Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.C. (a juvenile) was fourteen years of age when she was arrested for shoplifting merchandise from "Claire's," a discount jewelry store in the Rockingham Mall. She was transported, in handcuffs, to the Salem Police station. The arresting officer telephoned the juvenile's mother to pick her up. While in the booking room, the juvenile asked if she could use the bathroom. An officer allowed her to use the bathroom in one of the holding cells. Another officer observed her via a closed circuit monitor in the supervisor's office flush the toilet. The arresting officer asked the juvenile "what she had flushed down the toilet." The juvenile told the arresting officer "that it was a necklace that she had taken and . . . had concealed in her pants." The officer did not inform the juvenile of her Miranda rights before questioning her or at any other time. The juvenile remained at the police station until her mother picked her up. After she admitted to flushing the necklace down the toilet, the juvenile was charged with falsifying evidence. After a hearing in August 2011, she was found delinquent. During the merits hearing, she moved to suppress her admission on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation and that she was not advised of her Miranda rights before making it. The court denied her motion, and the juvenile appealed. The State appealed the circuit court's grant of the juvenile's motion to suppress. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.C. " on Justia Law

Defendant Taneal Broadus was convicted by jury on one felony count each of possession of oxycodone and codeine, and one misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana. She challenged only the felony convictions, arguing on appeal that the superior court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence of the oxycodone and codeine obtained after an unconstitutional search. Defendant did not dispute the legality of the initial traffic stop for littering. Upon review of the facts in the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that from the totality of the circumstances, the frisk in this case was not supported by particularized and objective facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and presently dangerous: neither defendant nor the driver was suspected of having committed, or being about to commit, a violent offense. Further, defendant had no outstanding warrants, complied with the officer's requests during the stop, and made no threatening or furtive movements during the stop. Moreover, the stop did not occur in a high crime area. Therefore, the Court held that that the trial court erroneously concluded that the frisk was valid. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court found only that Locke “could have” arrested her; it did not decide how likely it was that the officer “would have” arrested her. Nor did it appear that the parties fully litigated in the trial court how probable the defendant’s arrest would have to be in order to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the likelihood defendant would have been arrested. On remand, even though defendant did not appeal her conviction for marijuana possession, she may argue, as she did on appeal, that the oxycodone and codeine would not have been “inevitably discovered,” in part, because there was no probable cause to arrest her for possession of marijuana. View "New Hampshire v. Broadus" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Roy was convicted by jury on two counts of kidnapping, on count of first degree assault, four counts of second degree assault, one count of criminal restraint, and two counts of simple assault. These charges stemmed from a night of drinking; that night defendant allegedly failed to take his prescription medications for depression and alcoholism. The night would end with one of his live-in girlfriend's three children having been seriously injured: the child had extensive bruising all over his body, especially in his abdominal area. His pancreas was severely injured, and he had lost approximately half of his blood due to internal bleeding. Part of his bowel was torn, which had caused the contents of his bowel to spill into his abdomen. Doctors performed multiple surgeries on him. During his recovery, he required the use of a feeding tube for 11 months. On appeal, defendant argued the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellular telephone; (2) motions in limine to both admit and exclude certain evidence; (3) motion to dismiss during trial based upon the State’s alleged failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence; and (4) subsequent motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict in which he alleged that there was insufficient evidence to convict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Roy" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court’s ruling that legislative changes to the definition of "earnable compensation" applicable to members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s rulings that members’ rights to retirement benefits do not vest until they accrue ten years of creditable service, and that members do not have vested rights to cost-of-living adjustments to their pensions. The New Hampshire Retirement System took no position on the legal issues raised in the appeal, but objected to the remedy sought by plaintiffs and the intervenors. After review of the parties' arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on "earnable compensation," and affirmed its ruling on cost-of-living adjustments. View "American Federation of Teachers v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Colleen Carr was convicted by jury on one count of felony criminal solicitation of accomplice to insurance fraud, and two counts of felony witness tampering. These charges arose out of a scheme defendant proposed in 2013, to burn down a commercial building she owned in Milford to collect the insurance proceeds. Defendant approached one of her tenants about her proposal, even offering the tenant to move things he wanted to keep, and cash money to "leave for two weeks." Afraid he would lose everything, the tenant informed authorities of defendant's plan. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the criminal solicitation indictment; (2) declining to give the jury two of her requested instructions; and (3) denying her motion to dismiss the second witness tampering conviction on double jeopardy grounds. The defendant also argued the evidence was insufficient to convict her of criminal solicitation and of one of the witness tampering charges. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Carr" on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth Cloutier was convicted by jury on one count of burglary. The defendant was a friend of the victim and had recently helped the victim locate a safe that had been stolen from her home. Defendant went to the Berlin Police Department to take a voluntary polygraph test in connection with the investigation with that burglary. The defendant then signed a form acknowledging that she had read the enumerated rights and understood them. She also signed a form stating that she agreed to take the polygraph test. She was advised of her Miranda rights. Before the test began, defendant was asked if she had any involvement with the burglary. She denied any involvement. After four hours of questioning, defendant admitted her involvement in the burglary, explaining how she and two others took the safe, opened it and stole the contents. On appeal of her conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her confession. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant was convicted of murdering Susan Randall. At the time of the murder, the police obtained fingernail clippings from Randall. Between 2000 and 2008, by various motions to the trial court, defendant obtained multiple rounds of DNA testing on the fingernail clippings; however, none of these tests led to post-conviction relief because defendant could not be excluded as the DNA contributor. In 2012, defendant, with the State’s consent, obtained further DNA testing on the remaining clippings. This most recent testing, which used new and more sensitive technology, produced results which, for the first time, showed that the clippings contained DNA material from two different males. Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the male DNA profiles, but was excluded as a contributor of the second. Based on the 2012 test results, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that RSA chapter 651-D empowered the court to order a new trial when a defendant has obtained favorable DNA test results. The trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) did not apply to DNA testing obtained with the State’s consent. After review, the Supreme Court agreed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law