Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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The defendant, Avram M. Niebling, was arrested for driving under the influence. During the arrest, the officer conducted a pat-down search and removed a wallet from the defendant's pocket. The wallet was not searched at the scene but was placed in an evidence bag and taken to the police station. At the station, during the booking process, the officers counted the cash in the wallet and looked inside for the defendant's driver's license. In doing so, they discovered two white pills identified as oxycodone. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled drug.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the wallet, arguing that there was no applicable exception to a warrantless search of the wallet during the booking process. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the search of the wallet constituted a search incident to arrest. The defendant appealed, arguing that the warrantless search of his wallet was neither conducted incident to arrest nor conducted pursuant to a neutral inventory policy, and was therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a search that may be made at the time and place of arrest also may be legally conducted when the arrested individual later arrives at a place of detention. The court found that because the defendant's wallet was seized during a lawful arrest, the officer was permitted to search it at the police station during the booking process without a warrant. The court distinguished this case from others where the property was searched at the officer's convenience after passage of appreciable time and was at all times under the exclusive control of the arresting officer. In this case, the arresting officer obtained possession of the defendant's wallet during a lawful arrest and looked inside it at the time of the defendant's booking at the police station while the defendant was present. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in determining that the search of the wallet fell within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. View "State v. Niebling" on Justia Law

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The case involves Chasrick Heredia, who was convicted on three counts of accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and one count of witness tampering. The charges stemmed from an incident where Heredia and another man, Matthew Hugle, provided alcohol to three underage girls who had run away from a substance abuse treatment facility. The girls later reported that they had been sexually assaulted by the two men. While in jail, Heredia wrote an encoded letter to Hugle, asking him to delete a video related to the incident, leading to additional charges of tampering with witnesses and solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence.The Superior Court found Heredia guilty on the three charges of accomplice to intentional contribution to the delinquency of a minor, one count of witness tampering, and one count of solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence. However, he was acquitted on charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault and felonious sexual assault.On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Heredia challenged his convictions for witness tampering and accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Supreme Court vacated the witness tampering conviction on double jeopardy grounds, agreeing with Heredia that his separate convictions and sentences for both witness tampering and solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy under the State Constitution. The court also reversed the three convictions for accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove those charges. The case was remanded for consideration of resentencing. View "State v. Heredia" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in a case where the defendant, Jean M. Maxi Jr., was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: attempted felonious sexual assault (FSA) and certain uses of computer services prohibited. Maxi appealed, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The defendant also argued pro se that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the appellate defender failed to consider his research or argue a double jeopardy violation under the U.S. Constitution.The court found that, as charged, the two offenses required different evidence to prove different elements and did not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court also dismissed the defendant's pro se arguments as insufficiently developed for review. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision and affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for both charges. View "State v. Maxi" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs, two police officers injured in a shooting, filed a suit against Chester Arms, LLC (the seller of the firearm used in the shooting), and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) (which conducted the background check for the sale of the firearm). The suit accused Chester Arms of negligent entrustment and DOS of negligent entrustment and negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the basis of immunity under state law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The court of appeals found that the state law barring lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of their products by a third party was constitutional and not preempted by federal law. The court found that the law was designed to safeguard citizens' fundamental right to bear arms by limiting suits against the firearms industry, thereby protecting its solvency and ensuring law-abiding citizens have access to firearms. The court also found that the law did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection or right to a remedy.Regarding the suit against DOS, the court found that DOS had not been negligent in its background check as the shooter was not disqualified from owning a firearm at the relevant time under federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that any alleged error in the trial court's immunity analysis was harmless as DOS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, Alden Satas, the petitioner, sought parenting rights for his ex-wife's biological child from a previous relationship. The couple, Satas and Courtney Crabtree-Satas, the respondent, had married when the child was about two and a half years old. They divorced in 2017 and Satas never adopted the child, but the child continued to live with him for some time after the divorce. In December 2020, Satas filed a petition seeking a parenting plan concerning the child. Crabtree-Satas moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Satas' status as the child's stepparent ended when the parties divorced. The trial court found that Satas had standing to request parenting rights and responsibilities.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to consider three questions in this case. The first question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas was the stepparent of the child, given that the definition of a stepparent implies a current marital relationship, and Satas and Crabtree-Satas had been divorced since 2017. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed that Satas is not a stepparent for the purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because he was no longer married to the child's mother at the time he filed his petition for visitation privileges. The court thus found that the trial court had erred in ruling to the contrary.The second question asked whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas had standing to bring a petition for parenting rights and responsibilities on the basis that he had established an in loco parentis status with respect to the child. However, since the court had already found that Satas was not a stepparent, it did not need to address this question.The third question concerned whether the trial court violated the respondent's constitutional rights. However, the court did not need to answer this question as it had already resolved the appeal on statutory grounds.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petitioner's petition. View "In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas" on Justia Law

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This case involves a minor, J.H., whose father is in jail and whose mother passed away when he was less than three years old. The child's maternal grandmother was appointed as his guardian. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to review an order by the Circuit Court, which prohibited the grandmother from testifying against the father's release from prison at any parole or similar hearings without first obtaining permission from the Circuit Court.The grandmother appealed this order, arguing that it violated her right to freedom of speech. The Circuit Court denied her motion, reasoning that J.H.'s best interests outweighed the grandmother's free speech rights.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Circuit Court's decision in part. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court exceeded its statutory authority by restricting the grandmother's ability to testify at the father's parole hearing. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute, RSA chapter 463, and determined that while it does grant the Circuit Court the authority to limit or restrict the powers of a guardian or impose additional duties in the best interests of the minor, it does not permit the court to restrict the guardian from speaking at a parole hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that this restriction was unrelated to the grandmother's role as guardian and was therefore not within the scope of the court's authority. As a result, the case was remanded back to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of J.H." on Justia Law

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In this case, a group of New Hampshire voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's new boundaries for state senate and executive council districts. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature violated the New Hampshire Constitution by drawing districts that unfairly benefitted one political party at the expense of another. They sought a declaration that the districts violated various parts of the state constitution and an injunction preventing the implementation of the new boundaries.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the issue of partisan gerrymandering raised a non-justiciable political question because the New Hampshire Constitution committed the task of redistricting to the legislature and did not provide any legal standard for the courts to review such decisions. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not claim that the redistricting plans violated any mandatory requirements of the state constitution.The court also rejected the argument that the constitution's guarantees of free speech, equal protection, and association were violated by the alleged gerrymandering. The court found that these constitutional provisions did not provide clear and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the districts based on claims of excessive political gerrymandering presented non-justiciable political questions. View "Brown v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

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Defendant Charles Paul was convicted by jury of attempted murder and of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s motion in limine to admit evidence of his prior convictions under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609; and (2) failing to disclose additional portions of the victim’s mental health records submitted for in camera review. the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in either respect and therefore affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

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Defendant Julie Hellinger was tried on charges of disobeying a police officer (class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension (violation-level offense). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unlawful. Her motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges. She appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In superior court, defendant again moved to suppress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals. After review, the Supreme Court reversed her circuit court conviction for driving after suspension, vacated the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, and remanded both matters. The State conceded the trial court erred with respect to the driving after suspension charge, agreeing that the officer did not have the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a motor vehicle stop of defendant. If the stop was illegal, then the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not make findings "sufficient to purge the taint" with regard to the remaining charge. View "New Hampshire v. Hellinger" on Justia Law

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Defendant Keith Chandler was convicted by jury on five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two counts of felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion in limine to preclude the admission of a printed image of electronically stored information; (2) denied his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) failed to disclose records following in camera review. THe New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded for the trial court to review the confidential records in accordance with the standard set forth in New Hampshire v. Girard, 173 N.H. 619 (2020). "When the trial court conducted its in camera review, it did not have the benefit of our opinion in [Girard]. We agree with the parties that this case should be remanded for the purpose of having the trial court review any undisclosed records again, in accordance with the standard set forth in Girard. If the trial court concludes that the records do contain evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense, the court may release that evidence to the parties with any necessary protective order, taking into account the victim’s rights ... If the court releases any evidence to the parties, the court should then provide the parties with an opportunity to make arguments as to whether a new trial is warranted." View "New Hampshire v. Chandler" on Justia Law