Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A parent corporation headquartered in Massachusetts, together with its affiliated companies, forms a "water’s edge combined group" for New Hampshire business profits tax purposes. One group member realized a substantial capital gain in 2017 from selling a business division, while the parent company incurred a significant capital loss in 2020 from selling a subsidiary. The group attempted to use the parent’s 2020 capital loss as a carryback to offset the 2017 capital gain of another member, thereby reducing its overall tax liability in New Hampshire.The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) audited the group’s returns and denied the requested refund, reasoning that state law only permits a capital loss carryback to offset the same entity’s prior gains, not the gains of a different group member. After the DRA’s Hearings Bureau upheld this assessment, the group appealed to the Merrimack County Superior Court. The Superior Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of the taxpayer group, concluding that the relevant statutes allowed a combined group to offset one member’s capital loss against another’s gain. The court also found that certain administrative rules conflicted with the statute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Superior Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under RSA chapter 77-A, each member of a water’s edge combined group must calculate its net income, including capital losses and gains, separately, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, before the group’s net incomes are combined. Thus, a capital loss incurred by one group member cannot be used to offset a capital gain realized by another member. The court also found no constitutional violation and ruled that the administrative rules were consistent with the statute. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hologic, Inc. v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin." on Justia Law

Advent Medical Products, Inc., founded in 2004 by Randall Fincke, sought to develop and market manual and automatic defibrillators. After obtaining FDA clearance for some products in 2010, Advent began soliciting investments primarily through Fincke’s brother in New Hampshire. From 2012 to 2017, thirteen investors purchased securities, typically a promissory note, call option, and put option, without the company registering these securities as required under New Hampshire’s Uniform Securities Act. Product development was delayed due to regulatory changes requiring more stringent FDA approval, battery defects, enforcement actions in Massachusetts, and the COVID-19 pandemic.The New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation initiated an administrative proceeding alleging illegal sales of unregistered securities and misrepresentation of material facts to investors between 2010 and 2016. After a hearing, the Bureau’s director found the respondents liable for both violations, imposed a $345,000 fine for 138 violations, ordered rescission of the investments totaling $480,000, awarded $60,000 in costs, and issued a permanent injunction against offering or selling securities in New Hampshire. The director subsequently denied motions to reconsider.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the director’s orders, applying a standard that only errors of law or unjust/unreasonable orders by a clear preponderance of evidence would warrant reversal. The Court reversed the director’s findings that the respondents misrepresented material facts, determining that omissions about Fincke’s prior lawsuits were permissible and statements about product readiness were not proven false when made. The Court also reversed findings related to certain exemptions and extraterritorial sales, vacated the imposed penalties and injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed that joint and several liability and the award of investigative costs were appropriate. The director’s orders were affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Appeal of Advent Medical Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Two children were removed from their home after the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) received reports of neglect and abuse by their legal guardians, the paternal great-grandparents. The father, who lived in the home, was found responsible for neglect due to his failure to protect the children from abuse and the unsanitary conditions of his living space. Following removal, the court established objectives for the father to correct the neglect, including maintaining sobriety, obtaining appropriate housing, and prioritizing the children's needs. DCYF provided referrals and assistance to help the father meet these objectives.After several review hearings, the father showed substantial compliance, particularly in bonding with the children and engaging in treatment and counseling, but he failed to secure adequate housing. At a permanency hearing, he was granted a 90-day extension to resolve housing issues and cooperate with an Interstate Compact home study for placement in Vermont. During the extension, the father regressed—he canceled visits, relapsed into substance use, delayed paperwork, and faced criminal charges, leading DCYF to shift from supporting reunification to seeking termination of parental rights. The trial court found that despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts, the father failed to correct the neglect conditions and that termination was in the children's best interests.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the father did not correct the conditions of neglect within twelve months, plus the extension, and that DCYF made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. The court also determined that termination of parental rights served the children’s best interests, supported by evidence of their improved well-being in a stable foster home. The trial court’s findings were upheld as supported by the record and not erroneous as a matter of law. View "In re H.H." on Justia Law

The case centers on an insurance dispute involving the extent of uninsured or underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in a personal liability umbrella policy. In 2000, the insured applied for a $1 million umbrella policy and expressly rejected UIM coverage by checking a waiver box and signing a statement indicating this rejection would apply to future renewals and replacement policies unless a written request was made to add coverage. In 2001, the insured increased the umbrella policy’s liability limit to $5 million but did not sign a new UIM waiver at that time. Over the following years, the policy was renewed annually, and changes were made to covered vehicles and drivers. In 2021, after the plaintiff was injured in an accident involving the insured’s covered vehicle, she sought UIM coverage from the umbrella policy, but the insurer denied the claim based on the original 2000 waiver.The Hillsborough-northern judicial district Superior Court granted summary judgment to the insurer, concluding that the initial UIM rejection applied to subsequent renewals and the increased liability limit, thus barring UIM coverage for the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that under the applicable version of RSA 264:15, I, the insured’s act of increasing the policy limits constituted a new “purchase” of insurance that triggered the statutory requirement for UIM coverage unless expressly waived at that time.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed in part, holding that under the 1991 version of RSA 264:15, I, the increase of $4 million in umbrella coverage constituted a new purchase of insurance, requiring automatic UIM coverage absent a contemporaneous waiver. Because the insured did not execute a new waiver when increasing the limits, UIM coverage in that amount attached. However, the initial waiver remained effective for the original $1 million coverage. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this holding. View "Royce v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email.The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law

Three siblings became co-beneficiaries of their late mother’s revocable trust, which was to be divided equally among them. The trust included two properties in New Hampshire: a longstanding family home and an adjacent parcel, as well as a nearby home that one sibling, acting as trustee, had purchased for their mother using her funds. After their mother’s death, the trustee resided at the newly acquired property, funded renovations with trust assets, and did not pay rent. Disputes arose among the siblings over how to distribute the real estate, prompting the trustee to file a petition for partition. One sibling counterclaimed, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the trustee.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division reviewed the petition and counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the court awarded the family home and adjacent parcel to the sibling who requested it, and the renovated property to the trustee. The court calculated the value of the renovated property to include both improvements funded by the trust and the period of rent-free occupancy. It found the trustee had breached fiduciary duties by refusing to distribute property and by prioritizing personal interests over the trust’s beneficiaries, ordering him to reimburse the trust for all litigation-related attorney’s fees and costs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the probate court’s rulings. It held that the probate court acted within its broad equitable powers in distributing the properties as it did, and that its findings were supported by the record. The Supreme Court further concluded that the probate court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims, since they directly concerned the administration and distribution of trust assets. Finally, the Supreme Court determined that specific challenges to the remedy ordered for breach of fiduciary duty were either waived or not preserved for appellate review. View "Moffat v. Srebro" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was the biological father of a young girl who died while in his care. In 2019, after the defendant and his family became homeless, the child began to have toileting accidents, prompting the defendant to repeatedly hit her. On December 7, 2019, after several such incidents, the defendant struck the child multiple times in the head, after which she died. The defendant then concealed her body for several months, moving it between various locations and ultimately disposing of it. Subsequently, the defendant misled others about the child’s whereabouts, claiming to have returned her to her mother, who had not seen her since April 2019.The Hillsborough County Superior Court joined the charges for trial, including second degree murder, second degree assault, falsifying physical evidence, witness tampering, and abuse of a corpse. The defendant later moved to sever the second degree assault charge, arguing that new information from a prosecution witness changed the circumstances, but the court denied the motion. Various evidentiary motions were also filed, some granted and some denied in part. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the trial court erred by failing to sever the second degree assault and second degree murder charges, as the strong evidence of the prior assault could have improperly influenced the jury’s decision on the weaker murder charge. The court held that this error was not harmless with respect to the murder conviction but was harmless regarding the assault conviction. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the second degree murder conviction, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law

Law enforcement obtained and executed search warrants for two residences and a vehicle associated with the defendant based on an affidavit by a police detective. During the searches, various items were seized, including firearms and drugs. The defendant was later indicted on several drug-related offenses, including conspiracy to sell a controlled drug, possession with intent to sell, sale of a controlled drug, and being a drug enterprise leader. The State moved to join all these charges for a single trial, and the court granted joinder for the drug charges. Before trial, the defendant sought to suppress evidence from the searches, claiming the affidavit contained material misrepresentations, but the court denied this motion without a hearing.The Superior Court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s ownership and possession of firearms, as well as firearms found with drugs in a co-conspirator’s vehicle, ruling that this evidence was intrinsic to the drug offenses. At trial, the State presented testimony about the defendant’s general firearm possession and specific firearms, as well as evidence and testimony about his drug-related activities. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the trial court erred in admitting general evidence of the defendant’s firearm ownership and possession as intrinsic to the drug charges, holding that such evidence was inadmissible because its connection to the charged offenses was too attenuated. However, the court concluded that evidence of firearms found with drugs in a co-conspirator’s vehicle was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence. The court also determined that the trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the sale of a controlled drug charge for insufficient evidence, but vacated the order joining that charge with the others, remanding for further consideration. The defendant’s convictions were reversed, the joinder order vacated in part, and the case remanded. View "State v. Cherry" on Justia Law