Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff John Farrelly appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Concord police officers Walter Carroll and Eric Pichler and the City of Concord (city), on grounds that defendants were entitled to official and vicarious immunity. Plaintiff was charged with harassing his ex-girlfriend. Carroll and Pichler drafted the criminal complaint against the plaintiff. Ultimately, the charges against plaintiff were dropped. Plaintiff brought claims against the defendants for: (1) malicious prosecution (count I); (2) false imprisonment (count II); (3) violation of his rights of free speech and against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New Hampshire Constitution (count III); and (4) negligence (count IV). The court rejected the defendants’ arguments based upon RSA 594:13 and RSA 594:10, and found that the warrantless arrest was unlawful. However, the court ruled that the defendants were immune from suit. The court granted summary judgment to the city on count IV (negligence) because it concluded that the exception to municipal immunity found in RSA 507-B:2 (2010) does not apply, as the claim asserted therein has no nexus to cars or premises. This case presented a question of whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in "Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co.," (156 N.H. 202 (2007)) applied to intentional torts. The Court concluded that it did, and that the language set forth in "Huckins v. McSweeney," (166 N.H. 176 (2014)) had to be interpreted consistently with the standard articulated in Everitt. Although the Court found this to be a close case, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Farrelly v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Respondents Mesiti Development, Inc., JVL Construction Company, Inc., and Brook Hollow Corporation, appealed a superior court order dismissing their counterclaims against petitioner Town of Londonderry. In 2012, the Town filed a bill of interpleader to determine whether $264,517.02 in surplus impact fees collected under the Town’s impact fee ordinance should have been refunded to the developers who paid the impact fees or to the current owners of the properties for which the fees had been paid. Although the Town’s impact fee ordinance specifies that the current owners are entitled to the refunds, the Town sought to confirm that the ordinance is consistent with the impact fee statute. The bill listed seventeen properties and their respective impact fee payors and current owners. Additional parties intervened thereafter. Several parties, including the respondents, moved to add counterclaims alleging, among other things: (1) violations of RSA 674:21, V; (2) negligence; (3) violation of fiduciary duties owed to impact fee payors; (4) violation of the public trust in government; and (5) violation of the municipal budget law. The Town filed a motion to dismiss these counterclaims, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the order dismissing these claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Terrie Harman appealed a circuit court order denying her and her ex-husband Thomas McCarron's request to un-do their divorce. The parties were married in 1989. In July 2014, they were granted an uncontested decree of divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences that caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In March 2015, they jointly filed a “Petition to Change Court Order,” stating that they have “reconciled and therefore request the [trial court] to approve the attached agreement to vacate the July 1, 2014 divorce decree.” The attached agreement, signed by both parties, stated that they “agree that the . . . 2014 divorce decree shall be vacated in full and in all respects.” The trial court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that because New Hampshire courts “have authority to set aside, vacate, modify or amend their orders,” and have vacated final divorce decrees upon the request of one of the parties, the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to vacate the parties’ divorce decree. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in the absence of a statute authorizing the trial court to vacate a final divorce decree on the ground of the parties’ reconciliation, the trial court did not err in concluding that it had no such authority. View "In the Matter of Harman & McCarron" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law

Respondent Frank Ball appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to terminate his child support obligation as to his and Glenda Ball's eldest child. Respondent argued as grounds for termination the child having turned 18 and graduating from high school. In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring respondent to pay petitioner weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. Under the agreement, respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and . . . principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." According to respondent (and not disputed by petitioner), the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008, and the Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation modifying their Massachusetts decree. In the modification, they agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in the Massachusetts decree was "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law . . . until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." In her argument before the Supreme Court, petitioner relied upon RSA 546-B:49, III, which provided in pertinent part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state." Petitioner contended that, pursuant to this provision, because Massachusetts law would not shorten the duration of the respondent's child support obligation under these circumstances, the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that petitioner waived the alleged error by entering into the 2008 stipulation and by not arguing in the 2008 proceedings that applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation was error. Because the 2008 New Hampshire order was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because the petitioner waived any legal error in the 2008 order approving the parties' stipulation, the trial court erred by not extinguishing respondent's obligation to support the parties' eldest child as required by the court's 2008 order. View "In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball " on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Eldridge was a resident and condominium owner at the Whip-Poor-Will Condominium Complex in Hudson. The condominium complex was governed by two different entities: the Condominium Owners' Association (COA) and the Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Townhouse Owners' Association (TOA). Each association had separate and distinct legal obligations as set forth in the Condominium Declaration. Plaintiff has several disabling impairments that impact his mobility. When a walkway had not been repaired as he requested, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the COA with the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (HRC). Shortly thereafter, the COA repaired the plaintiff's walkway. The HRC, which continued to investigate the matter despite the repair, determined that there was probable cause to support a finding of discrimination and notified the COA that it had scheduled a public hearing on the complaint. The COA subsequently removed the case to superior court and filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. As relevant to this appeal, the COA argued that plaintiff's discrimination complaint should be dismissed because the HRC had not commenced proceedings within twenty-four months after the filing of the charge of discrimination, as required by statute. The Superior Court denied the COA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the twenty-four month limit specified in the statute was not jurisdictional. The COA then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that: (1) the case was moot because the walkway had been repaired; (2) the COA was not an entity covered by the Human Rights Act; (3) the plaintiff's claim was time-barred; (4) there was no dispute that the COA had accommodated the plaintiff; and (5) the COA had no legal obligation or authority to replace the walkway because it was located in a Townhouse Limited Common Area. The Superior Court (Temple, J.) granted the COA's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the plain language of the Declaration, the COA lacked authority over plaintiff's walkway and, as such, plaintiff had pursued the wrong party in seeking an accommodation. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asserted, for the first time, that because the COA had arranged for the walkway to be repaired, it had authority to repair the walkway. The court denied plaintiff's motion, reaffirming its earlier determination that the TOA, not the COA, had sole control over the walkway, and refusing to consider both plaintiff's theory regarding the COA's "assumed" authority over the walkway and any "new evidence" in support thereof. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was untimely under RSA 354-A:21, III, and as such, affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Eldridge v. Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Condo. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah and Matthew Hogan appealed a Superior Court decision granting defendant Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC's motion to dismiss their case. On February 4, 2012, both plaintiffs fell from a ski chairlift while skiing at defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs were evaluated that day by a member of defendant’s ski patrol and incident reports were completed. Both plaintiffs reported injuries from the fall. In May, plaintiffs sent notice to defendant by certified return receipt mail, stating that they had retained counsel regarding the February incident. The letter of notice was dated May 3, 2012, arrived at the Henniker post office on May 5, 2012, and was delivered to defendant May 10, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 3, 2013, seeking damages for negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide notice by May 4, 2012 (ninety days from the date of the injury) as required by RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011). Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute because the notice did not arrive until, at the earliest, May 5, 2012, the ninety-first day. In response, plaintiffs countered that mailing the notice on May 3, 2012, the eighty-ninth day, satisfied the statutory requirement. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended that they adhered to the notice provision by completing incident reports and giving verbal notice on the day of the incident and also by giving verbal notice on a later visit to the ski area. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the statutory phrase “shall be notified,” as it appeared in RSA 225-A:25, IV, was satisfied upon dispatch of notice or upon receipt of notice. Plaintiffs argued that the Court adopt the common law “mailbox rule” in interpreting the notice provision; defendant argued the Court interpret the provision to require actual receipt of notice. The Court concluded that both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s proffered constructions were reasonable. Because RSA 225-A:25, IV’s language was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court would normally resolve the ambiguity by determining the legislature’s intent in light of legislative history. In this case, however, the legislative history was not helpful. "In accordance with the principles of uniformity and certainty," the Court held that notice given pursuant to RSA 225-A:25, IV was effective upon mailing. In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the common law mailbox rule to RSA 225-A:25, IV," in consonance with holdings from other jurisdictions." View "Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah and Matthew Hogan appealed a Superior Court decision granting defendant Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC's motion to dismiss their case. On February 4, 2012, both plaintiffs fell from a ski chairlift while skiing at defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs were evaluated that day by a member of defendant’s ski patrol and incident reports were completed. Both plaintiffs reported injuries from the fall. In May, plaintiffs sent notice to defendant by certified return receipt mail, stating that they had retained counsel regarding the February incident. The letter of notice was dated May 3, 2012, arrived at the Henniker post office on May 5, 2012, and was delivered to defendant May 10, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 3, 2013, seeking damages for negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide notice by May 4, 2012 (ninety days from the date of the injury) as required by RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011). Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute because the notice did not arrive until, at the earliest, May 5, 2012, the ninety-first day. In response, plaintiffs countered that mailing the notice on May 3, 2012, the eighty-ninth day, satisfied the statutory requirement. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended that they adhered to the notice provision by completing incident reports and giving verbal notice on the day of the incident and also by giving verbal notice on a later visit to the ski area. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the statutory phrase “shall be notified,” as it appeared in RSA 225-A:25, IV, was satisfied upon dispatch of notice or upon receipt of notice. Plaintiffs argued that the Court adopt the common law “mailbox rule” in interpreting the notice provision; defendant argued the Court interpret the provision to require actual receipt of notice. The Court concluded that both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s proffered constructions were reasonable. Because RSA 225-A:25, IV’s language was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court would normally resolve the ambiguity by determining the legislature’s intent in light of legislative history. In this case, however, the legislative history was not helpful. "In accordance with the principles of uniformity and certainty," the Court held that notice given pursuant to RSA 225-A:25, IV was effective upon mailing. In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the common law mailbox rule to RSA 225-A:25, IV," in consonance with holdings from other jurisdictions." View "Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Gerald Mandelbaum, Christopher Lajoie, Nicholas Meuse, Michael Garrity, and Wayne Bickford, were charged with operating a taxicab business without a license from the City of Manchester. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on federal preemption grounds. The State appealed, arguing that the local ordinances were not preempted by federal law and that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the charges. The Supreme Court concluded after review of the case that defendants did not show that they could not comply with the requirements of both federal law and the City Ordinances in the operation of their respective businesses. Therefore, they failed to demonstrate that state and federal law actually conflicted. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the case. "If the trial court concludes that the defendants’ transportation service falls within the scope of the City Ordinances, they must comply with the requirements of those ordinances." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Bickford" on Justia Law