Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jason Wilbur was the former stepfather of the alleged victim (child) in the case. In 2007, the child disclosed she had been sexually assaulted by defendant. Defendant was subsequently indicted on charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), but the State nol prossed the charges in April 2009. In 2010, defendant was re-indicted on: (1) one count of AFSA alleging a single act of digital penetration; (2) one count of AFSA alleging a pattern of digital penetration; (3) one count of AFSA alleging a single act of penile penetration; and (4) one count of AFSA alleging a pattern of penile penetration. In May 2011, a jury found defendant guilty on the two counts of AFSA alleging digital penetration, and acquitted him on the two counts of penile penetration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. In June 2014, defendant moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed; defendant alleged his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient in four respects: (1) failure to rebut the State’s characterization of the defendant’s statement to the police; (2) lack of preparation of the mother for her testimony; (3) introduction of evidence of a prior sexual assault committed against the child by another person without a reasonable strategy; and (4) failure to object to opinion testimony given by a child protective services (CPS) worker. Because the Supreme Court agreed with defendant with respect to claims (1) and (4), the Court found it unnecessary to examine claims (2) and (3). The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Wilbur" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Foad Afshar a new trial following his convictions on one count of simple assault, two counts of unlawful mental health practice, and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, the State argued the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when, during a post-verdict hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, it failed to apply the proper legal analysis in evaluating the potential biases of two jurors. Finding no such error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Afshar" on Justia Law

Defendant John Brawley was charged with two criminal offenses in Circuit Court that were transferred to Superior Court for a jury trial. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. At that time, the trial court issued an order requiring defendant to reimburse the OCC for the costs and expenses associated with his public defense and directed him to contact the OCC, within 5 days of the court’s order, to verify his mailing address and to make payment arrangements. The jury acquitted the defendant of both charges following trial. The State alleged that the OCC attempted to contact defendant prior to and following his trial to arrange for his reimbursement of these costs, but to no avail. Consequently, the OCC filed a motion with the trial court alleging that defendant did not comply with his payment obligations or provide any cause for his non-compliance. The trial court scheduled a show cause hearing, but defendant failed to appear. In response, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for defendant and set bail at $50. Defendant was subsequently arrested pursuant to the warrant and paid the $50 bail as a condition of his release. When he posted his bond payment, defendant attested to having the same address he initially provided to the OCC and to the trial court. The bail payment was remitted to the OCC, thereby reducing the defendant’s reimbursement obligation. Thereafter, the OCC requested a further hearing on its show cause motion alleging that defendant made no other payments toward his obligation. The trial court scheduled a second show cause hearing and defendant again failed to appear. In response, the OCC requested that the trial court issue a warrant for defendant’s arrest and set bail in the full amount of his reimbursement obligation, which would then be forfeited to the OCC. Alternatively, the OCC requested that defendant be jailed for three days before being permitted a bail hearing. This request was denied, the trial court finding defendant was "unconditionally discharged" from the criminal case, and that it lacked jurisdiction to require defendant to show cause or be required to reimburse the OCC for the costs of his defense. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the second bench warrant, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire. v. Brawley" on Justia Law

In 1985, petitioner Edward White was convicted in Massachusetts on two counts of indecent assault and battery arising from allegations that he sexually assaulted an eight-year-old female. He served three years in prison and then was paroled. At the evidentiary hearing, he represented that, during his parole, he successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. In January 1994, as a New Hampshire resident, the petitioner became subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender for his Massachusetts convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, petitioner appealed a superior court order denying his petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire. Finding that the superior court properly applied the pertinent New Hampshire statute mandating petitioner's registration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "White v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire appealed a superior court order denying a motion for a bench warrant filed by the New Hampshire Division of Administrative Services, Office of Cost Containment (OCC) to secure the appearance of defendant John Brawley, at a show cause hearing. Defendant was charged with two criminal offenses that were transferred to the Superior Court for a jury trial. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. At that time, the trial court issued an order defendant to reimburse the OCC for the costs and expenses associated with his public defense and directed him to contact the OCC, within 5 days of the court’s order, to verify his mailing address and to make payment arrangements. The trial court set bail at $50; defendant paid that and confirmed his address. OCC thereafter requested another hearing, alleging defendant made no other payments toward his obligation. Hearing was set, and defendant again failed to appear. The trial court denied OCC's motion for a second bench warrant, finding he was "unconditionally discharged" from the criminal case, and that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce its repayment order or require the defendant to show cause why he cannot, or should not, be required to reimburse the OCC for the costs associated with his public defense. The New Hampshire determined the trial court misinterpreted RSA 604-A:9, I-c, contradicting the plain meaning of the statute. "[A]n OCC obligation constitutes an 'assessment' under RSA RSA 604-A:2-f. We have ruled that RSA 604-A:9 applies to acquitted defendants who have received the benefit of appointed counsel at the State’s expense. It logically follows that the procedural protections set forth in RSA 604-A:2-f similarly apply to indigent defendants confronting a final hearing for nonpayment of the costs associated with the services of court-appointed counsel - regardless of the outcome of the underlying criminal matter." The trial court's rulings were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire. v. Brawley" on Justia Law

Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, petitioner Edward White appealed a trial court order denying his petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire. In January 1994, as a New Hampshire resident, petitioner became subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender for his Massachusetts convictions. Because of constitutional limitations, a Tier III offender, like petitioner, whose convictions pre-dated the establishment of the sex offender registry, may be subject to the registration requirement “only if he is promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he is permitted to demonstrate that he no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify continued registration.” An assessment of petitioner was conducted, with findings that petitioner was then "a minimal risk to reoffend and therefore does not meet criteria for continued listing on the Sex Offender Registry." Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof he was no longer a danger to the public and no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the record submitted on appeal established an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court's denial of petitioner's petition, and therefore upheld its decision. View "White v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Allain appealed a superior court order denying his request for pretrial confinement credit toward a suspended sentence imposed for violating a good behavior condition. Defendant was arrested on October 10, 2015 for a burglary that took place August 31, 2015. Unable to post bail, he remained incarcerated until trial. In February 2016, the State obtained eight indictments against him relating to burglaries and thefts that took place during the late summer of 2015, including the August 31 burglary. On July 8, 2016, the State moved to impose defendant’s 2011 suspended sentence because he violated the good behavior condition by committing the August 31 burglary. On August 15, 2016, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the charge involving the August 31, 2015 burglary. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by denying him “presentence confinement credit beginning October 10, 2015.” He contended that had he posted bail on October 10, 2015, he would serve a total of three to six years of the 2011 sentence, but “[b]ecause he is indigent and the court denied credit, he will serve three years, 332 days to six years, 332 days.” Requiring him to serve more time because of his indigency, he argues, “involves precisely the discrimination” the presentence confinement credit statutes seek to prohibit. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred with defendant's argument and reversed the trial court's order's denying his request for pretrial confinement credit. The case was remanded for that court to grant pretrial credit toward defendant's sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Allain" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Plantamuro appealed his convictions by jury on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, one count of felonious sexual assault, and one count of felony indecent exposure and lewdness. In May 2016, defendant was convicted of sexually abusing the victim, who was born in 2007. At the time of the abuse, which occurred between 2012 and 2014, the victim and her mother lived in the same neighborhood as defendant. The victim would often go to defendant’s house to visit him and his mother. The victim testified that the assaults took place in defendant’s bedroom, which was, essentially, a porch converted into a bedroom. The victim testified that defendant showed her videos in which “[r]eal people” were “naked and . . . having sex”; she also testified that defendant told her that he was “going to do this to [her] one day.” According to the victim, defendant subsequently engaged in sexual activity with her and masturbated in front of her. She testified that this activity occurred on four occasions. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) excluding “evidence about the circumstances of” the victim’s disclosure of the assaults to her mother; and (2) prohibiting the defendant’s ex-wife from testifying that he “is sexually attracted to women, not to children.” Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Plantamuro" on Justia Law

Defendant David Martinko appealed a superior court order denying his motion to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2014 to three felony informations. The informations charged him with aggravated felonious sexual assault under the pattern sexual assault statute. He argued on appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: (1) the informations violated his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not advise the defendant of these violations. After review, the Supreme Court determined that under the federal Constitution, the State was permitted to seek separate convictions on the charged informations. Further, the Court determined trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise defendant his pleas were in violation of the State and Federal Double Jeopardy Clauses. View "New Hampshire v. Martinko" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old E.G. was petitioned as a delinquent for having committed the offenses of falsifying physical evidence, and possession of drugs. The petitions also alleged that E.G.’s case had been screened and deemed inappropriate for diversion because E.G. was “being petitioned as a delinquent for a felony level charge, and has several previous police contacts where he was involved in disturbances, criminal mischief and reckless conduct.” E.G. filed a motion to suppress, among other things, “all evidence obtained in violation of [his] right against self-incrimination.” Specifically, he contended that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation by police without having been informed of his rights in accordance with Miranda and New Hampshire v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 (1985). The trial court denied the motion. Considering the totality of the circumstances of the encounter, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded a reasonable juvenile in E.G.’s position would not have believed himself to be in custody, and therefore, that E.G. was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the incriminating statements to the officer. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law