Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner New Hampshire Right to Life (NHRTL) appealed the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy’s decision that NHRTL did not have standing to participate in administrative actions involving the renewal of Planned Parenthood of Northern New England’s (PPNNE) limited retail drug distributor license. NHRTL sent a written complaint to the Board, alleging that PPNNE did not have a state contract in place with DHHS and was therefore illegally dispensing prescription drugs at its clinics. In its letter, NHRTL claimed that PPNNE’s contract with DHHS had expired on June 30, 2011, and had not been renewed. On June 18, 2012, PPNNE sent renewal applications for its six clinics to the Board, and on July 2, 2012, the Board sent letters to each clinic acknowledging receipt of the application. Each letter stated that the Board would not review the renewal application until August 15, 2012, but notified the clinics that it had “ministerially” renewed its licenses through September 1, 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board, finding that none of NHRTL's generalized claims alleged NHRTL suffered an injury in fact, or that its own rights have been, or would have been specifically or directly affected. "NHRTL does not claim that any of its individual members has suffered, or will suffer, harm - it refers to deaths caused by the alleged failure to regulate that did not affect NHRTL’s membership. Instead, these concerns merely represent NHRTL’s interest in what it believes to be a public problem. Accordingly, the Board did not err in concluding that NHRTL lacked standing." View "Appeal of New Hampshire Right to Life" on Justia Law

Defendant Barion Perry appealed after a jury convicted him of theft and burglary. He argued that the superior court erred in denying the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. Detectives interviewed defendant following his arrest. The interview was recorded. Prior to defendant’s first trial, counsel for defendant and the State agreed that certain statements made by defendant during the interview should be redacted before the recording was played for the jury. Shortly after the State played a redacted version of the recording, defense counsel advised the trial court that three of the statements that should have been redacted were not, in fact, redacted. Defense counsel requested neither a mistrial nor a curative instruction. Because the court was concerned that defense counsel could not effectively advise the defendant about a mistrial as counsel had failed to “mark” two of the statements for redaction prior to trial, it considered assigning independent counsel to speak with the defendant about the mistrial request. The court ultimately concluded, however, that manifest necessity required a mistrial because the jury heard "damaging," "inflammatory" information that a curative instruction would not have been able to address adequately. The court did not assign independent counsel because it concluded that, given the prejudicial nature of the unredacted statements, it "could be ineffective assistance of counsel" for another lawyer to advise the defendant not to seek a mistrial. The trial court declared a mistrial over the defendant’s objection and scheduled a new trial. Prior to the second trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictments with prejudice. He argued that the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, and, therefore, that the double jeopardy provisions of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions barred retrial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in finding that manifest necessity required a mistrial. Consequently, the mistrial declaration did not bar the defendant’s retrial on double jeopardy grounds. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Theadore Mitchell, was convicted of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two class A misdemeanor counts of violation of a protective order. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he offered to take a polygraph test. Defendant also argued that the trial court plainly erred when it allocated his pretrial confinement credit. The State conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "New Hampshire v. Edson," defendant's sentence was plainly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court vacated the sentences imposed and remand for resentencing in accordance with "Edson." The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Mitchell " on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant’s ex-wife complained to the Hampstead Police Department that, while using defendant’s computer, she clicked on the browsing history and found disturbing links to websites that potentially contained child pornography. In a follow-up meeting with the police, defendant’s ex-wife explained that she had started checking the defendant’s browsing history six months earlier, and it was at that time that she first noticed child pornography on defendant’s computer. According to the police affidavit for the search warrant, she described the images as depicting “nude young undeveloped girls (well under 18 years of age).” Based upon this information, the police secured a search warrant and seized defendant’s computer. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the search warrant, arguing, in part, that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide a sufficient description of the alleged child pornography. After hearing, the superior court granted the motion, ruling that the search warrant did not describe the images with sufficient particularity. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Letoile" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Maga appealed his conviction for driving with an alcohol concentration of .02 or higher, while he was under the age of twenty-one (DUI). On appeal, he argued that the circuit court erred when it: (1) admitted into evidence a certificate from a state crime laboratory employee attesting that the breathalyzer machine used by the Salem Police Department was in working order; and (2) ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Maga" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Thomas Jur, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his pretrial request for an interpreter, thus violating his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under both the State and Federal Constitutions. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to appoint an interpreter at trial sua sponte was error. Defendant was from Sudan, and his primary language is Dinka. He stated he had difficulty understanding the English language. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the record showed defendant did have a sufficient command of English. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in failing to appoint an interpreter during the trial. View "New Hampshire v. Jur" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for injunctive relief seeking to compel the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to issue him a personalized vanity motor vehicle registration plate reading "COPSLIE." He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the DMV’s denial of his request violated his right to free speech. Because the Court found that the regulation relied upon by the DMV in denying petitioner’s request was unconstitutionally vague, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles " on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Collins appealed a superior court order that denied his motion for a new trial on three counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), four counts of AFSA by individual acts, and one count of misdemeanor sexual assault, based upon the court's conclusion that his trial attorney's performance was not constitutionally deficient. Defendant challenged his counsel's failure to object to improper expert witness opinion testimony by the complainant's therapist, Robert Fusco. On direct examination, without objection, Fusco testified that the complainant's behaviors "fit perfectly into the same kind of behavioral symptoms that we would see for a child who had been sexually abused." Fusco testified that, as a result of the complainant's January 2008 disclosure to him about the 2007 sexual assaults, he realized that "we were no longer dealing with . . . a major depressive disorder," but rather "a post[-]traumatic stress disorder on a child who had – who – who allegedly had been sexually abused." The trial court stated that it could not conclude that it was objectively reasonable to allow Fusco to so opine. The trial court explained that "Fusco's testimony is the type of expert testimony that the Supreme Court has held may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused." The trial court was correct. Defense counsel failed to object to Fusco's testimony that the fact that the complainant's disclosure "came out of the blue . . . added to its credibility." Such testimony "cross[ed] the line into the impermissible realm of vouching for the [alleged] victim's credibility." Counsel's failures to object, in the Supreme Court's view, "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Hillman Blesdell-Moore appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and psilocybin (mushrooms), arguing that the Superior Court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during a stop for a motor vehicle violation. Enfield police stopped defendant's truck for defective taillights. The officer did not observe an erratic behavior to suggest that defendant was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The officer allowed defendant to step out of his truck to attempt to fix the taillights while he conducted a license check in his cruiser. Upon returning to defendant's truck, the officer asked to see defendant's tongue to see if it was coated consistent with marijuana use. While defendant initially denied smoking marijuana that day, he admitted he had smoked the day before. Concerned that defendant was becoming agitated, the officer obtained consent to perform a pat-down search. That search netted two wads of cash in defendant's pockets. The officer was about to conclude the stop when he hesitated and asked defendant one last question: whether defendant had marijuana in his truck. Defendant denied that he did, and the officer's subsequent request to search the vehicle. The officer stated that defendant was free to leave, but then asked whether a drug canine would indicate whether there were drugs in the vehicle. At this point, defendant looked to the ground and replied that he did not think so. The officer dispatched a canine unit to search defendant's truck. Ultimately the canine discovered drugs in defendant's vehicle. Defendant was arrested for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress evidence of drugs the canine found, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Asking to examine defendant's tongue impermissibly expanded the scope of the initial traffic stop. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied suppression of all evidence obtained following the unlawful expansion of the stop. View "New Hampshire v. Blesdell-Moore" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified a question to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: Whether RSA 507-B:2 and RSA 507-B:5 were constitutional under Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution, to the extent they prevented recovery for Plaintiff's claim for civil battery and damages against the Town of Sanbornton under a theory of respondeat superior. This case arose from a municipal police officer's use of a stun gun during a field sobriety test. Plaintiff Dennis Huckins alleged that the police officer, defendant Mark McSweeney, used his stun gun on him "multiple times." McSweeney claimed he used it only once when plaintiff began to run away before completing the field sobriety test. Plaintiff sued McSweeney and his employer, defendant Town of Sanbornton for damages, alleging, among other claims, a battery claim against McSweeney for his use of the stun gun and a claim that the Town was liable for battery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendants sought summary judgment on both claims. The court denied McSweeney’s motion because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not establish that McSweeney fired only once, and because "[n]o reasonable police officer could have believed that the encounter . . . justified firing the [stun gun] a second time." Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the implicated statutes, the New Hampshire Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Huckins v. McSweeney" on Justia Law