Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant Samuel Pennock, appealed his conviction by a jury of felony simple assault, and the superior court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence and for a new trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) substantively admitting the victim’s pretrial oral and written statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (N.H. R. Ev. 803(2)); (2) denying his motion to dismiss the simple assault charge; (3) denying his post-conviction motion to reduce that charge to a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly; and (4) denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Pennock" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Gilley was convicted on one count of class A felony burglary. The burglary statute elevated the offense from a class B to a class A felony when it was "perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night." Before trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class A felony indictment, arguing that the house he had burglarized was not the dwelling of another and, therefore, did not trigger the felony enhancement under that statute. He contended that the house had ceased to be the "dwelling of another" because its resident had moved out and listed the house for sale. The Superior Court denied the motion. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the house did not lose its character as a dwelling when left vacant and listed for sale, it affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Gilley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott McCarthy appealed a Superior Court decision to dismiss his defamation action against defendants, the Manchester Police Department (MPD) and MPD Sergeant Craig Rousseau, on grounds that municipal immunity barred his claim. William Socha was working on a construction site in Manchester. At around noon, Socha noticed a truck parked on the site and went to tell the driver to move the vehicle. As he approached, he saw that the man in the driver's seat had his pants down, exposing his genitalia. Socha also observed a young female in the truck's passenger seat. The passenger appeared to Socha to be about twelve years old and to have some kind of disability. Socha called the police, but, by the time an MPD officer arrived, the vehicle had left. Socha gave the officer a description of the truck, its license plate number, and a physical description of the driver. The police determined that the truck was registered to plaintiff, who resided in Allenstown. A short time later, a detective from the Allenstown Police Department observed the plaintiff arrive at his residence in a truck matching the description and license plate number Socha had provided. Plaintiff told the detective that he had been in Manchester around 12:30 p.m. that day to pick up a friend and her daughter. The MPD filed a complaint charging plaintiff with indecent exposure and lewdness, and arrested him pursuant to a warrant. The MPD had not identified the female passenger whom Socha had described. In an effort to identify her, Sgt. Rousseau posted an entry on the MPD blog, describing the incident and stating, in relevant part, that "[d]etectives of the MPD Juvenile Division now say that McCarthy, 41, was in fact the man who was exposing himself in the vehicle. McCarthy was subsequently arrested [and] charged with one count of indecent exposure." The entry then asked for information concerning the identity of the female passenger. No passenger was ever identified. On the day of plaintiff's criminal trial, Socha failed to come to court, and the State entered a nolle prosequi. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against defendants, alleging that Rousseau's post on the MPD blog stating that plaintiff was "in fact" guilty of the crime was defamatory. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from suits that were not authorized by RSA chapter 507-B. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCarthy v. Manchester Police Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant Vincent Cooper appealed his convictions after a jury found him guilty of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by allowing the State to play an audio recording of a 911 telephone call at trial, and by allowing the State, in closing argument, to comment on a fact not in evidence and to misstate the burden of proof. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Kean appealed a superior court order granting in part and denying in part his motion for return of property. Defendant, while wearing an official but discontinued Manchester Police jacket, was observed by a Manchester Police Officer walking in front of a Manchester Police Department substation. Although the jacket had been discontinued in 1999, it bore a current Manchester Police Department patch. The officer stopped defendant, concerned that a passerby might mistake him for a police officer. Defendant stated that an attorney had confirmed that it was legal for him to wear the jacket, but the officer told him that continued wearing of the jacket would likely subject him to arrest for impersonating a police officer. Defendant was not arrested at that time. The next day, defendant, wearing the same jacket, was again observed walking past the Manchester Police Department substation, this time by a different Manchester Police Officer. Aware of the prior encounter, defendant was placed under arrest for impersonating a police officer. At trial, the case was dismissed, in part because of the Stateís inability to produce a material witness to the alleged crime. Defendant then moved for the return of the jacket. Following a hearing, the court found that the jacket, and implicitly the patch, were "at all times the property of the City of Manchester." However, the trial court ordered that the jacket be returned to defendant, subject to the condition that the Manchester Police patch be removed from the jacket sleeve. The court found that forfeiture of the patch best served the public interest. This appeal followed. Defendant contended that: the State had the burden of disproving his ownership; the State did not meet its burden; and that the trial court, therefore, erred in finding that defendant was not the rightful owner of the patch. The Supreme Court found, after review, that the trial court did not err in finding that the State had demonstrated ownership of the jacket and patch by the City of Manchester. The trial court did err, however, in ordering that the jacket be returned to the defendant, finding that the trial court may have ordered forfeiture to the State without first providing notice to the City of Manchester. As such the trial court's order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Kean" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Louise Pinault was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in Hollis. She was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and with violating the “conduct after an accident” statute. Following a bench trial, during which defendant represented herself, she was acquitted on the DUI charge, but was convicted on a conduct after an accident charge. As part of her sentence, she was ordered to pay $525 in restitution for property damage. Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the complaint alleging conduct after an accident was insufficient and that the restitution order was improper. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court improperly ordered restitution because the only offense for which she was convicted did not cause any economic loss; and (2) the complaint against her was insufficient to support her conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found: (1) the plain language of the restitution statute clearly and unambiguously required a causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or damage, and the crime for which the defendant was convicted necessarily occurred afterward. As the damage was already done, the defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause the economic loss suffered; and (2) the alleged deficiency in the complaint did not affect the outcome of the case, therefore failing to demonstrate plain error. View "New Hampshire v. Pinault" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2012, Joseph Jennings was arrested on drug-related charges and released on personal recognizance bail to the custody of defendant. That day, he was also served with a temporary order of protection that prohibited him, and third parties acting on his behalf, from contacting a certain woman. Approximately 45 minutes after Jennings was released, the woman reported that defendant Amy Mouser was contacting her on Jennings’s behalf, in violation of the protective order. Police went to the woman’s residence, where he retrieved drug paraphernalia that the woman said belonged to Jennings. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug (cocaine). On appeal, she argued that the Superior Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence after a search of her vehicle. After review of the specific facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error in denying her motion, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "New Hampshire v. Mouser" on Justia Law

Respondent Jerry Roberts was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and sentenced to four-to-ten years at the New Hampshire State Prison. Respondent also received a sentence of one-to-two years for related conduct; that sentence was suspended. Respondent began serving his four-to-ten year sentence in 2008. On April 1, 2013, the respondent was classified as a C-1 inmate and resided in a halfway house at the prison. While at the halfway house, respondent was arrested and consequently returned to general population status in the prison. Following his arrest, the State moved to impose his one-to-two year suspended sentence. The Superior Court partially granted the State’s motion: it imposed the one-year minimum sentence, which was to be served consecutively to the four-to-ten year sentence, but suspended the two-year maximum of the sentence. In August 2013, respondent appeared before the Adult Parole Board (APB) after he had served the minimum four years of his AFSA sentence. At that time, he was “approved for parole to consecutive,” and his parole hearing paperwork indicated that he must have “review prior to release consideration” with the Administrative Review Committee (ARC). Upon completion of his one-year consecutive sentence in August 2014, the respondent was not released from the prison into the community. Instead, he continued serving his original four-to-ten year sentence. The State asserted that the respondent was not released because he had not yet completed the required sexual offender treatment program. The respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to immediate release from the prison because he had been paroled from his four-to-ten year sentence to his one-year consecutive sentence, and he had completed the one-year sentence. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the respondent was not entitled to immediate release because the APB had not granted him “parole to release” from prison, but instead had merely granted him “parole to a consecutive sentence,” and thus the APB retained the authority to determine whether he should be released upon completion of the consecutive sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, granted the respondent’s petition, and ordered that the respondent be released from prison. Thereafter, the State sought certiorari review of the trial court’s order, arguing the Adult Parole Board (APB) exceeded its authority or otherwise violated respondent's rights when it paroled him to a consecutive sentence but then refused to release him from prison upon his completion of the minimum term of that sentence. The Supreme Court held that the APB’s actions were not improper and therefore reversed the Superior Court's order granting respondent habeas relief. View "Petition of Warden, New Hampshire State Prison " on Justia Law