Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Oscar Grande of armed robbery. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to contest the admission of evidence concerning an uncharged robbery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Grande" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Farrelly appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Concord police officers Walter Carroll and Eric Pichler and the City of Concord (city), on grounds that defendants were entitled to official and vicarious immunity. Plaintiff was charged with harassing his ex-girlfriend. Carroll and Pichler drafted the criminal complaint against the plaintiff. Ultimately, the charges against plaintiff were dropped. Plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for: (1) malicious prosecution (count I); (2) false imprisonment (count II); (3) violation of his rights of free speech and against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New Hampshire Constitution (count III); and (4) negligence (count IV). The court rejected the defendants’ arguments based upon RSA 594:13 and RSA 594:10, and found that the warrantless arrest was unlawful. However, the court ruled that the defendants were immune from suit. The court granted summary judgment to the city on count IV (negligence) because it concluded that the exception to municipal immunity found in RSA 507-B:2 (2010) does not apply, as the claim asserted therein has no nexus to cars or premises. This case presented a question of whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in "Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co.," (156 N.H. 202 (2007)) applied to intentional torts. The Court concluded that it did, and that the language set forth in "Huckins v. McSweeney," (166 N.H. 176 (2014)) had to be interpreted consistently with the standard articulated in Everitt. Although the Court found this to be a close case, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Farrelly v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Craig Sanborn on two counts each of manslaughter and negligent homicide as the result of an explosion that killed two employees at his gunpowder factory. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms in the state prison on the manslaughter convictions only. On appeal, defendant challenged, among other things, the manner in which the jury was selected, the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict, and the sentences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Sanborn" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Palermo on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, one count of criminal trespass, and two counts of simple assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) ruling that the State sufficiently authenticated certain Facebook messages; (2) admitting evidence of his prior incarceration, parole status, and civil lawsuit against the New Hampshire State Prison; and (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of him. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Palermo" on Justia Law

Defendant Marianne King was convicted by jury on one count of theft by unauthorized taking. At trial, defendant argued that it was error to instruct the jury that “if there is a conflict between witnesses who offer direct evidence concerning certain facts, you must decide which witness to believe.” She argued that this instruction, which, for the purposes of this appeal (“the Germain direct-evidence instruction”), was “misleading” because it conflicted with the State’s burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the instruction. After review, the Supreme Court made a slight adjustment to the wording of the instruction that the trial court repeated verbatim, but otherwise affirmed the judgment and conviction. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant Samuel Pennock, appealed his conviction by a jury of felony simple assault, and the superior court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence and for a new trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) substantively admitting the victim’s pretrial oral and written statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (N.H. R. Ev. 803(2)); (2) denying his motion to dismiss the simple assault charge; (3) denying his post-conviction motion to reduce that charge to a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly; and (4) denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Pennock" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a Michigan-based company that “assists corporations in complying with regulations associated with the conduct of corporate business by supplying annual corporate consent documents” by way of direct mail. Defendant mailed solicitations to potential customers. Its New Hampshire mailing address was “a private mailbox used as a clearinghouse to receive and bundle orders from New Hampshire customers.” According to defendant, as a result of these direct mailings, it made sales in New Hampshire totaling $12,625. A grand jury indicted defendant on 27 felony violations of the Consumer Protection Act, encompassing three sets of nine charges, all stemming from defendant’s allegedly deceptive use of the New Hampshire mailing address in 2013. The State appealed a Superior Court order dismissing the 27 indictments, ruling that the indictments were defective because they alleged that the defendant acted with the mental state of “knowingly,” and not “purposely.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Gilley was convicted on one count of class A felony burglary. The burglary statute elevated the offense from a class B to a class A felony when it was "perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night." Before trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class A felony indictment, arguing that the house he had burglarized was not the dwelling of another and, therefore, did not trigger the felony enhancement under that statute. He contended that the house had ceased to be the "dwelling of another" because its resident had moved out and listed the house for sale. The Superior Court denied the motion. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the house did not lose its character as a dwelling when left vacant and listed for sale, it affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Gilley" on Justia Law