Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, David Zuzelo, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of New Hampshire on one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and one count of AFSA alleging a single act of penetration. The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss both AFSA charges due to insufficient evidence and by denying his motion to preclude the admission of evidence pertaining to the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics.The Superior Court had denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the State had failed to introduce sufficient evidence supporting either the pattern AFSA charge involving touching of the complainant’s genitalia or the AFSA charge alleging penetration. The trial court also denied the defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics, arguing that this evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that while there was sufficient evidence to support the single-act penetration AFSA conviction, there was insufficient evidence to support the pattern AFSA conviction. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the court reversed the defendant’s pattern AFSA conviction and reversed and remanded his single-act penetration AFSA conviction. View "State v. Zuzelo" on Justia Law

The defendant, Christopher A. Small, was convicted on four charges, including aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) by sexual intercourse with a minor, AFSA by digital penetration of a minor, and two counts of pattern AFSA. The charges stemmed from incidents where Small sexually assaulted a minor victim, starting with inappropriate touching and escalating to touching the victim's vagina. The defendant was indicted on four counts of AFSA, including a pattern of touching the victim's genitalia and a pattern of touching the victim's breasts.During the trial in the Superior Court, the victim testified that the defendant's inappropriate behavior began with cuddling and escalated to touching her chest and vagina. At the close of the State's case, the defense moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing that there was no testimony to indicate that the victim was specifically referring to her breasts when she described it as her chest. The court denied the motion, stating that the jury could find that her testimony referred to her breasts. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant argued that the record only established that he may have touched the victim's breasts, which was not sufficient to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State countered that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant committed AFSA by touching the victim's breasts. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, stating that a rational jury could reasonably infer that the defendant touched the victim's breasts as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of pattern AFSA. View "State v. Small" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case of Kierran Pierce, who appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and attempted AFSA. Pierce argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge at the close of the State's case. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did indeed err in denying the request for a mistrial. The court found that a statement made during the trial, indicating that Pierce had allegedly touched multiple children inappropriately, was highly prejudicial and should have resulted in a mistrial.However, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge, as they found sufficient evidence to prove guilt. The court reasoned that, despite alternative explanations presented by the defendant, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was attempting to commit an act of sexual assault.The Supreme Court also briefly addressed the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a view of the residence where the alleged sexual assaults occurred. The court did not make a definite ruling on this issue, suggesting instead that the parties might wish to develop these facts further in any subsequent trial. The case was ultimately reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in a case where the defendant, Jean M. Maxi Jr., was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: attempted felonious sexual assault (FSA) and certain uses of computer services prohibited. Maxi appealed, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The defendant also argued pro se that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the appellate defender failed to consider his research or argue a double jeopardy violation under the U.S. Constitution.The court found that, as charged, the two offenses required different evidence to prove different elements and did not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court also dismissed the defendant's pro se arguments as insufficiently developed for review. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision and affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for both charges. View "State v. Maxi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction of Gregory M. Collins for selling a controlled drug resulting in death. Collins had appealed the conviction, arguing that the Superior Court erred by not recusing the Strafford County Attorney’s Office due to a conflict of interest and by denying his motions to dismiss the charge based on insufficient evidence. The conflict of interest arose from Collins' prior romantic relationship with a legal assistant in the Strafford County Attorney’s Office. The Supreme Court ruled that any conflict of interest from this relationship could not be attributed to the entire county attorney’s office, and the measures taken by the office were sufficient to avoid any appearance of conflict. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court found that Collins had not met his burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The court held that there was enough evidence to support the finding that the decedent died of acute fentanyl toxicity and that Collins was the source of the lethal dose. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Timmy J. Rouleau, was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault following a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Hampshire. The case involved claims that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim multiple times when she was between the ages of ten and thirteen. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case focusing on the trial court's decision to admit evidence about an Amazon "wish list" containing sexually oriented items. The defendant argued that the evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes and should not have been admitted.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the wish list evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and thus, its admission was an error. However, the court ruled that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reached this conclusion by considering the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt presented at trial, including the victim's detailed testimony of the repeated sexual assaults. The court also noted that the wish list evidence comprised a small portion of the victim's testimony and was not mentioned in the State's closing argument. Therefore, even though the evidence was admitted erroneously, it did not affect the verdicts, and the court ultimately affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Rouleau" on Justia Law

In the case argued before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant, Joshua D. Shea, was convicted of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The case surrounds an altercation involving a road rage incident. According to Shea, the complainant approached him aggressively, to which Shea responded by unclipping his holster containing a firearm and rolling it up to his chest, warning the complainant that he had a firearm. The complainant claimed Shea pointed the gun at him, a claim Shea denied. Shea was thereafter indicted for criminal threatening.On appeal, Shea argued that the trial court erred in its jury instruction concerning the statutory defense related to the display of a firearm. The trial court had told the jury to consider whether Shea could have safely left the area without any risk to himself or others, which Shea contended imposed on him a duty to retreat not mandated by the statute.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed with Shea, holding that the trial court’s jury instruction was incorrect. The court explained that the legislation only imposes a duty to retreat before using deadly force, not non-deadly force. The court found that the display of a firearm in this case constituted non-deadly force. Therefore, Shea was not required to retreat before displaying his firearm. The court concluded that the ability to retreat in lieu of displaying a firearm is not a relevant factor when determining whether a threat would be considered likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed Shea’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Shea" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant, Nestor Roman, appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), attempted AFSA, and misdemeanor sexual assault. The key issue in the appeal was whether the defense or the prosecution "opened the door" to allow testimony from a nurse who performed a Child Advocacy and Protection Program (CAPP) examination of the victim. The defense argued that the prosecution opened the door by introducing testimony about the existence of medical records from the CAPP examination, which created a misleading impression that there was medical evidence supporting the charges. The prosecution argued that the defense opened the door by asking specific questions about the nurse's findings documented in the records.The Supreme Court held that the defense opened the door to the nurse's testimony. The court reasoned that the prosecution's mention of the existence of medical records did not create a misleading advantage, as the prosecution did not discuss the contents of these records, and therefore did not open the door. On the other hand, the defense's cross-examination of a detective about the specific findings of the CAPP examination was considered inadmissible hearsay and opened the door to the nurse's testimony to counter the prejudice caused.The court also disagreed with the defense's argument that the admission of the nurse's testimony was overly prejudicial and served to bolster the victim's credibility. The court noted that the nurse's testimony was narrowly focused on her findings and did not establish whether the victim was sexually abused. The court concluded that the defense failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was an unsustainable exercise of its discretion or that it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. The court thus affirmed the defendant's convictions. View "State of New Hampshire v. Roman" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Paul was convicted by jury of attempted murder and of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s motion in limine to admit evidence of his prior convictions under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609; and (2) failing to disclose additional portions of the victim’s mental health records submitted for in camera review. the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in either respect and therefore affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Hellinger was tried on charges of disobeying a police officer (class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension (violation-level offense). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unlawful. Her motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges. She appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In superior court, defendant again moved to suppress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals. After review, the Supreme Court reversed her circuit court conviction for driving after suspension, vacated the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, and remanded both matters. The State conceded the trial court erred with respect to the driving after suspension charge, agreeing that the officer did not have the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a motor vehicle stop of defendant. If the stop was illegal, then the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not make findings "sufficient to purge the taint" with regard to the remaining charge. View "New Hampshire v. Hellinger" on Justia Law