Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christopher Kean appealed a superior court order granting in part and denying in part his motion for return of property. Defendant, while wearing an official but discontinued Manchester Police jacket, was observed by a Manchester Police Officer walking in front of a Manchester Police Department substation. Although the jacket had been discontinued in 1999, it bore a current Manchester Police Department patch. The officer stopped defendant, concerned that a passerby might mistake him for a police officer. Defendant stated that an attorney had confirmed that it was legal for him to wear the jacket, but the officer told him that continued wearing of the jacket would likely subject him to arrest for impersonating a police officer. Defendant was not arrested at that time. The next day, defendant, wearing the same jacket, was again observed walking past the Manchester Police Department substation, this time by a different Manchester Police Officer. Aware of the prior encounter, defendant was placed under arrest for impersonating a police officer. At trial, the case was dismissed, in part because of the Stateís inability to produce a material witness to the alleged crime. Defendant then moved for the return of the jacket. Following a hearing, the court found that the jacket, and implicitly the patch, were "at all times the property of the City of Manchester." However, the trial court ordered that the jacket be returned to defendant, subject to the condition that the Manchester Police patch be removed from the jacket sleeve. The court found that forfeiture of the patch best served the public interest. This appeal followed. Defendant contended that: the State had the burden of disproving his ownership; the State did not meet its burden; and that the trial court, therefore, erred in finding that defendant was not the rightful owner of the patch. The Supreme Court found, after review, that the trial court did not err in finding that the State had demonstrated ownership of the jacket and patch by the City of Manchester. The trial court did err, however, in ordering that the jacket be returned to the defendant, finding that the trial court may have ordered forfeiture to the State without first providing notice to the City of Manchester. As such the trial court's order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Kean" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Louise Pinault was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in Hollis. She was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and with violating the “conduct after an accident” statute. Following a bench trial, during which defendant represented herself, she was acquitted on the DUI charge, but was convicted on a conduct after an accident charge. As part of her sentence, she was ordered to pay $525 in restitution for property damage. Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the complaint alleging conduct after an accident was insufficient and that the restitution order was improper. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court improperly ordered restitution because the only offense for which she was convicted did not cause any economic loss; and (2) the complaint against her was insufficient to support her conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found: (1) the plain language of the restitution statute clearly and unambiguously required a causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or damage, and the crime for which the defendant was convicted necessarily occurred afterward. As the damage was already done, the defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause the economic loss suffered; and (2) the alleged deficiency in the complaint did not affect the outcome of the case, therefore failing to demonstrate plain error. View "New Hampshire v. Pinault" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2012, Joseph Jennings was arrested on drug-related charges and released on personal recognizance bail to the custody of defendant. That day, he was also served with a temporary order of protection that prohibited him, and third parties acting on his behalf, from contacting a certain woman. Approximately 45 minutes after Jennings was released, the woman reported that defendant Amy Mouser was contacting her on Jennings’s behalf, in violation of the protective order. Police went to the woman’s residence, where he retrieved drug paraphernalia that the woman said belonged to Jennings. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug (cocaine). On appeal, she argued that the Superior Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence after a search of her vehicle. After review of the specific facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error in denying her motion, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "New Hampshire v. Mouser" on Justia Law

Respondent Jerry Roberts was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and sentenced to four-to-ten years at the New Hampshire State Prison. Respondent also received a sentence of one-to-two years for related conduct; that sentence was suspended. Respondent began serving his four-to-ten year sentence in 2008. On April 1, 2013, the respondent was classified as a C-1 inmate and resided in a halfway house at the prison. While at the halfway house, respondent was arrested and consequently returned to general population status in the prison. Following his arrest, the State moved to impose his one-to-two year suspended sentence. The Superior Court partially granted the State’s motion: it imposed the one-year minimum sentence, which was to be served consecutively to the four-to-ten year sentence, but suspended the two-year maximum of the sentence. In August 2013, respondent appeared before the Adult Parole Board (APB) after he had served the minimum four years of his AFSA sentence. At that time, he was “approved for parole to consecutive,” and his parole hearing paperwork indicated that he must have “review prior to release consideration” with the Administrative Review Committee (ARC). Upon completion of his one-year consecutive sentence in August 2014, the respondent was not released from the prison into the community. Instead, he continued serving his original four-to-ten year sentence. The State asserted that the respondent was not released because he had not yet completed the required sexual offender treatment program. The respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to immediate release from the prison because he had been paroled from his four-to-ten year sentence to his one-year consecutive sentence, and he had completed the one-year sentence. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the respondent was not entitled to immediate release because the APB had not granted him “parole to release” from prison, but instead had merely granted him “parole to a consecutive sentence,” and thus the APB retained the authority to determine whether he should be released upon completion of the consecutive sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, granted the respondent’s petition, and ordered that the respondent be released from prison. Thereafter, the State sought certiorari review of the trial court’s order, arguing the Adult Parole Board (APB) exceeded its authority or otherwise violated respondent's rights when it paroled him to a consecutive sentence but then refused to release him from prison upon his completion of the minimum term of that sentence. The Supreme Court held that the APB’s actions were not improper and therefore reversed the Superior Court's order granting respondent habeas relief. View "Petition of Warden, New Hampshire State Prison " on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Steven Collins was convicted on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). All three charges involved the same victim: the AFSA charge alleged a “pattern” of sexual assaults occurring on or between January 1, 2009, and November 30, 2009; and the two FSA charges alleged specific instances of sexual assault occurring within that same time period. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more;” (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in sentencing defendant, and agreed that double jeopardy would have been violated had defendant been convicted of two discrete acts of FSA and convicted of a pattern AFSA that relied upon the same discrete acts. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the Supreme Court vacate the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction nor that the Court vacate the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Collins was convicted by jury on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). The three charges involved the same victim. The AFSA charge alleged a "pattern" of sexual assaults and the two FSA charged alleged specific instances of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more” as required by RSA 632-A:1, I-c (2007); (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court as to defendant's first two alleged errors on appeal. With regard to his Double Jeopardy claim, in the absence of a jury instruction, the Court had no way of knowing whether defendant was being punished twice for the same act. Accordingly, since the Court could not exclude the possibility that defendant was subjected to multiple punishments for the same act, it concluded that defendant’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution were violated. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction or the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Armando Lisasuain was convicted by jury of, among other offenses, two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, the argued that the trial court: (1) erred by finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove lack of consent by the victim on the aggravated felonious sexual assault charges; (2) may have erred by not disclosing more documents from its in camera review of certain of the victim’s records; and (3) erred by not allowing cross-examination of a police officer as to the nature and duration of his interrogation of the defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lisasuain" on Justia Law

The State appealed a circuit court order that dismissed the habitual offender prosecution of defendant Steven Laux based upon the State’s failure to provide discovery prior to the preliminary, or probable cause, hearing in accordance with the court’s standing discovery order. When the State indicated it would not comply with the order, the court postponed the probable cause hearing and allowed the parties “to brief the issue of whether or not discovery could be ordered by the Circuit Court for a Probable Cause Hearing.” The court concluded that it had inherent authority to order discovery and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case for the State’s noncompliance. On appeal, the State argued that the circuit court lacked authority to order discovery of police reports prior to a probable cause hearing. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court exceeded its authority in requiring, through promulgation of section IV of its standing discovery order, the disclosure of prepared police reports in all cases. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Laux" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lincoln police charged defendant Jeffrey Maxfield with criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor offense. The complaint alleged that defendant had recklessly damaged another’s property at a motel in Lincoln. A justice of the peace issued an arrest warrant one week later, but defendant was not arrested until 2013. The State filed the complaint in court three days after the defendant’s arrest. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the delay between the issuance of the arrest warrant and his arrest violated his rights to a speedy trial, due process, and fundamental fairness under both the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. The trial court denied this motion. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider, which the court also denied. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that the charge was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanor level offenses. The trial court granted this second motion to dismiss. In denying the State’s motion to reconsider, the trial court stated that it “was unreasonable for there to be a delay of eighteen months between the commencement of prosecution and the commencement of the adversarial proceeding.” This appeal followed. The Supreme Court found in its review of the State's arguments on appeal that under the plain language of the statute, the one-year limitations period for the defendant’s criminal mischief charge began to run on December 15, 2011, the day after all the elements of the alleged offense had occurred. Because the language of RSA 625:8 was plain and unambiguous, and because the Court refused to "add language to a statute that the legislature did not see fit to include," the trial court erred by reading a reasonableness standard into the statute. The Court found that the statute of limitations was not violated in this case, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the State's complaint. View "New Hampshire v. Maxfield" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Scott was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder, and one count of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant confronted his eventual victim over alleged money owed. Defendant raised multiple issues of alleged error from the trial court proceedings. Reviewing each one, but finding none were reversible in defendant's favor, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Scott" on Justia Law