Hogan v. Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC

Plaintiffs Deborah and Matthew Hogan appealed a Superior Court decision granting defendant Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC's motion to dismiss their case. On February 4, 2012, both plaintiffs fell from a ski chairlift while skiing at defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs were evaluated that day by a member of defendant’s ski patrol and incident reports were completed. Both plaintiffs reported injuries from the fall. In May, plaintiffs sent notice to defendant by certified return receipt mail, stating that they had retained counsel regarding the February incident. The letter of notice was dated May 3, 2012, arrived at the Henniker post office on May 5, 2012, and was delivered to defendant May 10, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 3, 2013, seeking damages for negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide notice by May 4, 2012 (ninety days from the date of the injury) as required by RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011). Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute because the notice did not arrive until, at the earliest, May 5, 2012, the ninety-first day. In response, plaintiffs countered that mailing the notice on May 3, 2012, the eighty-ninth day, satisfied the statutory requirement. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended that they adhered to the notice provision by completing incident reports and giving verbal notice on the day of the incident and also by giving verbal notice on a later visit to the ski area. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the statutory phrase “shall be notified,” as it appeared in RSA 225-A:25, IV, was satisfied upon dispatch of notice or upon receipt of notice. Plaintiffs argued that the Court adopt the common law “mailbox rule” in interpreting the notice provision; defendant argued the Court interpret the provision to require actual receipt of notice. The Court concluded that both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s proffered constructions were reasonable. Because RSA 225-A:25, IV’s language was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court would normally resolve the ambiguity by determining the legislature’s intent in light of legislative history. In this case, however, the legislative history was not helpful. "In accordance with the principles of uniformity and certainty," the Court held that notice given pursuant to RSA 225-A:25, IV was effective upon mailing. In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the common law mailbox rule to RSA 225-A:25, IV," in consonance with holdings from other jurisdictions." View "Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC" on Justia Law