Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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A jury convicted defendant Eric Cable for negligent homicide - driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). He appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he caused the victim’s death and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of certain evidence and to certain statements by the prosecutor in his opening statement and closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cable" on Justia Law

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Defendant Albert Boutin, III appealed after a jury convicted him on one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. At trial, the State did not produce the marijuana seized from defendant’s apartment, but rather relied upon photographs and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of the police and the state laboratory worker who analyzed a sample of the seized marijuana. After the State rested its case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge for possession of marijuana, arguing that “the state hasn’t proven a prima facie case because there is no marijuana . . . in evidence.” The trial court denied the motion. Defendant again moved to dismiss at the close of his case, and the trial court again denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing a laboratory analyst to testify about a substance that was not introduced at trial; and (2) failing to dismiss the marijuana charge for insufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boutin" on Justia Law

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Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

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The State appealed a Circuit Court order granting defendant Tyler Boyer's motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a warrant, the police entered the apartment that he shared with his girlfriend and arrested him. The trial court found that defendant had standing to object to the search despite the fact that, at the time of the search, he was present with his girlfriend in violation of a court order that prohibited him from having contact with her. The State argued that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because, given his presence in the apartment in violation of the order, he could not have an expectation of privacy in the apartment that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Boyer" on Justia Law

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Defendant Roland Dow appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of first degree assault, one count of second degree assault, five counts of endangering the welfare of a child, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of unlawful interception and disclosure of oral communications or telecommunications. Dow argued the Superior Court erred by: (1) admitting detailed evidence that he physically abused his former girlfriend, Jessica Linscott; and (2) allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding the effects of domestic violence on a victim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dow" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted defendant Oscar Grande of armed robbery. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to contest the admission of evidence concerning an uncharged robbery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Grande" on Justia Law

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In consolidated appeals, petitioners Deere & Company, CNH America LLC (CNH), AGCO Corporation (AGCO), Kubota Tractor Corporation (Kubota), and Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (Husqvarna), all appealed superior court orders that granted summary judgment to the State on their constitutional challenges to Senate Bill (SB) 126. SB 126 was enacted in 2013, amending RSA chapter 357-C to define "motor vehicle" as including "equipment," which "means farm and utility tractors, forestry equipment, industrial equipment, construction equipment, farm implements, farm machinery, yard and garden equipment, attachments, accessories, and repair parts." Like its federal counterpart and similar state statutes, RSA chapter 357-C, "the so-called ‘dealer bill of rights,''" was enacted "to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." RSA chapter 357-C regulated, among other things, a manufacturer's delivery and warranty obligations and termination of dealership agreements. RSA chapter 357-C also defines unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Violation of any provision of RSA chapter 357-C constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioners manufactured agricultural, construction, forestry, industrial, lawn, and garden equipment, including commercial mowers, wheel loaders, backhoes, and agricultural tractors. Their complaint alleged that: (1) retroactive application of SB 126 substantially impaired their existing dealership agreements in violation of the State and Federal Contract Clauses; and (2) SB 126 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it voided or otherwise rendered unenforceable mandatory binding arbitration clauses in existing dealership agreements, thereby conflicting with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld SB 126 against petitioners' claims that it violated the State and Federal Contract Clauses. The Court agreed with the trial court that the preempted provisions were severable from the remaining provisions of RSA chapter 357-C as applied to petitioners. The Court rejected Husqvarna's argument that SB 126 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court also rejected Husqvarna's contention that SB 126 had either a discriminatory purpose or effect within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State on Husqvarna's dormant Commerce Clause claim and remanded for the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether SB 126 was unconstitutional under the "Pike" balancing test. View "Deere & Co. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted defendant Craig Sanborn on two counts each of manslaughter and negligent homicide as the result of an explosion that killed two employees at his gunpowder factory. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms in the state prison on the manslaughter convictions only. On appeal, defendant challenged, among other things, the manner in which the jury was selected, the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict, and the sentences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Sanborn" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted defendant Christopher Palermo on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, one count of criminal trespass, and two counts of simple assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) ruling that the State sufficiently authenticated certain Facebook messages; (2) admitting evidence of his prior incarceration, parole status, and civil lawsuit against the New Hampshire State Prison; and (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of him. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Palermo" on Justia Law

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Defendant Marianne King was convicted by jury on one count of theft by unauthorized taking. At trial, defendant argued that it was error to instruct the jury that “if there is a conflict between witnesses who offer direct evidence concerning certain facts, you must decide which witness to believe.” She argued that this instruction, which, for the purposes of this appeal (“the Germain direct-evidence instruction”), was “misleading” because it conflicted with the State’s burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the instruction. After review, the Supreme Court made a slight adjustment to the wording of the instruction that the trial court repeated verbatim, but otherwise affirmed the judgment and conviction. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law