Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tammy Cole was the biological grandmother of N.B. and J.B. In May 2012, DCYF filed a petition alleging that N.B. and J.B. had been neglected by their biological parents. The court appointed CASA to serve as the children’s guardian ad litem. After the court made a finding of neglect and awarded DCYF legal custody, DCYF removed N.B. and J.B. from their parents’ home and placed them in Cole’s physical custody. In November 2013, the biological parents sexually abused N.B. and J.B. during an unsupervised visit. The court subsequently terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, and the abuse and neglect case was closed. In May 2014, Cole and her husband adopted the children. In July, Cole filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to copy the court’s records relating to the children’s abuse and neglect case. Cole also notified DCYF and CASA that N.B. and J.B. had potential negligence claims against these agencies based upon the abuse that occurred while the children were in the legal custody of DCYF. DCYF and CASA objected to Cole’s motion and each requested a protective order. DCYF and CASA argued that Cole was not entitled to make a copy of the court record, and CASA requested that the court grant a protective order limiting Cole’s inspection of the records to review at the courthouse and limiting disclosure of the court file. After a hearing, the court granted Cole’s motion to copy records and also granted CASA’s request for a protective order, in part. Cole only appealed the part of the circuit court's order required that any future case be filed as confidential and the pleadings filed under seal. She argued that this constituted a prior restraint on free speech that violated her rights under the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions because it was neither narrowly tailored nor did it serve a compelling State interest. Further, she asserted that it impermissibly placed the burden upon her, instead of on the parties seeking nondisclosure, and that it unfairly restricted her disclosure while allowing others to disclose the same information. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the court’s ruling constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, it reversed this part of the order. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review called for the Court to determine the constitutionality of New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-W 654.04(c). The rule required DHHS to include a child’s federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the calculation of a family’s eligibility for benefits under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), as administered by the State’s Financial Assistance to Needy Families program (FANF). Plaintiffs Carrie Hendrick and Jamie Birmingham were mothers whose children received SSI and FANF benefits, and whose benefits were ultimately cut by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and their children, seeking a declaratory judgment that DHHS’s “inclusion of children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income is unlawful and void” pursuant to applicable federal law. In addition, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Rule He-W 654.04 “is invalid because it impairs [their] legal rights.” Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining DHHS from including children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income and an award of attorney’s fees “because this litigation will result in a substantial benefit to the public.” After requesting that the Solicitor General of the United States file an amicus brief in this matter, and after reviewing that brief, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the Supremacy Clause did not permit the State to redirect federal benefits as required by Rule He-W 654.04(c). The rule, by counting a disabled child’s SSI benefits as income available to the child’s “assistance group,” treated the child’s benefits as a source of income for the entire household. The rule, thereby, reduced a household’s TANF benefit by one dollar for every dollar in SSI that was received by a disabled child in the household. Because the rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the New Hampshire Court held that Rule He-W 654.04(c) was preempted by federal law and, thus, invalid to the extent that it required inclusion of children’s SSI as income to the TANF assistance group for the purpose of determining eligibility for TANF benefits. View "Hendrick v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law

Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation’s claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Dowgiert appealed a superior court order dismissing his plea of title, which he filed in response to a possessory action brought in the circuit court by plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in ruling that the plea was time-barred under RSA 479:25, II (Supp. 2015) and RSA 479:25, II-a (2013). After review, the Court held that it did not, and, accordingly, affirmed. View "The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee v. Dowgiert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs New Hampshire Right to Life and Jackie Pelletier, appealed superior court orders granting in part and denying in part their petition for an order requiring defendants the Director, Charitable Trusts Unit (CTU), the Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General (AG), the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy (Board of Pharmacy), and the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), collectively referred to as “the State,” to produce, under the Right-to-Know Law, without redaction, all documents and other materials responsive to plaintiffs’ prior requests. The trial court ordered the State to produce certain documents, but upheld the State’s withholding or redactions of other documents because it determined that they were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that in so deciding and in denying their associated requests for attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court erred. At issue were three Right-to-Know requests that plaintiffs made of the State in July 2014 and September 2014 for documents and materials related to Planned Parenthood of Northern New England (PPNNE) and/or its New Hampshire clinics. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order upholding the State's decision to withhold certain DVDs from disclosure, and remanded for the trial court to conduct additional fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "New Hampshire Right to Life v. Director, New Hampshire Charitable Trusts Unit" on Justia Law

Petitioners Scott Bach and the Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. (ANJRPC), appealed a superior court decision entering summary judgment in favor of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Petitioners had challenged, as ultra vires and invalid, Department administrative rules that required nonresidents applying for a concealed-carry license in New Hampshire to provide proof of a “resident state license” to carry a concealed weapon. The trial court concluded that the administrative rules were valid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the rules at issue were indeed ultra vires, it reversed and remanded. View "Bach v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathan Wolfgram appealed a superior court order affirming a decision by respondent the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS), to retain notations on petitioner’s motor vehicle record referring to his certification and decertification as a habitual offender, despite the fact that the convictions that led to his habitual offender certification had been annulled. Petitioner argued that, because the habitual offender notations revealed the fact of his annulled criminal convictions, allowing DOS to retain the notations on his motor vehicle record defeated the purpose of the annulment statute. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, reversed and remanded. View "Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kathleen Nawn-Benoit and Thomas Benoit appealed a superior court order granting the summary judgment motion filed by defendants Ronald and Rita Delude, and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. In July 2014, over the objections of several lot owners in the parties' subdivision, plaintiffs obtained a variance to build a single-family residence on property designated as Common Land in their original 1974 plans. A "Declaration of Covenants" was recorded with the development plan, making all lots in the development subject to the Declaration, and the intention of the Developer to create "open spaces and other common facilities for the benefit of [that] community." In January 2015, plaintiffs brought a petition against the residents of the subdivision seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Declaration was unenforceable; (2) an order that they acquired title to the Common Land “free and clear of the Declaration through adverse possession”; and (3) to the extent that the Declaration was deemed enforceable, an order requiring defendants to form a homeowners' association, purchase the Common Land from plaintiffs “at its fair market value,” and reimburse them for their “out-of-pocket expenses . . . , including real estate taxes.” The trial court concluded that “[b]ecause the undisputed material facts and the applicable law apply equally to the [plaintiffs’] claims asserted against all of the other [defendant]-lot owners, they are likewise entitled to summary judgment.” The court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benoit v. Cerasaro" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Willette appealed a circuit court decision issuing a writ of possession in favor of plaintiff, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In February 2013, Freddie Mac purchased Willette's property through a foreclosure sale. Freddie Mac subsequently filed a landlord and tenant writ in the district division seeking possession of the premises. After a hearing, Willette filed the required recognizance with the district division and then filed a title action in superior court. In April 2014, Freddie Mac removed the title action from the superior court to the federal district court. The federal district court granted Freddie Mac’s motion to dismiss Willette’s title action. Afterward, Freddie Mac filed a motion in superior court for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied. Freddie Mac then requested a hearing in the district division on the merits of its possessory action. At the hearing, Willette argued that the district division lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. The district division disagreed and issued the writ. On appeal, Willette argued that the district division erred in issuing the writ of possession because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the possessory action; and (2) Freddie Mac failed to obtain judgment pertaining to its possessory action in both the superior court and the federal district court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Willette" on Justia Law

Respondents Marco Dorfsman and the University of New Hampshire Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (Union), appealed a superior court order granting the petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioners the University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees and the University of New Hampshire (collectively, UNH). The superior court vacated the arbitrator’s decision that UNH had violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Union by terminating Dorfsman’s employment for engaging in an act of “moral turpitude.” Dorfsman was an Associate Professor and the Chair of the Language, Literature, and Culture Department at UNH. In December of that year, he intentionally lowered the evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer by erasing markings on the evaluations; if the highest ranking had been given, he entered a different and lower rating. In May 2013, UNH terminated Dorfsman’s employment for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA, the parties submitted to binding arbitration to resolve that grievance. On appeal, respondents argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s decision, the issues were not ripe for judicial review, and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he found that UNH lacked just cause to terminate Dorfsman’s employment. Respondents did not challenge the arbitrator’s finding that Dorfsman’s conduct constituted “moral turpitude” within the meaning of the CBA. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "University System of New Hampshire Board of Trustees v. Dorfsman" on Justia Law