Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Joel Harrington appealed a superior court order in favor of Respondent Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc. (Metropolis). On May 27, 2005, Petitioner entered into a residential lease for an apartment at Hollis Commons Apartments in Concord. The lease agreement required the petitioner to pay a security deposit of $875 to be held "until the termination of Lessee's occupancy." Petitioner entered into two lease renewals, the first in May 2006 renewing the lease for one year, and another in June 2007. The second renewal called for a term commencing on July 1, 2007, and ending "60 days after written notice has been given." The original lease agreement and both lease renewals identified "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor. The parties had a dispute over the lease agreement and return of the security deposit. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that Metropolis was not a party to the lease agreement, and in dismissing his contract claims. Although the lease agreement and renewals all show "Hollis Commons Apartments, LLC" as the lessor and either Petitioner or the Petitioner and his wife as the lessees, Petitioner contended that Metropolis must be considered a party to the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's case. View "Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Yvette Bouffard appealed a trial court's denial of her request for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to uninsured motorist (UM) insurance coverage under her umbrella insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. Plaintiff was injured in 2006 from a car accident. She recovered $250,000 from the other party's insurer and her UM coverage under her personal automobile policy. Because her damages exceeded this sum, Plaintiff sought UM coverage under her umbrella policy. State Farm denied the claim because UM coverage was rejected on her original insurance application. The trial court found that Plaintiff authorized her husband to go to the insurance agency to purchase insurance for both of them, and that because the husband did not elect UM coverage, Plaintiff ratified his decision when she failed to object after reviewing the application in the car or after the policy arrived in the mail. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the husband acted as Plaintiff's agent in rejecting UM coverage and affirmed the court's decision to deny Plaintiff declaratory relief. View "Bouffard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Winecellar Farm ("Winecellar") appealed a superior court order that found it was not entitled to: (1) a decree pro confesso awarding it specific performance to purchase the Bedard Farm ("Bedard"); (2) specific performance to purchase the farm under the part performance doctrine; and (3) continued haying in perpetuity under a lease agreement. Craig and Jennifer Rief purchased Winecellar, a working farm adjacent to the Bedard Farm. Bedard was owned by two siblings who until 2006, had lived there all their lives. The Riefs had enjoyed a close, friendly relationship with the Bedards until the Bedards died in 2006. The Riefs informed the Bedards on multiple occasions of their interest in buying the Bedard Farm when the Bedards were ready to sell. Until that time, the Riefs were content with farming the two properties together. In 2004, the Riefs and the Bedards signed a "memorandum of understanding" to harvest hay. In exchange, Winecellar/Riefs would maintain certain access ways and roadways to a shared driveway. In 2004, the Riefs wanted to lease the Bedard land to raise a small herd of buffalo to which the Bedards declined. In January 2006, the Bedards acquiesced to the Riefs' proposal to lease the land for buffalo. They drafted a "letter of understanding" for which the Riefs would lease the land, and later be given the opportunity to purchase the land should the Bedards sell. When the Bedards died, the land passed to their family. The Riefs filed a preliminary injunction in an attempt to preclude the Bedards' estate from evicting its buffalo and removing fencing equipment maintained on two leased pastures. Although the Bedard heirs filed responses in the case, their answer was untimely. The Riefs moved for a decree pro confesso for the right to purchase the Bedard land. The trial court denied the motion, but ordered a voluntary nonsuit as to the Bedard estate. On appeal, the Riefs argued that the sum of the various memoranda/letters of understanding constituted contracts for which specific performance was the only remedy. According to the Riefs, the monthly lease payments were in consideration for the right to purchase the land. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the record adequately supported the trial court's decisions to deny the Riefs specific performance for the Bedard Farm. Additionally, the Court found that the haying arrangement between the parties was not sufficient to constitute an "interest in land" consistent with "the ultimate intent that Winecellar Farm would own the Bedard Farm." As such, the Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "Winecellar Farm, Inc. v. Hibbard" on Justia Law

Petitioner Harold French appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Auctioneers (Board) that sanctioned him for submitting a fictitious bid at an auction. In 2009, Petitioner attended an auction run by another auctioneer and registered as a bidder under his own name. Of the items for sale, Petitioner asked the auctioneer about a particular painting that had a set reserve price of $10,000. When the bid reached $9,000, Petitioner bid $9,500. He later testified before the Board that he did not intend to purchase the painting, but sought to protect the reserve and ensure the painting was sold. No one else bid on the painting. The owner believed he had waived the reserve when he had gestured to the auctioneer following Petitioner’s bid. The owner subsequently requested payment for the painting from Petitioner. However, the auctioneer told the owner that the painting did not sell because the reserve was not met. The owner filed a complaint with the Board, and the Board subsequently issued its sanction against Petitioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented against Petitioner supported the Board’s findings and sanction. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Harold French" on Justia Law

"Homes by George," run by Adelaide and Rick George, developed residential real estate known as "Esther's Estates" in Newton. Homes by George entered into a written contract with Defendant Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., in which Defendant agreed to perform certain work in connection with the development. Defendant was paid but did not complete the work. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and claimed that Defendant violated the State Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Defendant counter-claimed that Plaintiff failed to pay amounts due in accordance with the contract. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings to allow a jury to first determine liability claims. A second trial was held on the contract claims. Plaintiffs won on all liability claims in the first trial, and received damages on its breach of contract and CPA claims at the second. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs challenged the amounts of damages they were awarded by the trial court. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its finding of violations under the CPA, and in its damages awarded to Plaintiffs. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the grant of damages was appropriate in light of the terms of the contract, the state case law, and the evidence presented at trial. However, the Court questioned how the trial court arrived at the amount of damages. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on its damages award to Plaintiffs. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other aspects of its decision.

Plaintiff Darlene Gray appealed an order of the Superior Court that dismissed her complaint against Defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company. In 2003, Plaintiff and her sister, in their capacity as trustees of the Ocean Estates Realty Trust, received a quitclaim deed from the Triple P Ranch Realty Trust. Ocean Estates paid $80,000 for the parcel and recorded the deed. Later that year, Ocean Estates conveyed a warranty deed for the land to Plaintiff. At the time she received the deed, Plaintiff obtained a construction loan, granted a mortgage, and purchased title insurance from Commonwealth. The title insurance provided $328,000 in coverage against a title defect. In 2006, Plaintiff learned that Triple P Ranch Realty Trust never acquired title to the property and that the State legally owned it. The land was appraised at $15,000, and the insurer paid the mortgage lender the amount of the appraisal. Plaintiff sued Commonwealth for breach of contract, arguing that Commonwealth's policy should reimburse her for all expenses she incurred prior to learning of the title defect. When the Superior Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found that trial court properly determined the measure of damages for Plaintiff's claim. Without finding errors in the trial court's findings of fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.