendant sprayed the trapped cat inside a container, we cannot say that those facts alone ‘clearly constitute mistreatment of the cat that grossly deviates from what a reasonable person would do in the same situation.’” Because the erroneously-admitted evidence of prior cat trapping could have influenced the jury to view the defendant as a person who was “hostile toward cats” and likely to abuse or mistreat one, it could have led the jury to credit Roberge’s testimony over the defendant’s and to convict him of the charged offense. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Tufano" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Smart petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to order the Governor and Executive Council to reconsider whether to grant a hearing on the substance of her Petition for Commutation. Petitioner was serving a life-without-parole sentence for a conviction as an accomplice for first-degree murder. Petitioner submitted a Petition for Commutation, which requested a hearing before the Executive Council. She asked that her sentence be modified to eliminate the “without the possibility of parole” condition, and commuted to time served. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded petitioner’s challenge to the executive branch’s discretionary exercise of its clemency power sought a ruling on a nonjusticiable question. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Petition of Smart" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Woodburn was convicted by jury on one count of domestic violence, one count of simple assault, and two counts of criminal mischief. On appeal, he challenged only the domestic violence and simple assault convictions, arguing the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense. He also argued the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the complainant’s alleged prior acts of aggression against him, arguing that the evidence was admissible under either New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) or the verbal completeness and opening-the-door doctrines. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that the court’s failure to give a self-defense instruction was error, it reversed his convictions for domestic violence and simple assault, affirmed his criminal mischief convictions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Woodburn" on Justia Law

Defendant John Cullen was convicted by jury on two counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault and one count of sexual assault. One of the pattern indictments alleged sexual contact; the other alleged sexual penetration. Defendant appealed his convictions on the pattern indictments, arguing that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss the two pattern charges because the State failed to prove that “the acts relevant to each indictment occurred over a period of 2 months or more” and, with respect to the pattern sexual contact charge, that the victim was under the age of 13 when he committed those acts. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Cullen" on Justia Law

Defendant Philip Perez was convicted by jury of first-degree assault and conduct after an accident. Defendant argued appealing his convictions that the superior court erred in excluding evidence pertaining to statements that the victim made to hospital staff two days after the assault. The State argued any error relating to the trial court’s exclusion of the victim’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, defendant’s convictions should be affirmed. After review of the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred with the State and affirmed defendant’s convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Perez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marc Mallard appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus on grounds that it was procedurally defaulted and, even if it were not, that Mallard failed to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Mallard was charged with committing acts of domestic violence in 2012 against a romantic partner. Mallard was convicted by jury of second degree assault, attempted second degree assault, simple assault and criminal threatening. When his petition for a new trial was denied, Mallard petitioned for habeas relief, arguing that by describing him as a “big, menacing black guy” during cross-examination of the victim, trial counsel deprived him of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that because Mallard had “already fully litigated” a motion for a new trial based on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel — albeit on different grounds — his habeas petition was procedurally barred. To the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Mallard argued the trial court erred: (1) in finding his habeas petition was procedurally barred; and (2) in finding that he failed to establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The Supreme Court disagreed Mallard's petition was procedurally barred. Trial counsel’s improper appeal to racial bias in Mallard’s criminal case “effectively invited the jury to make a decision based on a characterization of the defendant and not on the evidence of his guilt or innocence.” Accordingly, the Court concluded Mallard established a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial, thereby satisfying that his trial counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of the case. Judgment was revered and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Laguerre appealed a superior court order denying his motion to amend bail. The court ruled that RSA 597:2, III(a) (Supp. 2022) did not authorize it to consider whether the conditions of confinement endangered defendant’s safety when deciding whether to order preventive detention. Defendant argued that RSA 597:2, III(a) permitted courts to consider the safety of a defendant, including factors pertaining to his or her health and safety while confined, when determining bail. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly interpreted RSA 597:2, III(a) as applied in this case and held that it did not authorize a court to consider the safety of a defendant while detained when deciding whether to grant bail. View "New Hampshire v. Laguerre" on Justia Law