Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Amadou Diallo appealed the extended term of imprisonment imposed by the Superior Court after his conviction for felonious sexual assault. He argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the State provided sufficient notice of its intent to seek an extended sentence, and because of that lack of notice, he asked the Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Supreme Court denied his request and affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Diallo" on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law

Defendant David Aldrich appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued the trial court erred by preventing him from cross-examining the victim about three of four allegedly false allegations of sexual assault that she had made against other men. He also challenged the court’s failure to disclose material following an in camera review. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Adams, Jr. appealed his convictions of reckless conduct, and simple assault. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by: (1) recalling the jury to correct an error in the verdict on the reckless conduct charge; (2) denying his motion to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial; and (3) prohibiting him from introducing evidence of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, he filed a motion asking the trial court to order, among other things, “the State to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve all cell phone activity of [complainant] including voice mails, text messaging, e-mails, social media postings and photographs by making a mirror image of all cell phones utilized by [complainant].” Defendant also requested that the court order the State to “mak[e] immediate preservation and production requests of all service providers including, but not limited to cell phone[] carriers, Facebook and any other social media or communication provider with which [the complainant] had an account.” The State objected, arguing, among other things, that “[d]efendants generally do not have the legal authority to direct an investigation or demand that the State investigate, obtain, and preserve specific evidence.” Defendant responded in his motion that he was “not seeking discovery . . . but rather the preservation of” the records and communications. At the time the defendant filed his motion, the State did not possess any of the records or communications that defendant was seeking. The trial court granted defendant's proposed order, which compelled the State to obtain and produce the records for in camera inspection. The State appealed when its motion for reconsideration was denied. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that there were other procedural means through which defendant could obtain the records, and that the trial court did not have authority to grant the motion to compel them as it did. View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Long appealed a superior court order imposing a portion of his previously-suspended sentences based on findings that he violated the "no-contact" provision of those sentences by filing a petition to establish a parenting plan for his and the victim's child. Long had kidnapped the victim who had been at the time, pregnant with Long's child. Long pled guilty to six criminal charges for which prison sentences were imposed. All sentences included the provision. In August 2014, Long filed a petition in the circuit court to establish a parenting plan for his and the victim’s child. In the petition, Long wanted a "[m]ediator [a]ppointed to help [him and the victim] to create a Parenting Plan." Long also averred that he had had no contact with the child and that there was "currently a restraining order in full effect." He requested that the court send the victim “[a]ll copies of Motions, Notification[s], [and] Financial Affidavits” on his behalf. He did not mention the no-contact provision of his sentences. According to Long (and apparently not disputed by the State), the victim accepted service of the petition at the courthouse, after having been contacted by the court. Thereafter, she filed a petition to terminate the defendant’s parental rights. Thereafter, the State moved to impose portions of Long's suspended sentences. The trial court found that the no-contact provisions were clear and unambiguous and that by filing the parenting petition, Long willfully violated them. Accordingly, the trial court granted the State's motion. The Supreme Court reversed: "On the surface, the disposition of this case might appear straightforward. [. . .] But we cannot simply say 'end of story' and resolve the case on this basis because there are broader constitutional principles at stake. Here, the sentencing order did not give the defendant fair warning that filing the parenting petition constituted 'contact' such that his suspended sentences could be imposed." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Long" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Gay was convicted by jury of second degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. He appealed the convictions, arguing the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure. Furthermore, he argued that the Trial Court erred in excluding evidence of an “alternative perpetrator” and in allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding certain footwear impressions. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gay" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominick Stanin, Sr. appealed a Superior Court decision to impose his two previously suspended sentences. In June 2014, defendant was arrested for loitering (a violation-level offense), and resisting arrest (a misdemeanor). Those charges were tried in September 2014. The trial court acquitted the defendant of the loitering charge and placed the resisting arrest matter “on file without a finding.” In August 2014, defendant was charged with first degree assault, robbery, and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, for his involvement in a stabbing incident. He was subsequently also charged with misdemeanor resisting arrest in connection with the August incident. In October 2014, the State moved to impose the defendant’s two consecutive three-and-one-half-to-seven-year sentences on the ground that his June and August charges established that he had violated the condition of good behavior. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion in limine seeking to limit the State’s cross-examination of him or, alternatively, to “sever” the bases for the motion to impose. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Stanin" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order dismissing the charges against defendant Drew Fuller. The court ruled that the 2014 amendments to RSA chapter 169-B, which vested jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents ages 17 and under in the family division of the circuit court, applied retroactively to his case. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Defendant Arthur Kardonsky appealed a circuit court's finding that he was guilty of the violation-level offense of driving after suspension of his driver’s license. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by ruling that this violation-level offense did not require the mens rea of “knowingly.” Because the Supreme Court agreed, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Kardonsky" on Justia Law