Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Paul was convicted by jury on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of marijuana, and one count of the sale of a substance represented to be LSD. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court failed to comply with RSA 519:23-a (Supp. 2013) by declining to give the jury nullification instruction he requested and by giving other jury instructions that effectively contravened his "jury nullification defense." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Rawnsley was convicted by jury of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it failed to strike certain testimony by defendant's ex-wife. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Rawnsley" on Justia Law

Defendant Myles Webster appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted murder, armed robbery, reckless conduct, and resisting arrest. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motions to suppress eyewitness identification evidence and for a change of venue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Webster" on Justia Law

Defendant James Perry was indicted on one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of criminal restraint arising out of a single course of conduct in late 2011. A jury convicted defendant on both counts, but, because the offenses arose out of the same uninterrupted course of conduct, the trial court sentenced defendant only on the attempted kidnapping conviction, while holding the criminal restraint conviction in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant when she had not made a prior out-of-court identification; and (2) sentencing him for a class A felony when the indictment failed to allege, and the jury was not instructed to find, a fact necessary for that level offense; namely, that he did not “voluntarily release[] the victim without serious bodily injury and in a safe place prior to trial.” Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s kidnapping conviction, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with class B felony standards. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Paul Costella on two counts of criminal threatening, and one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant brought his car to Wal-Mart for an oil change. Jane Sylvestre, an employee in the automobile department, drove the defendant’s car into the service bay. While in the defendant’s car, Sylvestre saw a photograph of the defendant and his daughter in front of a red flag with a swastika on it. Sylvestre took offense because the Nazis had killed her uncle, who had been a member of the French resistance. After parking the car in the service bay, Sylvestre returned to the service area, where she told the defendant that she had the right to refuse service to customers with whom she was uncomfortable. In response, the defendant asked Sylvestre if she was a Jew. After the oil change had been completed, a second employee handed the car keys to the defendant. As Sylvestre started to process the invoice, the defendant asked her if she had seen his gun, saying, "It’s a Jew killing killer." He also accused Sylvestre of "wreck[ing]" his car because she was "a stupid Jew that doesn’t know how to drive a car." The defendant then paid his bill. As he was leaving, the defendant declared (to no one in particular, but audibly, and within earshot of Sylvestre) that he was "getting his gun to kill the Jew b***h behind the counter." Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct and charged with two counts of criminal threatening, one count for his statements to Sylvestre, and the other for his statements to other store employees. Prior to trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to the hate crime statute it would seek enhanced penalties on the criminal threatening charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the superior court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss the hate crime enhancement; and (2) excluded the testimony of his daughter that he was not motivated by hostility towards Judaism. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Costella" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Superior Court defendant, Timothy McKenna was convicted of six counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court found no evidence in that before or during his interrogation defendant was told that he was free to leave the property or informed of his Miranda rights. Nor was there evidence that the officers informed him that he was free to ask them to leave the property, or that he was not required to answer their questions. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McKenna" on Justia Law

The respondents were convicted of first degree murder for offenses committed when they were seventeen years old. Accordingly, they each received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On June 25, 2012, after all of the respondents’ convictions had become final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). In this Rule 11 petition, the State appealed the superior court's determination that the rule announced in "Miller" applied retroactively to the respondents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Petition of New Hampshire" on Justia Law