Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Brooks appealed his conviction following a jury trial for capital murder involving solicitation, capital murder in the course of a kidnapping, first degree murder (as an accomplice), and conspiracy to commit capital murder, in connection with the death of Jack Reid, Sr. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) permitting the State to authenticate documents by use of affidavits, rather than live testimony, in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) permitting an FBI agent to testify that the defendant's account may have been untruthful; (3) permitting the State to introduce a new opinion from the medical examiner during the trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury that it must determine the "predominating cause" of death, pursuant to "State v. Seymour;" (5) failing to instruct the jury that the solicitation variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant acted for his personal pecuniary gain; and (6) failing to instruct the jury that the kidnapping variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant intended to confine Reid to commit a crime other than murder. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Charest appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court following his conviction by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felon-in-possession charge, the trial court asked the jury to issue a special verdict on whether it unanimously found that the defendant possessed, rather than controlled or owned, a firearm. The jury answered "yes." The trial court sentenced the defendant to three to six years' imprisonment. The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of three years under RSA 651:2, II-g, which applies "[i]f a person is convicted of a felony, an element of which is the possession . . . of a deadly weapon, and the deadly weapon is a firearm." At sentencing, the trial judge explained to the defendant, "You were just sentenced to the minimum. . . . I don't have any discretion . . . to do anything other than to sentence you . . . to . . . those terms." The defendant did not appeal his conviction, but argued that the trial court erred when it imposed the minimum mandatory sentence under RSA 651:2, II-g because: (1) the offense he was charged with, RSA 159:3, I, did not have as an element the possession of a firearm in a manner that rendered it a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V; and (2) the jury did not find that he possessed a deadly weapon within the meaning of RSA 625:11, V. Because the defendant did not make these arguments before the trial court, he invoked the plain error rule, which allowed the Supreme Court to correct errors not raised before the trial court. Because the trial court erroneously failed to exercise the discretion afforded to it at sentencing, the Court found that the error affected the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, Defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Charest" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Dunn, III appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to vacate the imposition of a suspended sentence. In 2006, defendant pled guilty to one count of accomplice to burglary and one count of tampering with witnesses. Under the plea agreement, he was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of three and one-half to seven years, suspended for five years on the condition of his good behavior. On May 11, 2010, the Laconia District Court found defendant guilty of two counts of simple assault and one count of criminal threatening in connection with a physical altercation that occurred in 2009. Defendant appealed to the superior court for a jury trial. Later in May, the State filed a motion to impose the 2006 suspended sentence, alleging that the physical altercation constituted a violation of the good behavior requirement. The defendant requested that the hearing on the motion to impose be deferred until final disposition of the pending criminal trial. The State objected, and the court denied defendant's request. On July 6, 2011, defendant was tried by a jury on the charges stemming from the 2009 altercation. At trial, he argued that his actions were justified by self-defense. The jury acquitted him of all the charges. On July 21, defendant filed a motion to vacate the imposition of his sentence for the 2006 convictions. He argued that his actions in the 2009 altercation were justified by self-defense, as evidenced by the jury's acquittal on those charges, and, thus, he did not violate the good behavior requirement of his 2006 suspended sentence. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Defendant Logan Schulz appealed his convictions for being an accomplice to possession of cocaine, and an accomplice to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant for his home was unconstitutional both on its face and in its execution. In 2010, a Haverhill Police officer went to the home that Defendant shared with his mother to serve her with a notice against trespass and harassment. While lawfully inside the home, the officer saw three long guns near a staircase. Knowing that the defendant's mother was a convicted felon and prohibited from possessing firearms, the officer sought a warrant to search the home. Early in the search, they learned that the three guns near the staircase were, in fact, "BB" guns and were not unlawful for the defendant's mother to possess. The officers then continued the search and asked the defendant whether there were any additional guns in the house. The defendant informed them that he had a muzzle loader rifle and took them to his bedroom to show it to them. In the room, the officer observed a lock box large enough to contain a handgun but too small to contain a long gun, and told the defendant to open it, noting that the officers could open it by force if necessary. Both the defendant and his mother protested on the grounds that the police had no reason to believe they had a handgun. The defendant's mother then became upset and admitted that the lock box contained cocaine and money. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the police were required to discontinue their search after discovering that the guns they had believed to be firearms were, in fact, BB guns. The warrant contained no other facts upon which the police might have relied in continuing to believe that the search was justified. As a result, the officers' continued search of the defendant's home under authority of the warrant was unconstitutional. View "New Hampshire v. Schulz" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Ball appealed his conviction following a bench trial on stipulated facts one felony count of possessing child sexual abuse images (child pornography). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence derived from the search of his home computer. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ball" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order that dismissed charges filed against Defendant Burton Hollenbeck, Jr. because it determined that the statute upon which they were based violated Defendant's state and federal substantive due process rights. Defendant was a licensed psychologist who provided services to the complainant in 2007. Less than a year after the therapy ended, the two became sexually involved. In April 2010, defendant was charged with thirty counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) for engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant between February 1, 2008, and December 9, 2008. The indictments alleged that by engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant "within one year of the termination of their therapeutic relationship," defendant "act[ed] in a manner which is not professionally recognized as ethical," thereby violating RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1). In December 2010, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing, inter alia, that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) violated his state and federal rights to substantive due process because it "criminalizes the private sexual conduct of consenting adults." The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed. Because defendant did not meet his burden of proving that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in all circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that his facial challenge failed. The Court reached the same result under the Federal Constitution as it did under the State Constitution because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances. View "New Hampshire v. Hollenbeck, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Saad Moussa appealed his convictions, and sentences on three counts of stalking entered following a jury trial in Superior Court. In 2005, the Rockingham County grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant, each alleging a separate incident of stalking the victim, to whom he had been married for approximately eleven years. According to the victim's testimony, they were divorced at the time of trial. Each charged incident involved the defendant allegedly sending a letter to the victim "after having been served with or otherwise provided notice of a protective order issued by the Salem Family Court on 12/10/04, that prohibited him from having contact with [her]." The defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him to choose between self-representation and representation by a lawyer he wanted to dismiss; (2) making certain evidentiary rulings; (3) denying his request for counsel at sentencing; and (4) imposing felony sentences. Finding no error in the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Moussa" on Justia Law

Defendant Josiah Davies appealed a district court order that partially denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Defendant was charged with two counts of false imprisonment and one count of simple assault following a single incident of alleged domestic violence. On June 1, 2009, he appeared pro se for arraignment on the three class A misdemeanor charges. Prior to his arraignment, he spoke with the prosecutor regarding a potential plea agreement. During this discussion, Defendant indicated his intention to plead guilty, and then signed the acknowledgement and waiver of rights form that the prosecutor provided him. At this time, he was nineteen years old and had a GED and some technical college experience. The scheduled arraignment then went forward as a plea hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not enter a valid guilty plea because he was not advised of the essential elements of the simple assault charge. He contended, therefore, that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as required by Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and no violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. View "New Hampshire v. Davies" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial in Superior Court Defendant, Bryan Alwardt was convicted of second degree assault and criminal restraint based on accomplice liability principles. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to dismiss the assault charge due to insufficient evidence; (2) failing to dismiss the criminal restraint charge as against the weight of the evidence; (3) not ordering disclosure of all of the victim’s counseling records; and (4) prohibiting cross-examination of the victim regarding certain drugs found in her boyfriend’s apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Alwardt" on Justia Law

D.B. appealed the Manchester Family Division's finding of delinquency based on misdemeanor sexual assault. D.B. was accused of inappropriately touching and subsequently threatening the female complainant while the two rode home on the school bus. On appeal, D.B. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complainant’s direct testimony indicated that D.B. put his hand down her shirt and touched her breasts. She further stated that the he put his hand down her pants and “ran it” down to her ankle. This evidence failed to describe in what way the juvenile overcame her with the actual application of physical force. Nor did the surveillance video from the bus support the State’s position. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to charge D.B. with misdemeanor sexual assault within the meaning of RSA 632-A:2, I(a). The Family Division's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.B. " on Justia Law