Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Hjalmar Bjorkman was convicted by jury on one count of using computer services for a prohibited purpose. He challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, contending that jury selection did not fulfill the requirement under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) that a defendant be “brought to trial” within 180 days of filing a request for final disposition. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Bjorkman’s conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Bjorkman" on Justia Law

Defendant Owen Labrie appealed his conviction by jury on three counts of sexual assault, one count of endangering the welfare of a child, and one count of using computer services for a prohibited purpose. He challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under RSA 649-B:4, I(a); (2) the trial court’s decision not to allow certain cross-examination by the defendant of a State’s witness; and (3) the trial court’s failure to sua sponte correct statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Labrie" on Justia Law

Defendant Sean Stacey appealed his convictions on one felony count and one misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled drug. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of the drugs he was convicted of possessing. At issue was a warrantless search and seizure; police procured a warrant five days after the seizure, which defendant argued was an unreasonable delay such that police did not have probable cause to support his arrest. Finding this argument unavailing in light of New Hampshire caselaw precedent, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Stacey" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire appealed a superior court order granting defendant Shannon Glavan's motion to suppress evidence seized from her automobile. Defendant was discovered sleeping in the driver's seat in a gas station parking lot. The station had been closed since 11:00 PM; she was discovered at 1:45 AM. The officer that found defendant sleeping shone a light into the car and saw a "loaded syringe containing a clear, reddish liquid" by her leg. The officer believed the syringe to contain narcotics. The officer asked defendant to exit the car, not to touch the syringe to avoid being stuck by the needle. The syringe later tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. In granting her motion to suppress, the trial court concluded there was no recognized automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the State Constitution, and the plain view doctrine did not authorize the officer's warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle. On the facts of this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the defendant’s automobile was stopped in transit, and the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. View "New Hampshire v. Glavan" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Wilbur was the former stepfather of the alleged victim (child) in the case. In 2007, the child disclosed she had been sexually assaulted by defendant. Defendant was subsequently indicted on charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), but the State nol prossed the charges in April 2009. In 2010, defendant was re-indicted on: (1) one count of AFSA alleging a single act of digital penetration; (2) one count of AFSA alleging a pattern of digital penetration; (3) one count of AFSA alleging a single act of penile penetration; and (4) one count of AFSA alleging a pattern of penile penetration. In May 2011, a jury found defendant guilty on the two counts of AFSA alleging digital penetration, and acquitted him on the two counts of penile penetration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. In June 2014, defendant moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed; defendant alleged his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient in four respects: (1) failure to rebut the State’s characterization of the defendant’s statement to the police; (2) lack of preparation of the mother for her testimony; (3) introduction of evidence of a prior sexual assault committed against the child by another person without a reasonable strategy; and (4) failure to object to opinion testimony given by a child protective services (CPS) worker. Because the Supreme Court agreed with defendant with respect to claims (1) and (4), the Court found it unnecessary to examine claims (2) and (3). The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Wilbur" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Foad Afshar a new trial following his convictions on one count of simple assault, two counts of unlawful mental health practice, and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, the State argued the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when, during a post-verdict hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, it failed to apply the proper legal analysis in evaluating the potential biases of two jurors. Finding no such error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Afshar" on Justia Law

Defendant John Brawley was charged with two criminal offenses in Circuit Court that were transferred to Superior Court for a jury trial. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. At that time, the trial court issued an order requiring defendant to reimburse the OCC for the costs and expenses associated with his public defense and directed him to contact the OCC, within 5 days of the court’s order, to verify his mailing address and to make payment arrangements. The jury acquitted the defendant of both charges following trial. The State alleged that the OCC attempted to contact defendant prior to and following his trial to arrange for his reimbursement of these costs, but to no avail. Consequently, the OCC filed a motion with the trial court alleging that defendant did not comply with his payment obligations or provide any cause for his non-compliance. The trial court scheduled a show cause hearing, but defendant failed to appear. In response, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for defendant and set bail at $50. Defendant was subsequently arrested pursuant to the warrant and paid the $50 bail as a condition of his release. When he posted his bond payment, defendant attested to having the same address he initially provided to the OCC and to the trial court. The bail payment was remitted to the OCC, thereby reducing the defendant’s reimbursement obligation. Thereafter, the OCC requested a further hearing on its show cause motion alleging that defendant made no other payments toward his obligation. The trial court scheduled a second show cause hearing and defendant again failed to appear. In response, the OCC requested that the trial court issue a warrant for defendant’s arrest and set bail in the full amount of his reimbursement obligation, which would then be forfeited to the OCC. Alternatively, the OCC requested that defendant be jailed for three days before being permitted a bail hearing. This request was denied, the trial court finding defendant was "unconditionally discharged" from the criminal case, and that it lacked jurisdiction to require defendant to show cause or be required to reimburse the OCC for the costs of his defense. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the second bench warrant, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire. v. Brawley" on Justia Law

In 1985, petitioner Edward White was convicted in Massachusetts on two counts of indecent assault and battery arising from allegations that he sexually assaulted an eight-year-old female. He served three years in prison and then was paroled. At the evidentiary hearing, he represented that, during his parole, he successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. In January 1994, as a New Hampshire resident, the petitioner became subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender for his Massachusetts convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, petitioner appealed a superior court order denying his petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire. Finding that the superior court properly applied the pertinent New Hampshire statute mandating petitioner's registration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "White v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire appealed a superior court order denying a motion for a bench warrant filed by the New Hampshire Division of Administrative Services, Office of Cost Containment (OCC) to secure the appearance of defendant John Brawley, at a show cause hearing. Defendant was charged with two criminal offenses that were transferred to the Superior Court for a jury trial. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. At that time, the trial court issued an order defendant to reimburse the OCC for the costs and expenses associated with his public defense and directed him to contact the OCC, within 5 days of the court’s order, to verify his mailing address and to make payment arrangements. The trial court set bail at $50; defendant paid that and confirmed his address. OCC thereafter requested another hearing, alleging defendant made no other payments toward his obligation. Hearing was set, and defendant again failed to appear. The trial court denied OCC's motion for a second bench warrant, finding he was "unconditionally discharged" from the criminal case, and that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce its repayment order or require the defendant to show cause why he cannot, or should not, be required to reimburse the OCC for the costs associated with his public defense. The New Hampshire determined the trial court misinterpreted RSA 604-A:9, I-c, contradicting the plain meaning of the statute. "[A]n OCC obligation constitutes an 'assessment' under RSA RSA 604-A:2-f. We have ruled that RSA 604-A:9 applies to acquitted defendants who have received the benefit of appointed counsel at the State’s expense. It logically follows that the procedural protections set forth in RSA 604-A:2-f similarly apply to indigent defendants confronting a final hearing for nonpayment of the costs associated with the services of court-appointed counsel - regardless of the outcome of the underlying criminal matter." The trial court's rulings were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire. v. Brawley" on Justia Law

Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, petitioner Edward White appealed a trial court order denying his petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire. In January 1994, as a New Hampshire resident, petitioner became subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender for his Massachusetts convictions. Because of constitutional limitations, a Tier III offender, like petitioner, whose convictions pre-dated the establishment of the sex offender registry, may be subject to the registration requirement “only if he is promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he is permitted to demonstrate that he no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify continued registration.” An assessment of petitioner was conducted, with findings that petitioner was then "a minimal risk to reoffend and therefore does not meet criteria for continued listing on the Sex Offender Registry." Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof he was no longer a danger to the public and no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the record submitted on appeal established an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court's denial of petitioner's petition, and therefore upheld its decision. View "White v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law