Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Colleen Carr was convicted by jury on one count of felony criminal solicitation of accomplice to insurance fraud, and two counts of felony witness tampering. These charges arose out of a scheme defendant proposed in 2013, to burn down a commercial building she owned in Milford to collect the insurance proceeds. Defendant approached one of her tenants about her proposal, even offering the tenant to move things he wanted to keep, and cash money to "leave for two weeks." Afraid he would lose everything, the tenant informed authorities of defendant's plan. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the criminal solicitation indictment; (2) declining to give the jury two of her requested instructions; and (3) denying her motion to dismiss the second witness tampering conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The defendant also argued the evidence was insufficient to convict her of criminal solicitation and of one of the witness tampering charges. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Carr" on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth Cloutier was convicted by jury on one count of burglary. The defendant was a friend of the victim and had recently helped the victim locate a safe that had been stolen from her home. Defendant went to the Berlin Police Department to take a voluntary polygraph test in connection with the investigation with that burglary. The defendant then signed a form acknowledging that she had read the enumerated rights and understood them. She also signed a form stating that she agreed to take the polygraph test. She was advised of her Miranda rights. Before the test began, defendant was asked if she had any involvement with the burglary. She denied any involvement. After four hours of questioning, defendant admitted her involvement in the burglary, explaining how she and two others took the safe, opened it and stole the contents. On appeal of her conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her confession. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant was convicted of murdering Susan Randall. At the time of the murder, the police obtained fingernail clippings from Randall. Between 2000 and 2008, by various motions to the trial court, defendant obtained multiple rounds of DNA testing on the fingernail clippings; however, none of these tests led to post-conviction relief because defendant could not be excluded as the DNA contributor. In 2012, defendant, with the State’s consent, obtained further DNA testing on the remaining clippings. This most recent testing, which used new and more sensitive technology, produced results which, for the first time, showed that the clippings contained DNA material from two different males. Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the male DNA profiles, but was excluded as a contributor of the second. Based on the 2012 test results, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that RSA chapter 651-D empowered the court to order a new trial when a defendant has obtained favorable DNA test results. The trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) did not apply to DNA testing obtained with the State’s consent. After review, the Supreme Court agreed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Paul was convicted by jury on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of marijuana, and one count of the sale of a substance represented to be LSD. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court failed to comply with RSA 519:23-a (Supp. 2013) by declining to give the jury nullification instruction he requested and by giving other jury instructions that effectively contravened his "jury nullification defense." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Rawnsley was convicted by jury of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it failed to strike certain testimony by defendant's ex-wife. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Rawnsley" on Justia Law

Defendant Myles Webster appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted murder, armed robbery, reckless conduct, and resisting arrest. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motions to suppress eyewitness identification evidence and for a change of venue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Webster" on Justia Law