Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Paul Santamaria appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for a writ of coram nobis. In 1998, defendant was convicted of first degree assault. His trial counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the court denied. Subsequently, the court sentenced the defendant to incarceration for twelve months. Defendant’s trial counsel withdrew from the case and, through appellate counsel, defendant appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the trial court’s decision to permit a police officer to testify as an expert witness. At that time, the Court affirmed his conviction. On December 30, 2014, defendant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking to have his conviction vacated for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s petition, ruling that he was procedurally barred because he "could have, and should have, raised this claim earlier either on direct appeal, in a motion for a new trial, or in a habeas corpus petition," and because he failed to show "sound reasons" for failing to seek proper relief earlier. A common threshold requirement to bringing a petition for a writ of coram nobis is that "sound reasons exist[] for fail[ing] to seek appropriate earlier relief." Here, the Supreme Court found defendant failed to meet that requirement. Defendant argued he could not have brought his ineffective assistance claim earlier in a direct appeal, a motion for a new trial, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. "Even if we assume without deciding that the defendant’s claim could not have been brought in a direct appeal, we conclude that he could have brought his claim in a motion for a new trial or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." View "New Hampshire v. Santamaria" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Lynch appealed his conviction, following a jury trial, of misdemeanor simple assault. He argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting hearsay testimony from a pediatrician at trial. The State cross-appealed the trial court’s order dismissing two indictments post-trial on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendants, the City of Dover (City) and its city council, school board, school board superintendent search committee, ethics commission, and city council ethics sub-committee, appealed a Superior Court order requiring them to disclose to plaintiff Jeffrey Clay, the written rubric forms completed by members of the superintendent search committee when evaluating applicants for the superintendent position. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred when it determined that the completed rubrics were not exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed: the completed rubric forms pertained to “internal personnel practices” and were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. View "Clay v. City of Dover" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant Robert Breest was convicted for Susan Randall’s murder. Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, defendant has maintained his innocence since his conviction and has instituted numerous collateral proceedings in an effort to secure his freedom. Since 2000, defendant has succeeded in obtaining multiple rounds of DNA testing of fingernail clippings taken from Randall’s body. All of this testing, including the latest round conducted in 2012, showed that defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA material found on the clippings. However, the most recent testing revealed for the first time that the clippings also contained DNA material from another unidentified male contributor. Based upon the latest test results, defendant moved for a new trial. At the hearing on his new trial motion, the State sought to exclude non-DNA evidence that defendant had proffered, but that was not presented at his original trial. The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to exclude the non-DNA evidence and, following a hearing, denied the motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals both rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alberto Ramos appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, asserting that his trial counsel failed to inform him, prior to pleading guilty to felony charges, that he could be transferred to a prison in another state. In 1998, pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded guilty to second degree murder and attempted escape. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to 28 years to life. Fifteen years later, petitioner was transferred from the New Hampshire State Prison to a Florida prison. In June 2013, he filed a habeas corpus petition as a self-represented party. After the appointment of counsel, petitioner supplemented his habeas corpus petition with an IAC claim, alleging that he was “denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel” because his trial attorneys “failed to ensure that he made a knowing waiver of his rights” by not telling him when he pleaded guilty that he could be transferred to a prison outside of New Hampshire. The State moved to dismiss the claim. After a telephonic hearing, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s IAC claim, ruling that, because “the possibility of being sent out of state is a collateral consequence,” and the “fail[ure] to inform a client of the collateral consequences of his conviction . . . does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” he could not “demonstrate [that] his trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to warn him that he could serve his time out of state.” Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ramos v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Smith was convicted by jury for possession of heroin. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; and (2) excluding the testimony of a defense investigator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Remi Gross-Santos appealed his convictions on two counts of second degree assault and one charge of transportation of alcoholic beverages by a minor. He argued on appeal that the Trial Court erred in: (1) allowing the State to introduce evidence that there was a marijuana grinder in the back seat of his vehicle at the time of the accident (grinder evidence); and (2) ruling that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gross-Santos" on Justia Law

Defendant William Edic appealed his conviction by jury on one count of second degree murder and one count of falsifying physical evidence. On appeal, defendant challenged various evidentiary rulings made at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Edic" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial based upon stipulated facts, defendant Sean McInnis was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled drug. On appeal, he challenged his convictions, arguing that the Superior Court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. After review of the record and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. McInnis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Reid appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law, to compel defendant, New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster, to produce unredacted records of the Attorney General’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing by former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court’s ruling violated Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that the investigative records at issue were “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices,” because the attorney general’s investigation cannot be considered “internal”; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the attorney general’s investigation of Reams was “conducted jointly with Rockingham County.” “Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s second argument, which raised an issue of statutory interpretation. In it, plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contrary to the plain language of RSA 91-A:5[,] IV.” Fundamentally, plaintiff’s argument was that records of the defendant’s investigation of Reams did not “pertain[] to internal personnel practices,” because “[t]he Attorney General is simply not the County Attorney’s employer.” The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and, therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law