Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dominick Stanin, Sr. appealed a Superior Court decision to impose his two previously suspended sentences. In June 2014, defendant was arrested for loitering (a violation-level offense), and resisting arrest (a misdemeanor). Those charges were tried in September 2014. The trial court acquitted the defendant of the loitering charge and placed the resisting arrest matter “on file without a finding.” In August 2014, defendant was charged with first degree assault, robbery, and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, for his involvement in a stabbing incident. He was subsequently also charged with misdemeanor resisting arrest in connection with the August incident. In October 2014, the State moved to impose the defendant’s two consecutive three-and-one-half-to-seven-year sentences on the ground that his June and August charges established that he had violated the condition of good behavior. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion in limine seeking to limit the State’s cross-examination of him or, alternatively, to “sever” the bases for the motion to impose. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Stanin" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order dismissing the charges against defendant Drew Fuller. The court ruled that the 2014 amendments to RSA chapter 169-B, which vested jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents ages 17 and under in the family division of the circuit court, applied retroactively to his case. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Defendant Arthur Kardonsky appealed a circuit court's finding that he was guilty of the violation-level offense of driving after suspension of his driver’s license. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by ruling that this violation-level offense did not require the mens rea of “knowingly.” Because the Supreme Court agreed, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Kardonsky" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Bedell appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued the superior court erred when, on the second day of trial, it dismissed a juror after it erroneously concluded that the juror could no longer be impartial. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed because it concluded that, although error, the juror’s dismissal was not prejudicial because an impartial jury ultimately rendered the verdict in defendant’s case. View "New Hampshire v. Bedell" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodric Reinholz was convicted by jury on two counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), two counts of ASFA by individual acts, and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, defendant argued the superior court erred when it admitted into evidence an "affidavit" written by the victim. He also argued that his convictions on the two pattern AFSA charges should have been vacated under the rule of mandatory joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted in "New Hampshire v. Locke," (166 N.H. 344 (2014)). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Reinholz" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Concord (City) appealed a Superior Court order requiring it to issue demolition permits to plaintiff Everett Ashton, Inc. so that Everett Ashton could remove three abandoned, valueless manufactured homes from its manufactured housing park. The court also ruled that the City could not place a lien on Everett Ashton’s park for the unpaid water bills of the former residents of the abandoned homes, and that, by withholding demolition permits, the City engaged in a regulatory taking, entitling Everett Ashton to compensation and attorney’s fees. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the court’s ruling that the City had to issue the demolition permits, reversed its rulings concerning the unpaid bills and the regulatory taking, vacated the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Everett Ashton, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kuchman appealed decisions related to his conviction by a jury on one count of first degree assault. Defendant and his friend, Joshua Texeira, were at a Rochester bar. While there, defendant and Texeira became loud and eventually asked to leave. Following an argument with the victim and the manager of the bar, defendant and Texeira were escorted outside, where defendant threatened the victim and stated that he was going to come back for him. Eventually, the defendant and Texeira walked away. A few minutes later, the victim went out of the back door of the bar to take out the trash and to smoke. The victim saw defendant and Texeira standing near one of the dumpsters, and said something to them. Neither responded, but both defendant and Texeira approached the victim. Texeira then took out an expandable baton that had been in his truck, and hit the victim with it. The victim fell down, and was kicked several times. The victim later identified, by way of photographic lineups, both defendant and Texeira as his attackers. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a bill of particulars, denied his multiple motions for a mistrial, and admitted evidence of a telephone conversation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Kuchman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Green appealed a superior court decision to enter judgment in favor of defendants School Administrative Unit #55 (SAU), Timberlane Regional School District, Nancy Steenson, and Earl F. Metzler, II. This matter arose out of Green's request for documents under the Right to Know law; the trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to receive electronic copies of documents that she had requested from defendants. Responding to her request for documents, Steenson, the chair of the school board, told plaintiff could make an appointment to “see the documents” that she had requested. Plaintiff replied, “in that case, give me the file electronically and we will all save money and time”; in response to this communication, the SAU stated that it had already responded to plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff noted that her “request is for an electronic file . . . or a paper report, whichever suits the district,” and she declined to make an appointment to view the documents. Plaintiff explained that “[a]ll of the documents requested could have been emailed or copied in the time it has taken to answer these excuses for not providing [them]. . . . This isn’t that difficult.” In response, the SAU stated that the documents that she requested were immediately “available for public inspection.” After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found that both proffered interpretations of RSA 91-A:4, V were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Right-to-Know statute was ambiguous. "In light of the purpose of the Right-to-Know Law, and our broad construction of it, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. Although the SAU notified the plaintiff that the documents that she requested were available for inspection, there is no evidence in the record that the paper documents made available constituted 'original records' as contemplated by RSA 91-A:4, V." Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff was entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. View "Green v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Bobola appealed a superior court decision denying his petition to annul a criminal conviction for second degree assault and a second degree assault charge that did not result in a conviction. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his petition to annul on the basis that he had a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on his record that was ineligible for annulment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bobola" on Justia Law

Defendant Vic Washington was charged with a number of offenses that arose from his “alleged use and attempted use of fraudulent credit cards, as well as his possession of the allegedly fraudulent credit cards and credit card numbers.” He was indicted on three counts of identity fraud. Each of these indictments charged that he “pose[d] as Eli Watts with the purpose to defraud in order to obtain merchandise” from a specific merchant. He was also indicted on several counts of receiving stolen property. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the State had failed to “provide proof of the validity of the credit card numbers” and proof that Eli Watts was a “bona fide person.” At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State conceded that Eli Watts was “a person that the Defendant fabricated . . . . a fictitious person.” After the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss with the exception of the three identity fraud charges. As to those charges, the court ruled that the plain language of the applicable statute required the State to prove, among other things, that defendant posed as a natural person. Because the State did not dispute that Eli Watts was “a fictitious person,” the court ruled that the indictments charging that defendant “pose[d] as Eli Watts” were insufficient to allege that he posed as another person. The State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling, arguing, in part, that “the State did not intend to concede that Eli Watts is, in fact, a fictitious person. Rather, the State’s argument has always been that it didn’t matter whether Mr. Watts was a fictitious person or not.” The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Washington" on Justia Law