Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of voting in more than one state during the 2016 general election. He maintained residences in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts and was alleged to have voted in Holderness, New Hampshire by absentee ballot and in Belmont, Massachusetts in person. The State introduced evidence of his voting history in both states from 1996 to 2018 and sought to exclude statements by an acquaintance, William Botelho, who had previously admitted to voting in the defendant's name in Massachusetts.The Grafton County Superior Court allowed the State to admit the defendant’s prior voting records under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluded Botelho’s statements as inadmissible propensity evidence, also denying the defendant’s request for a Richards hearing regarding Botelho’s potential testimony. After a jury found the defendant guilty, the Superior Court denied his post-trial motions for dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to set aside the verdict.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the Superior Court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior voting history because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since the prior alleged acts were nearly identical to the charged crime. The court also held that evidence of Botelho’s confession to voting in the defendant’s name in the 2016 election was not evidence of other bad acts under Rule 404(b) and should not have been categorically excluded. The Supreme Court further ruled that, if Botelho asserts his Fifth Amendment rights on remand, the trial court must hold a Richards hearing.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motions regarding territorial jurisdiction, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence, but reversed the conviction due to the evidentiary errors and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The defendant, a patient at a community mental health center, was informed by his career counselor that he had been dismissed from classes at UNH Manchester and would be removed by security if he returned to campus. Distressed by this news, he insisted he would still attend his evening class. In communications with his counselor and later his therapist, he reiterated his plan to attend, culminating in a statement asking if “doing a mass shooting” would be required for him to get what he wanted. When told his statement would be reported, he claimed it was a figure of speech. The counselor reported his comments to the treatment team and local police, in accordance with center policy. Law enforcement notified UNH Manchester, which took security precautions, and later apprehended the defendant. He was indicted for criminal threatening based on his statements.Prior to trial in the Superior Court, the defendant sought to exclude the testimony of his counselor and therapist regarding his statements, asserting the therapist-patient privilege, and also moved to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. The Superior Court denied both motions, finding an “essential need” for the privileged communications and concluding that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The jury convicted the defendant of criminal threatening.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the privileged communications and whether the evidence was sufficient for conviction. The court held that the State demonstrated an “essential need” to pierce the therapist-patient privilege due to the centrality of the communications to the charged offense and the compelling public safety interest in investigating threats of mass violence. The court also found the evidence sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for causing fear, terror, or public inconvenience. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The case concerns allegations of sexual abuse committed by the defendant against a complainant when she was between the ages of four and ten during visits to the defendant’s home. The complainant testified that the defendant engaged in multiple acts of sexual assault over several years, including threats to her and her family to ensure her silence. After the complainant disclosed the abuse to her mother, law enforcement became involved, which led to the defendant’s indictment on multiple charges, including pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault, felonious sexual assault, and criminal threatening.In Superior Court, the defendant moved for in camera review of the complainant’s counseling records, which the court partially granted. The State successfully moved to allow the complainant to testify by two-way live video feed from outside the defendant’s presence, arguing that testifying in front of the defendant would cause her trauma and render her unavailable. During the trial, the complainant testified remotely. After the State rested, several charges were dismissed or nol prossed by agreement, and the jury ultimately convicted the defendant on the remaining counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that allowing the complainant to testify remotely, outside the defendant’s presence, violated his confrontation right under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution as interpreted in State v. Warren. The court found that this right requires a face-to-face, in-person meeting between the accused and the witness. The court also held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for one pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault charge involving sexual intercourse, as the complainant’s testimony did not establish that the acts occurred over the required statutory period. The court reversed the conviction on that charge and remanded the remaining convictions for further proceedings, vacating the trial court’s discovery order in part for additional review in light of a recent precedent. View "State v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

The case involved a traffic stop in Salem, New Hampshire, where a police officer, upon detecting a strong odor of alcohol in a vehicle, interacted with its passengers. The defendant, seated in the back, became verbally aggressive toward the officer, yelling and cursing. After being ordered out of the vehicle, the defendant stepped toward the officer, pointed at him, and shoved his finger into the officer’s chest. When the officer attempted to arrest him, the defendant pulled away, struggled, and resisted being handcuffed. A portion of this encounter was captured on video by another passenger.Following these events, the defendant was charged in the Rockingham County Superior Court with misdemeanor counts of simple assault and resisting arrest. At trial, the jury was presented with video evidence and heard testimony from the officers involved. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, but the trial court (St. Hilaire, J.) denied these motions. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, leading to the present appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The defendant argued that appellate review of video evidence should be de novo, asserting that the court was in as good a position as the jury to interpret such evidence. The court rejected this argument, holding that video evidence must be reviewed under the traditional standard: all evidence, including video and live testimony, is viewed in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the court found sufficient evidence to support both convictions. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that his conduct was de minimis, noting it was not preserved or plain error. The court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was accused of touching a minor inappropriately during a trip to the store in October 2021. Two months after the alleged incident, the victim made a separate allegation against her father, claiming he had broken her half-sister’s leg, based on a social media post. This accusation was later determined to be false after investigation, with the victim’s mother and a counselor concluding the report was made due to the victim’s misunderstanding and feelings toward her father. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sexual assault and simple assault, with events alleged to have occurred in Gilford and Laconia.The Superior Court (Attorri, J.) presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about her false accusation against her father, arguing it was relevant to her credibility. The initial ruling permitted this, but upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the court excluded the evidence, finding it not probative of the victim’s character for truthfulness because she believed the accusation was true when made. At trial, the State introduced limited evidence regarding the defendant’s alcohol consumption on the day of the alleged assaults. When the jury inquired about the locations of the alleged offenses, the court declined to provide the indictments, instructing the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the false allegation, as it lacked sufficient probative value and risked confusing the jury. The court also ruled that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was proper and that any error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hodgdon" on Justia Law

The defendant owned a house on Farm Island, New Hampshire, near a summer camp with which he had a history of disputes. After hearing a group outside his house at night, he yelled at them and, when unable to reach the police, left a voicemail for the camp, using profane language and stating, “you better get them the f**k out of here or I will shoot them.” He also accused the group of damaging his property. The State charged him with harassment, alleging that his communication constituted a threat to the life or safety of another, made with the purpose to annoy or alarm.The Superior Court of Carroll County held a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced the voicemail, evidence of the contentious relationship between the defendant and the camp, and testimony from camp staff and police. Over the defendant’s objections, the court admitted testimony from a camp director about security measures the camp undertook in response to the message, including ceasing use of part of the island and enhancing security. The defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the required mental state; the court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant acted with the purpose to annoy or alarm and that the communication constituted a true threat as defined by federal law. However, the court found that admitting testimony about the camp’s security response was error under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403, as its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law

After a traffic collision, the defendant exited his vehicle—leaving his ten-year-old child alone inside, where a loaded but unchambered firearm was holstered in the front seat—and confronted the other driver. The defendant smashed the other driver’s window with a baton, then struck and kicked him multiple times after the driver exited his vehicle and fell to the ground. Several motorists witnessed the altercation and contacted authorities. The defendant departed before police arrived, but later called 911 and was arrested. During the arrest, he disclosed the presence of both his child and the firearm in his vehicle.The Superior Court (Edwards, J.) presided over the ensuing jury trial, in which the defendant was convicted of reckless conduct (for leaving his child unsupervised in a car with a gun), second degree assault (for striking with a baton), two counts of simple assault (for kicking), and criminal mischief. The defendant appealed three of these convictions, contending: that there was insufficient evidence for reckless conduct; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense for the second degree assault charge; and that the court wrongly refused a specific unanimity instruction for the simple assault charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the reckless conduct conviction, as no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk to his child. The court held that the self-defense instruction for second degree assault improperly directed the jury regarding the element of deadly force and thus constituted reversible error. Finally, it found that the court's refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction on the simple assault charge was also reversible error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions for reckless conduct, second degree assault, and simple assault, and remanded the latter two for further proceedings. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while walking along a road after a report of a violent incident involving a vehicle and a fleeing suspect. The man matched the description of the person who fled the scene. Without first giving Miranda warnings, an officer handcuffed him and questioned him briefly at the roadside, where he made limited admissions about a fight. Hours later, at the police station, different officers gave him Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned him further. During this interview, the man made additional incriminating statements. He was later indicted for two forms of second degree murder based on the death of the other individual involved in the incident.The Superior Court partially granted and partially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. It suppressed the initial roadside statements, finding a Miranda violation, and also suppressed statements made after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. However, the court found that the post-Miranda statements made at the police station were voluntary and admissible. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing second degree murder. The defendant also objected to the admission of certain recorded jail calls, arguing they were irrelevant.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the post-Miranda interview statements and the jail calls. The court held that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, considering the circumstances and the break between interviews. Regarding the jail calls, the court held that even assuming error in admitting certain portions, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Sleeper" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on criminal charges and released on bail. His counsel raised concerns about his competency to stand trial, prompting the trial court to order a competency evaluation as provided by statute. The appointed evaluator, the Office of the Forensic Examiner, informed the court that it could not complete the evaluation within the ninety-day statutory period. The State requested an extension, which the court granted for an additional ninety days. When it became clear that the evaluation would still not be completed on time, the State sought a second extension or appointment of a different evaluator. The court denied the second extension and dismissed the charges, finding that the statutory timeframe was mandatory and permitted only one extension per party.After the trial court (Superior Court) dismissed the case, the State moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The State then appealed, arguing that the statute did not impose a mandatory, jurisdictional deadline for competency evaluations and that dismissal was not required when the deadline was missed, especially if extensions had been granted.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and found that RSA 135:17, I(a) does not set a mandatory deadline for completion of competency evaluations. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “shall” is modified by the phrase allowing either party to request an extension, and nothing in the statute limits the number of extensions a court may grant. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court was not legally required to deny the State’s second extension request or to dismiss the charges for missing the extended deadline. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Cormiea" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted in 2022 on two charges in the northern judicial district of Hillsborough County, New Hampshire. While serving a separate sentence in Pennsylvania in 2023, a detainer was lodged against him for these charges. On December 21, 2023, the defendant signed a request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for final disposition of his pending New Hampshire charges. This request was sent by the Pennsylvania correctional facility to both the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and the Superior Court in Nashua (Hillsborough-South), rather than the Superior Court in Manchester (Hillsborough-North), where the charges were pending. The State delayed processing the paperwork, and the defendant was not brought to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period.The Superior Court (Messer, J.) initially granted the State’s motion for a 120-day extension but, upon reconsideration, found the State lacked good cause for the delay. The court determined that the defendant’s request had been adequately served and attributed the delay to the State’s inaction. As a result, the court dismissed the indictments with prejudice after concluding the State failed to bring the defendant to trial within the required period. The State’s subsequent motion to reconsider was denied as untimely.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the 180-day period under the IAD began when the defendant’s request was delivered to Hillsborough-South instead of Hillsborough-North. The court held that under New Hampshire law, service on any superior court within the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction is sufficient to trigger the IAD timeline. The court found that the defendant had complied with the IAD, and affirmed the dismissal of the indictments with prejudice. View "State v. Laforest" on Justia Law