Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal of a superior court order denying the State's request to compel Defendant Gary E. Marchand, to undergo a psychological evaluation by the State's expert. There were two issues presented to the Court: (1) does the right against self-incrimination prevent the State from compelling a defendant to undergo a psychological or psychiatric examination when he raises an insanity defense; and (2) if such examinations may be compelled, what procedures should trial courts use when ordering them? The Court answered the first question in the negative, and provide a procedural framework for courts to follow. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Marchand" on Justia Law

Defendant William Town was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault which occurred sometime between 1990 and 1992. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude a juror and by allowing the victim to testify about certain statements Defendant made. Furthermore, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after testimony suggestive of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct and by providing a deadlock jury instruction after twice learning of the jury's split. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to the disqualification of a juror, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Town" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court vacating the judgment in "New Hampshire v. Dilboy," (160 N.H. 135 (2010)) (Dilboy I), and remanding for further consideration in light of "Bullcoming v. New Mexico," (131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)). On remand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reconsidered only its holding on the Confrontation Clause issue. As to the other five issues, the Court's prior decision in Dilboy I remained unchanged. In Dilboy I, the Court affirmed the conviction of Defendant Anthony Dilboy, on two counts of manslaughter and two alternative counts of negligent homicide. The relevant issue before the Court in Dilboy I was whether the admission of certain evidence at trial violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On appeal in Dilboy I, Defendant did not challenge the admission of certain blood evidence on "transmittal slips." Rather, he contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the blood test results were non-testimonial, and, accordingly, that an expert's testimony at trial about the test results violated the Confrontation Clause. In its reconsideration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that though the transmittal slips were admitted into evidence, the Court declined to address Defendant’s Confrontation Clause arguments because Defendant did not address the issue in his brief in Dilboy I. "Indeed, the defendant did not even brief the issue after the Supreme Court vacated Dilboy I, but rather raises the issue for the first time in a supplemental brief filed in response to an order issued by this court." After reconsidering its decision in light of "Bullcoming" and thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court affirmed its prior holding. View "New Hampshire v. Dilboy " on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Forest, appealed a superior court decision that denied his request for pretrial confinement on his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and accomplice liability for burglary. In 2007, Defendant was arrested on a parole violation warrant for various parole violations unrelated to the burglary charges. At the time of his arrest, he was also a suspect in a burglary at the A-1 Gas Station in Goffstown. That same day or shortly thereafter, he was formally arrested on charges arising out of the burglary and he was unable to post bail. A month later, a second parole violation warrant was issued in relation to the burglary charges. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary parole violation hearing pending resolution of the burglary charges. Following his arrest, Defendant was initially housed at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections; however, at some point, he was transferred to the New Hampshire State Prison as a result of the parole violation warrants. The burglary charges were not adjudicated until September 9, 2010. Defendant had been incarcerated for 1,154 days. Defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial confinement credit toward any sentence on the burglary charges for the entire period of his incarceration following his arrest in 2007. Defendant argued that since he had not yet had a parole revocation hearing, his parole had not been revoked and, thus, the entire period of his incarceration constituted pretrial confinement on the burglary charges rather than any other sentence of confinement. That same day, Defendant pled guilty to the charges in this case as part of a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced on each charge to three and a half to seven years, stand committed, with all but six months of the minimum sentence suspended. The sentences ran concurrent with one another but consecutive to any “parole setback.” This appeal followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his rights and chose to wait for the burglary charges to be resolved before having a hearing before the parole board on the parole violation charges. "Had Defendant chosen to have a parole revocation hearing within forty-five days, he may have received a punishment for violating parole that he could have served pending resolution of the burglary charges. Any remaining time spent incarcerated before resolving the burglary charges would then have been allotted as pretrial confinement credit." The Court denied any pretrial credit and affirmed the superior court's order. View "New Hampshire v. Forest " on Justia Law

Free Bail Bonds appealed a district court's order that forfeited bonds guaranteeing the court appearance of Defendant Sean McGurk. Approximately one month before Defendant's scheduled appearance, he was arrested in Vermont and held in custody by the Vermont Department of Corrections pending trial there for offenses allegedly committed after the New Hampshire bonds were issued. The surety's representative then moved to revoke Defendant's bail. The trial court did not rule on this motion until Defendant's ongoing incarceration prevented him from appearing as scheduled. At that point, it forfeited bail over Defendant's objection. The surety moved to vacate the forfeiture order and, when its motion was denied, filed two motions to reconsider, both of which were also denied. The principal issue in this case concerned the forefeiture order and the denial of the surety's request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court rejected the surety's argument that the trial court treated the bonds as performance rather than appearance bonds. Although the court noted that Defendant's failure to appear resulted from his decision to travel to Vermont and commit crimes, the court's order made clear that it forfeited the bonds because Defendant failed to appear, not because of his criminal activity. The bonds guaranteed Defendant’s appearance, so the Court concluded forfeiture was entirely appropriate. View "New Hampshire v. McGurk " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Willey was convicted of one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial or in the alternative, for further curative instructions to the jury. He also argued that the trial court sentenced him based upon improper considerations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, but vacated his sentence: "[b]ecause [the Court could not] conclude either that the trial court 'clearly gave no weight' to the improper factors [the Court] identified, or that it would have imposed the same sentence but for any improper factors that it may have considered, [the Court] vacate[d] the defendant's sentence and remand[ed] for resentencing." View "New Hampshire v. Willey" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Fischer appealed a superior court order on his motions for pretrial bail, claiming that the court delegated authority to Strafford County Community Corrections (SCCC), which is managed by the Respondent, Superintendent of the Strafford County House of Corrections, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The written order stated that bail was set at $50,000 cash "[t]o convert to PR if found accep[table] by SCCC – Whether Bail is Posted or Converted all conditions apply." A pretrial motion to amend bail was denied, stating from the bench "[the judge was] just not going to order [SCCC] to do something it is not inclined to do. I have the power, and I have the discretion to do that, but I'm not going to in this case. The bail remains as is." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bail orders at issue here reflected "a cooperative accommodation among" the judicial and executive branches and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "Fischer v. Superintendent, Strafford County House of Corrections " on Justia Law

Defendant Roderick Davidson appealed his conviction by a jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of criminal mischief. He argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his motions in limine to exclude evidence that he "controlled" the complainant; and (2) denying his request for a defense of property instruction. In October 2009, Defendant and the complainant lived together. Consistent with their habit of "br[eaking] up every other day," Defendant broke up with the complainant. They nonetheless drove home together, napped together for about three hours, and then went to dinner together at a restaurant. After dinner, during which they both consumed some alcohol, Defendant drove the couple home, where they began to argue about money. The complainant insisted that they talk, and in an attempt to do so, Defendant grabbed her and threw her into a wall. The complainant ended up on her back at the bottom of the stairs with Defendant above her, and that his hand made contact with her face. The following day, the complainant had a bruised eye, which she tried to conceal with makeup. After speaking with several people, she ultimately decided to go to the police. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting "unlimited context" evidence as inherently prejudicial. In light of the Court's reversal of Defendant’s convictions for improperly admitted evidence, it did not reach Defendant’s jury instruction argument. View "New Hampshire v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant Derrick DiMaggio appealed a superior court's denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credit for approximately 471 days he participated in the Grafton County Drug Court Sentencing Program. Finding there was no dispute that he was entitled credit for at least sixty-three of those days (for failing to comply with the Program’s rules), the Supreme Court was asked to review whether Defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was at liberty while participating in the Program. The Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to pretrial confinement credit, and affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion. View "New Hampshire v. DiMaggio" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Guild appealed his conviction on one count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated felonious assault (ASFA) involving the same minor victim. He contended that the superior court erred by: (1) violating New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 615 and RSA 632-A:6, IV (2007) by failing to sequester the minor victim’s mother; (2) erroneously denied his motion to disqualify a juror without first conducting a voir dire of the juror; and (3) erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the AFSA charge. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that when, in a criminal trial, a trial court has violated Rule 615 and RSA 626:6, IV by failing to sequester a witness, a new trial is in order unless the State proves that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that rule to this case, the Court concluded that any presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Furthermore, because Defendant's conviction was supported by other substantial evidence, and because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim’s mother tailored her testimony to the victim’s testimony, the Court held that any error in failing to sequester the victim's mother was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the AFSA charge, the Court found Defendant did not preserve the argument for the Supreme Court’s review. Defendant’s convictions were upheld. View "New Hampshire v. Guild" on Justia Law