Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1973, defendant was convicted of murdering Susan Randall. At the time of the murder, the police obtained fingernail clippings from Randall. Between 2000 and 2008, by various motions to the trial court, defendant obtained multiple rounds of DNA testing on the fingernail clippings; however, none of these tests led to post-conviction relief because defendant could not be excluded as the DNA contributor. In 2012, defendant, with the State’s consent, obtained further DNA testing on the remaining clippings. This most recent testing, which used new and more sensitive technology, produced results which, for the first time, showed that the clippings contained DNA material from two different males. Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the male DNA profiles, but was excluded as a contributor of the second. Based on the 2012 test results, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that RSA chapter 651-D empowered the court to order a new trial when a defendant has obtained favorable DNA test results. The trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) did not apply to DNA testing obtained with the State’s consent. After review, the Supreme Court agreed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Paul was convicted by jury on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of marijuana, and one count of the sale of a substance represented to be LSD. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court failed to comply with RSA 519:23-a (Supp. 2013) by declining to give the jury nullification instruction he requested and by giving other jury instructions that effectively contravened his "jury nullification defense." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

The respondents in this case were fourteen non-residents who were named in a petition filed by the New Hampshire Bank Commissioner, as liquidator for Noble Trust Company (Noble) and Aegean Scotia Holdings, LLC (Aegean Scotia). They appealed a superior court order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Each respondent had signed an individual account application with Noble Trust Company, which had a New Hampshire address. Respondents' accounts were funded with either a check deposit (mailed to New Hampshire) or wired electronically. As respondents tried to check on their accounts, withdraw from or close their accounts, they encountered problems. Respondents' petition alleged Noble was involved in a Ponzi scheme, in which the Bank was using their money to cover losses of other investors. They sought to set aside transfers of money from Noble to the respondents, impose constructive trusts, and recover for unjust enrichment and conversion. The respondents moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondents on the basis that: (1) respondents Carlson and the Schweitzers filed proofs of claim in the liquidation proceeding against Noble in New Hampshire; and (2) the remaining respondents had sufficient minimum contacts with New Hampshire. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the superior court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire Bank Commissioner v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Rawnsley was convicted by jury of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it failed to strike certain testimony by defendant's ex-wife. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Rawnsley" on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law