Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, defendant Kevin Balch was convicted on two counts of burglary, six counts of receiving stolen property, and six counts of violating the armed career criminal statute. On appeal, defendant challenged the sentence imposed pursuant to the armed career criminal statute, and argued that the trial court erred by construing it to: (1) permit a conviction and sentence for each individual firearm he possessed on a single occasion; (2) require that each sentence be served consecutively rather than concurrently; and (3) prohibit the trial court from deferring some or all of said sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Balch" on Justia Law

Defendant Taneal Broadus was convicted by jury on one felony count each of possession of oxycodone and codeine, and one misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana. She challenged only the felony convictions, arguing on appeal that the superior court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence of the oxycodone and codeine obtained after an unconstitutional search. Defendant did not dispute the legality of the initial traffic stop for littering. Upon review of the facts in the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that from the totality of the circumstances, the frisk in this case was not supported by particularized and objective facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and presently dangerous: neither defendant nor the driver was suspected of having committed, or being about to commit, a violent offense. Further, defendant had no outstanding warrants, complied with the officer's requests during the stop, and made no threatening or furtive movements during the stop. Moreover, the stop did not occur in a high crime area. Therefore, the Court held that that the trial court erroneously concluded that the frisk was valid. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court found only that Locke “could have” arrested her; it did not decide how likely it was that the officer “would have” arrested her. Nor did it appear that the parties fully litigated in the trial court how probable the defendant’s arrest would have to be in order to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the likelihood defendant would have been arrested. On remand, even though defendant did not appeal her conviction for marijuana possession, she may argue, as she did on appeal, that the oxycodone and codeine would not have been “inevitably discovered,” in part, because there was no probable cause to arrest her for possession of marijuana. View "New Hampshire v. Broadus" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Roy was convicted by jury on two counts of kidnapping, on count of first degree assault, four counts of second degree assault, one count of criminal restraint, and two counts of simple assault. These charges stemmed from a night of drinking; that night defendant allegedly failed to take his prescription medications for depression and alcoholism. The night would end with one of his live-in girlfriend's three children having been seriously injured: the child had extensive bruising all over his body, especially in his abdominal area. His pancreas was severely injured, and he had lost approximately half of his blood due to internal bleeding. Part of his bowel was torn, which had caused the contents of his bowel to spill into his abdomen. Doctors performed multiple surgeries on him. During his recovery, he required the use of a feeding tube for 11 months. On appeal, defendant argued the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellular telephone; (2) motions in limine to both admit and exclude certain evidence; (3) motion to dismiss during trial based upon the State’s alleged failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence; and (4) subsequent motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict in which he alleged that there was insufficient evidence to convict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant Colleen Carr was convicted by jury on one count of felony criminal solicitation of accomplice to insurance fraud, and two counts of felony witness tampering. These charges arose out of a scheme defendant proposed in 2013, to burn down a commercial building she owned in Milford to collect the insurance proceeds. Defendant approached one of her tenants about her proposal, even offering the tenant to move things he wanted to keep, and cash money to "leave for two weeks." Afraid he would lose everything, the tenant informed authorities of defendant's plan. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the criminal solicitation indictment; (2) declining to give the jury two of her requested instructions; and (3) denying her motion to dismiss the second witness tampering conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The defendant also argued the evidence was insufficient to convict her of criminal solicitation and of one of the witness tampering charges. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Carr" on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth Cloutier was convicted by jury on one count of burglary. The defendant was a friend of the victim and had recently helped the victim locate a safe that had been stolen from her home. Defendant went to the Berlin Police Department to take a voluntary polygraph test in connection with the investigation with that burglary. The defendant then signed a form acknowledging that she had read the enumerated rights and understood them. She also signed a form stating that she agreed to take the polygraph test. She was advised of her Miranda rights. Before the test began, defendant was asked if she had any involvement with the burglary. She denied any involvement. After four hours of questioning, defendant admitted her involvement in the burglary, explaining how she and two others took the safe, opened it and stole the contents. On appeal of her conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her confession. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant was convicted of murdering Susan Randall. At the time of the murder, the police obtained fingernail clippings from Randall. Between 2000 and 2008, by various motions to the trial court, defendant obtained multiple rounds of DNA testing on the fingernail clippings; however, none of these tests led to post-conviction relief because defendant could not be excluded as the DNA contributor. In 2012, defendant, with the State’s consent, obtained further DNA testing on the remaining clippings. This most recent testing, which used new and more sensitive technology, produced results which, for the first time, showed that the clippings contained DNA material from two different males. Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the male DNA profiles, but was excluded as a contributor of the second. Based on the 2012 test results, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that RSA chapter 651-D empowered the court to order a new trial when a defendant has obtained favorable DNA test results. The trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) did not apply to DNA testing obtained with the State’s consent. After review, the Supreme Court agreed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law