Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Paul Costella on two counts of criminal threatening, and one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant brought his car to Wal-Mart for an oil change. Jane Sylvestre, an employee in the automobile department, drove the defendant’s car into the service bay. While in the defendant’s car, Sylvestre saw a photograph of the defendant and his daughter in front of a red flag with a swastika on it. Sylvestre took offense because the Nazis had killed her uncle, who had been a member of the French resistance. After parking the car in the service bay, Sylvestre returned to the service area, where she told the defendant that she had the right to refuse service to customers with whom she was uncomfortable. In response, the defendant asked Sylvestre if she was a Jew. After the oil change had been completed, a second employee handed the car keys to the defendant. As Sylvestre started to process the invoice, the defendant asked her if she had seen his gun, saying, "It’s a Jew killing killer." He also accused Sylvestre of "wreck[ing]" his car because she was "a stupid Jew that doesn’t know how to drive a car." The defendant then paid his bill. As he was leaving, the defendant declared (to no one in particular, but audibly, and within earshot of Sylvestre) that he was "getting his gun to kill the Jew b***h behind the counter." Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct and charged with two counts of criminal threatening, one count for his statements to Sylvestre, and the other for his statements to other store employees. Prior to trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to the hate crime statute it would seek enhanced penalties on the criminal threatening charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the superior court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss the hate crime enhancement; and (2) excluded the testimony of his daughter that he was not motivated by hostility towards Judaism. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Costella" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Superior Court defendant, Timothy McKenna was convicted of six counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court found no evidence in that before or during his interrogation defendant was told that he was free to leave the property or informed of his Miranda rights. Nor was there evidence that the officers informed him that he was free to ask them to leave the property, or that he was not required to answer their questions. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McKenna" on Justia Law

The respondents were convicted of first degree murder for offenses committed when they were seventeen years old. Accordingly, they each received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On June 25, 2012, after all of the respondents’ convictions had become final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). In this Rule 11 petition, the State appealed the superior court's determination that the rule announced in "Miller" applied retroactively to the respondents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Petition of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Manchester appealed a Superior Court order denying the City’s motion to dismiss and granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner, Prolerized New England Company (Prolerized). The City argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously ruled that RSA chapter 322 preempted the City’s ordinances regulating junk and scrap metal dealers. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Prolerized New England Company v. City of Manchester" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of a Superior Court's order ruling in favor of the petitioners, eight individual New Hampshire residents and taxpayers and LRS Technology Services, LLC (LRS), on their petition for a declaratory judgment that the Education Tax Credit program. The State and several intervenors defended the program. The intervenors were three New Hampshire citizens, who wanted their children to receive scholarship funds under the program, and the Network for Educational Opportunity, a non-profit organization involved with the program. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had standing. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ declaratory judgment petition because it concluded that: (1) the 2012 amendment to RSA 491:22, I, which allowed taxpayers to establish standing without showing that their personal rights have been impaired or prejudiced, was unconstitutional; and (2) absent that amendment, the petitioners had no standing to bring their constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Duncan v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Tariq Zubhuza was convicted by jury of criminal restraint, and criminal threatening with a firearm all connected with his involvement with a home invasion. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. Finding the evidence sufficient to support those convictions, and finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Zubhuza" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Addison moved to disqualify the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office from further participation in his case, and moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2008. In August 2009, Attorney Lisa Wolford, who had been employed by the New Hampshire Public Defender for approximately seven years, began working with the New Hampshire Appellate Defender. When Wolford began her rotation, the appellate defender office was preparing a brief regarding the standards applicable to our mandatory review of the defendant’s sentence. In early 2010, Wolford was reassigned from the defendant’s defense team. In March 2012, she submitted her resume to the attorney general’s office, requesting consideration for a position with the criminal justice bureau’s appeals division. Wolford was offered a position with the attorney general’s office; she began employment there in early July 2012. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court that it should "follow a line of cases that requires per se disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office from a defendant’s case when (a) the defendant’s attorney switches sides and joins the prosecutor’s office in the middle of the case and (b) the defendant does not waive the conflict." The Supreme Court found Wolford had no involvement in the defendant’s case at the pre-trial or trial stages and participated in a limited aspect at one preliminary phase of the defendant’s multi-phased appeal approximately three years before joining the attorney general’s office. As such, the Court rejected defendant's per se argument, and further concluded defendant suffered no prejudice as a result in Wolford's change of employment. Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's office.View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lucien Vincent appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in favor of defendant Davina MacLean on his small claim complaint against her. In late January 2012, while incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Prison, plaintiff filed a small claim complaint against the defendant, his former girlfriend, seeking to recover seven thousand dollars for "[i]dentity theft, personal earnings and [b]enefits." He argued on appeal that the trial court erred by disregarding "overwhelming" evidence in his favor and failing to hold the defendant liable and by denying his motion to appear in person at the hearing on the merits, which he alleges violated his right to due process. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Vincent v. MacLean" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bulcroft was charged with kidnapping and rape. The trial court accepted his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to New Hampshire Hospital for life, unless or until earlier discharged by court order. Defendant was discharged from the hospital in 1979. In late 2012, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his arrest and indictment record annulled because he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is not the same as a finding of "not guilty" for purposes of RSA 651:5, II, and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to have his record annulled. This presented an issue of first impression to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Agreeing with the trial court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Bulcroft" on Justia Law