Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Paul was convicted by jury on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of marijuana, and one count of the sale of a substance represented to be LSD. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court failed to comply with RSA 519:23-a (Supp. 2013) by declining to give the jury nullification instruction he requested and by giving other jury instructions that effectively contravened his "jury nullification defense." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

The respondents in this case were fourteen non-residents who were named in a petition filed by the New Hampshire Bank Commissioner, as liquidator for Noble Trust Company (Noble) and Aegean Scotia Holdings, LLC (Aegean Scotia). They appealed a superior court order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Each respondent had signed an individual account application with Noble Trust Company, which had a New Hampshire address. Respondents' accounts were funded with either a check deposit (mailed to New Hampshire) or wired electronically. As respondents tried to check on their accounts, withdraw from or close their accounts, they encountered problems. Respondents' petition alleged Noble was involved in a Ponzi scheme, in which the Bank was using their money to cover losses of other investors. They sought to set aside transfers of money from Noble to the respondents, impose constructive trusts, and recover for unjust enrichment and conversion. The respondents moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondents on the basis that: (1) respondents Carlson and the Schweitzers filed proofs of claim in the liquidation proceeding against Noble in New Hampshire; and (2) the remaining respondents had sufficient minimum contacts with New Hampshire. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the superior court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire Bank Commissioner v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Rawnsley was convicted by jury of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it failed to strike certain testimony by defendant's ex-wife. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Rawnsley" on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law

Defendant Myles Webster appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted murder, armed robbery, reckless conduct, and resisting arrest. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motions to suppress eyewitness identification evidence and for a change of venue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Webster" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. Appealed a superior court decision to affirm a default judgment by the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board in favor of respondents Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC, Peters Auto Sales, Inc., and Crest Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively "dealers"). Mahindra argued that "there is no dispute that [it] was never properly served by the [dealers] in this matter," and argues that the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to insist on proper service pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. The dealers contended they were not bound by the requirements of the Hague Service Convention in this case and that, regardless of the convention's applicability, Mahindra waived its challenge to service and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed with Mahindra, and found that the trial court erred as a matter of law. View "Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. V. Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents, Larry M. and Sonia M. appealed a Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights over their children, A.M. and C.M. On appeal, Larry argued that the trial court erred by: (1) proceeding with the termination case based on an underlying neglect case in which he was improperly denied counsel; and (2) finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Sonia argues that the court erred because: (3) the trial judge did not recuse himself despite the fact that he presided over the underlying neglect case in the circuit court. Both respondents argue that the court erred by: (4) failing to afford them twelve months from the superior court's de novo finding of neglect within which to correct the conditions which led to the finding of neglect; and (5) finding that the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), made reasonable efforts to assist them in correcting the conditions that led to the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

Defendant James Perry was indicted on one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of criminal restraint arising out of a single course of conduct in late 2011. A jury convicted defendant on both counts, but, because the offenses arose out of the same uninterrupted course of conduct, the trial court sentenced defendant only on the attempted kidnapping conviction, while holding the criminal restraint conviction in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant when she had not made a prior out-of-court identification; and (2) sentencing him for a class A felony when the indictment failed to allege, and the jury was not instructed to find, a fact necessary for that level offense; namely, that he did not “voluntarily release[] the victim without serious bodily injury and in a safe place prior to trial.” Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s kidnapping conviction, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with class B felony standards. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law