Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Heilan Grimes appealed a Circuit Court order granting a writ of possession for property located in Nashua to plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA. The sole issue on appeal was whether, under RSA 540:2, II(e) (Supp. 2014), a property owner’s desire to market, sell and/or convey property in a vacant condition constituted “other good cause” for purposes of terminating a tenancy. In the absence of evidence of selective eviction or other acts of bad faith, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s stated reason for eviction satisfied the statute. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Grimes" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in various aspects of the design, construction, and installation of a ventilation system in a research laboratory at the University of New Hampshire (UNH). By November 2003, the project was substantially complete. In November 2009, plaintiff suffered injuries while working in the laboratory due to a faulty vent pipe that exposed her to toxic fumes. In February 2012, plaintiff filed a negligence action against Oak Point, and in November 2012, she added Ambient as a defendant. Plaintiff also sued UNH, which owned the laboratory where plaintiff was injured, but she eventually settled her claims with UNH. Defendants subsequently filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of repose found in RSA 508:4-b, I. Plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lennartz v. Oak Point Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ismail Yaman, a Turkish citizen, and respondent Linda Yaman, a United States citizen, were married in Turkey in August 2000, and respondent became a Turkish citizen in October 2000. Their first child, K.Y., was born in March 2002, in the United States. In January 2003, the family moved to Turkey. The couple’s second child, E.Y., was born in Turkey in August 2003. In early to mid-2004, the respondent became suspicious that petitioner was sexually abusing their older child. In December 2004, the parties separated, and early the next year, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Turkish Family Court. On March 13, 2006, after conducting six hearings in which the court considered evidence from both parties and from the independent experts, the Turkish court rejected respondent’s claim that petitioner had abused the children, and issued an order granting sole legal custody of the children to petitioner and granting respondent visitation. Respondent appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey on two occasions, and both times the appellate court affirmed the family court’s order. The family court finalized its order in 2007. Within weeks after the family court’s order became final, and without notice to petitioner, respondent fled Turkey with the children by engaging the services of a self-proclaimed “snatch back” specialist. After years of searching, petitioner, who remained in Turkey, was informed in December 2011 that respondent and the children were living in New Hampshire. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) with the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the return of the children to Turkey would not pose a grave risk of harm to them because respondent had not established that petitioner abused them. The court also found, however, that the respondent had established that the children were “settled” in New Hampshire within the meaning of Article 12 of the Hague Convention; in light of this finding, the court ruled that it lacked the authority to order the children’s return to Turkey. Alternatively, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, even if it did have the authority to do so, it would not order the return of the children to Turkey. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which determined that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to order the return of “settled” children, but affirmed the trial court’s alternative ruling denying return of the children on equitable grounds as a sustainable exercise of discretion. After its review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting enforcement of the Turkish custody order. View "In the Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendants K. William Clauson and the law firm of Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas, represented plaintiff James Yager in an action against D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. (Hardwick), which alleged that Hardwick was the party who "trespassed on Plaintiff's land and cut timber belonging to Plaintiff." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hardwick because the action was filed more than three years after the timber cutting ceased and, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Plaintiff subsequently filed a malpractice action against defendants, alleging that they "breached the duty of care owed to [plaintiff] by failing to file the D.H. Hardwick action within the timeframe allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and by otherwise failing to represent [plaintiff's] interests with reasonable professional care, skill, and knowledge." Defendants moved to dismiss the case, alleging that plaintiff: (1) failed to provide requested discovery information; and (2) failed to disclose the experts required to prove his case. The trial court granted the defendants' motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that expert testimony was not required to prove legal malpractice where defendants failed to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court did not examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether the nature of the case was such that expert testimony was required. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eddie Nash & Sons, Inc. appealed a circuit court order ruling that respondent the Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist (the estate), owed petitioner $544.21, and excluding the petitioner's claim for post-judgment interest. In November 2001, petitioner brought a small claims complaint against the decedent for $5,000.00 owed pursuant to an agreement to purchase logging equipment. In February 2002, the court entered a default judgment for the petitioner for $5,136.99, including costs and interest. After the decedent failed to make any payment on the judgment, petitioner filed a motion for periodic payments. In 2003, the district court entered a periodic payment order requiring monthly payments of $50 to begin in May 2003 until the "judgment and all costs are paid in full." The order listed the total due as $5,394.26, but did not indicate why that total had increased more than $250 in the thirteen months following entry of the original judgment. Neither the 2002 judgment nor the 2003 order made explicit reference to the petitioner's entitlement to continuing post-judgment interest. The decedent made payments under the order each month until May 2011; petitioner was made aware of his death in June 2011. Petitioner filed a creditor's claim against the estate that included $3,697.57 for "Balance of Court Judgment," and requested the total claim "Plus Interest." The estate objected to the claim, which petitioner later amended to consist only of the $3,697.57 for the remaining balance on the court judgment, "plus statutory post[-]judgment interest on that amount." At a hearing on the objection, Susan Nash (counsel for petitioner), stated her belief, based on her own extensive experience in small claims court, that judgments in small claims actions always included continuing post-judgment interest. The estate agreed that petitioner was owed $544.21 as the remaining balance due on the $5,394.26 specified in the periodic payment order, but argued that post-judgment interest had not been awarded, and should be excluded from the claim, because the periodic payment order was silent on the subject. The probate division agreed, and entered judgment for the petitioner for $544.21. On appeal, petitioner argued that the probate division erred when it excluded its claim for statutory post-judgment interest. The estate countered that petitioner's claim for post-judgment interest was barred by res judicata and was an attempt to retroactively modify the 2003 periodic payment order. Because petitioner was entitled, as a matter of law, to continuing post-judgment interest, the Supreme Court concluded the probate division erred in excluding its claim for that interest. View "In re Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist" on Justia Law

Appellant Kerry McCarty, as executrix of the Estate of Ruth C. McCarty, appealed a circuit court order denying her motion to dismiss the claim of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for repayment of medical assistance provided to the decedent through the State's Medicaid program. She argued the court erred by concluding that DHHS's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Trinity EMS, Inc. appealed a circuit court order dismissing its collection action against defendant Timothy Coombs. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant in 2003. Defendant made some payments, but as of March 2012, the judgment had not been satisfied. Plaintiff filed a new suit in 2012, for a new judgment, which it could use to attach the defendant’s real estate, because the first judgment was outside of the statute of limitations for an action of debt upon a judgment. In dismissing plaintiff's 2012 suit, the trial court ordered that "all hearings should be scheduled in [the 2003 action’s docket]." Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion, finding (in relevant part): "There is no Cause of Action for obtaining 'an attachment' which is what Plaintiff is seeking. . . . Plaintiff has a judgment. It was apparently never recorded and is beyond the limitation period set forth in RSA 511." On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing its 2012 action because its complaint set forth a claim upon which relief could have been granted. The Supreme Court disagreed after review of the pertinent New Hampshire case law: plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trinity EMS, Inc. v. Coombs " on Justia Law