Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Metro Treatment of New Hampshire, L.P. operates outpatient opioid treatment clinics licensed by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire is a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) responsible for arranging healthcare services for Medicaid-eligible patients, including some treated by Metro. The parties’ relationship was governed by an ancillary services agreement. Following an audit of Metro’s patient records, AmeriHealth determined that Metro had violated certain state administrative rules and sought to recoup $36,722.27 in alleged Medicaid overpayments. After Metro appealed through the contractual process, AmeriHealth reduced the recoupment amount and advised Metro it could seek further review through a State Fair Hearing as provided by statute.Metro then filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of DHHS, but argued that the AAU lacked jurisdiction over payment disputes between MCOs and providers. The AAU issued a written decision concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII to hear appeals arising from determinations that Medicaid payments were inappropriately made and should be recouped. The AAU denied Metro’s motion for reconsideration and stayed further proceedings pending Metro’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the AAU has jurisdiction in this dispute. The court held that the AAU does possess jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII because Metro is a provider licensed by DHHS and the statute provides for appeals by such providers. The court rejected Metro’s argument that the statute or administrative rules limited jurisdiction only to disputes involving direct departmental actions. The decision of the AAU was affirmed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of Metro Treatment of N.H." on Justia Law

Two insurance companies, Century Indemnity Company (CIC) and The Home Insurance Company (Home), both issued policies to a common insured covering the same risks. CIC also served as a reinsurer for Home. After Home became insolvent in 2003, it entered liquidation proceedings under New Hampshire’s Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. In 2023, the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner, as Home’s liquidator, settled Home’s liability to the insured for a specified amount, enabling the insured to assert a Class II claim against Home’s estate. However, because Home’s assets were insufficient, the insured would not receive the full settlement amount.CIC, anticipating that it might have to pay the insured for the shortfall between Home’s settlement amount and the actual distribution from Home’s estate, filed a contingent contribution claim against Home. CIC sought to offset this contribution claim against its reinsurance obligation to Home. The Liquidator disallowed CIC’s contribution claim, arguing that Home’s liability was satisfied by the allowed claim, regardless of the amount actually paid. The parties submitted to a referee the question of whether CIC’s contribution right should be based on the full settlement amount or only on the distributions made. The referee concluded that the settlement amount was controlling. CIC moved to recommit the referee’s order, but the Merrimack County Superior Court denied this motion, adopting the referee’s reasoning.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered whether the statutory scheme abrogated common law rules on contribution and whether CIC’s contribution rights should be based on the settlement amount or actual distributions. The court held that the Act provides a comprehensive scheme that abrogates inconsistent common law principles. It concluded that CIC’s contribution rights are determined by the settlement amount, not the actual distributions. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Two Dartmouth College students were arrested in Hanover, New Hampshire, prompting Valley News to file a Right-to-Know request to obtain their arrest records. After months of email exchanges between the Town of Hanover, Valley News, and the students’ attorney, Hanover decided not to release the records, citing ongoing criminal prosecution despite the students’ attorney assenting to disclosure. Hanover based its refusal on exemptions derived from prior case law, specifically the Murray exemptions, which mirror certain provisions of the federal Freedom of Information Act regarding law enforcement records.Hanover initiated an action for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court, seeking a ruling on whether it was legally required to release the arrest records in light of the pending prosecutions. Valley News counterclaimed, seeking an order for disclosure with redactions. The Superior Court ordered Hanover to disclose the records and awarded Valley News attorney’s fees and costs. Upon Hanover’s motion to reconsider, the court upheld the disclosure order but reversed the award of fees and costs, reasoning that Hanover had made a good faith effort in navigating unsettled law. Neither party appealed this order. After Hanover released the records, Valley News moved to reopen the case for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, which the Superior Court denied, finding Hanover neither knew nor should have known its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that Valley News’s motion was timely and that, under the Right-to-Know Law, Hanover knew or should have known that at least some of the records, especially publicly available information, were not exempt from disclosure. The court found that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance and that Hanover’s blanket denial was improper. The court reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for an award to Valley News. View "Town of Hanover v. Valley News" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of voting in more than one state during the 2016 general election. He maintained residences in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts and was alleged to have voted in Holderness, New Hampshire by absentee ballot and in Belmont, Massachusetts in person. The State introduced evidence of his voting history in both states from 1996 to 2018 and sought to exclude statements by an acquaintance, William Botelho, who had previously admitted to voting in the defendant's name in Massachusetts.The Grafton County Superior Court allowed the State to admit the defendant’s prior voting records under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluded Botelho’s statements as inadmissible propensity evidence, also denying the defendant’s request for a Richards hearing regarding Botelho’s potential testimony. After a jury found the defendant guilty, the Superior Court denied his post-trial motions for dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to set aside the verdict.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the Superior Court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior voting history because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since the prior alleged acts were nearly identical to the charged crime. The court also held that evidence of Botelho’s confession to voting in the defendant’s name in the 2016 election was not evidence of other bad acts under Rule 404(b) and should not have been categorically excluded. The Supreme Court further ruled that, if Botelho asserts his Fifth Amendment rights on remand, the trial court must hold a Richards hearing.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motions regarding territorial jurisdiction, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence, but reversed the conviction due to the evidentiary errors and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The defendant, a patient at a community mental health center, was informed by his career counselor that he had been dismissed from classes at UNH Manchester and would be removed by security if he returned to campus. Distressed by this news, he insisted he would still attend his evening class. In communications with his counselor and later his therapist, he reiterated his plan to attend, culminating in a statement asking if “doing a mass shooting” would be required for him to get what he wanted. When told his statement would be reported, he claimed it was a figure of speech. The counselor reported his comments to the treatment team and local police, in accordance with center policy. Law enforcement notified UNH Manchester, which took security precautions, and later apprehended the defendant. He was indicted for criminal threatening based on his statements.Prior to trial in the Superior Court, the defendant sought to exclude the testimony of his counselor and therapist regarding his statements, asserting the therapist-patient privilege, and also moved to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. The Superior Court denied both motions, finding an “essential need” for the privileged communications and concluding that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The jury convicted the defendant of criminal threatening.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court properly allowed admission of the privileged communications and whether the evidence was sufficient for conviction. The court held that the State demonstrated an “essential need” to pierce the therapist-patient privilege due to the centrality of the communications to the charged offense and the compelling public safety interest in investigating threats of mass violence. The court also found the evidence sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for causing fear, terror, or public inconvenience. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A married couple living in New Hampshire began divorce proceedings after a long-term marriage. The husband had previously suffered a spinal cord injury in Ontario, Canada, before meeting his wife. As a result of lawsuits related to the injury, he acquired two annuities through structured settlements: the first before the marriage and the second during the marriage. After moving to New Hampshire, the couple used the second annuity to support their household. Upon divorce, the wife sought an equitable share of the annuities, and the husband requested to exclude the annuities from division or, alternatively, sought alimony if division occurred.The Circuit Court (Nashua Family Division) found the first annuity, which was acquired before marriage, should remain with the husband, but divided the second annuity equally between the parties, as it was obtained during the marriage. The court denied both parties’ requests for alimony. The husband moved for reconsideration, arguing that Ontario law precluded division of the second annuity and challenging the denial of alimony. The trial court denied the motion, as did the wife’s motion.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that New Hampshire law, not Ontario law, governs the classification of the second annuity as marital property because New Hampshire had the most significant relationship to the marriage at the time of divorce. Under New Hampshire law, the second annuity is divisible marital property. However, the court concluded the trial court erred by not considering the impact of dividing the annuity on the husband’s income and his health-related earning capacity when ruling on alimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the division of property, vacated the denial of alimony, and remanded for further proceedings on alimony. View "In the Matter of Whitehead & Whitehead" on Justia Law

A seller owned a twelve-unit apartment complex and entered into a written contract to sell the property to a buyer for $1.3 million, with a closing date set on or before November 30, 2021. The contract contained a financing contingency requiring the buyer to provide written proof of financing or inability to obtain financing by November 26, 2021, stating that “time is of the essence.” After the buyer’s bank conditionally approved financing, but anticipated a delay in the appraisal, the buyer informed the seller and attempted to extend the financing deadline. While the seller did not sign proposed written extensions, both parties continued to communicate about closing logistics, including scheduling a closing in December. On December 3, the seller terminated the contract, expressing unwillingness to proceed with the sale.The Superior Court of Hillsborough County denied the seller’s motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the buyer’s failure to meet the financing deadline constituted a breach entitling the seller to terminate. The court also denied the seller’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of oral communications and closing agent emails. After a jury trial, the jury found the buyer had not materially breached the contract, that the parties had agreed to extend the closing, and that the seller had materially breached. The trial court then awarded specific performance, ordering the sale to proceed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed. The court held that the seller’s conduct after the missed financing deadline raised a material factual dispute about whether the seller waived its right to declare a default. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of oral communications and that the longstanding presumption favoring specific performance in land sale contracts applied, even where the buyer was an investor. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "J&C Properties v. Rayster Realty" on Justia Law

The case concerns allegations of sexual abuse committed by the defendant against a complainant when she was between the ages of four and ten during visits to the defendant’s home. The complainant testified that the defendant engaged in multiple acts of sexual assault over several years, including threats to her and her family to ensure her silence. After the complainant disclosed the abuse to her mother, law enforcement became involved, which led to the defendant’s indictment on multiple charges, including pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault, felonious sexual assault, and criminal threatening.In Superior Court, the defendant moved for in camera review of the complainant’s counseling records, which the court partially granted. The State successfully moved to allow the complainant to testify by two-way live video feed from outside the defendant’s presence, arguing that testifying in front of the defendant would cause her trauma and render her unavailable. During the trial, the complainant testified remotely. After the State rested, several charges were dismissed or nol prossed by agreement, and the jury ultimately convicted the defendant on the remaining counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that allowing the complainant to testify remotely, outside the defendant’s presence, violated his confrontation right under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution as interpreted in State v. Warren. The court found that this right requires a face-to-face, in-person meeting between the accused and the witness. The court also held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for one pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault charge involving sexual intercourse, as the complainant’s testimony did not establish that the acts occurred over the required statutory period. The court reversed the conviction on that charge and remanded the remaining convictions for further proceedings, vacating the trial court’s discovery order in part for additional review in light of a recent precedent. View "State v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on neighboring parcels of land in Moultonborough, New Hampshire, near Lake Winnipesaukee. The plaintiff owns Lot 3, which abuts Park Lane, and the defendant is a nonprofit club that owns nearby roadways, paths, and a lakefront beach area reserved for its members. Both parties’ properties originated from a 1959 subdivision, with subsequent conveyances and subdivisions altering the land’s configuration. The plaintiff asserted that Lot 3 retained rights to use the defendant’s roadways and beach area, either through implied or prescriptive easement, based on prior deeds and historical use by Lot 3’s owners.The Superior Court for Carroll County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It determined that Lot 3 was not part of a common scheme of development that would entitle it to membership benefits in the club, including the use of the roadways and beach. The trial court found no express or implied easements in the relevant chain of title for Lot 3 and concluded that the plaintiff had not shown twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and applied de novo review to the legal questions. The court held that Lot 3, by virtue of the deed referencing the 1972 subdivision plan showing Park Lane and Far Echo Road as boundaries, has an implied easement as a matter of law to use those roadways. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding claims to use other roadways and the Lot 200 beach area, finding no implied or prescriptive easement rights for Lot 3. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club" on Justia Law

The case involved a traffic stop in Salem, New Hampshire, where a police officer, upon detecting a strong odor of alcohol in a vehicle, interacted with its passengers. The defendant, seated in the back, became verbally aggressive toward the officer, yelling and cursing. After being ordered out of the vehicle, the defendant stepped toward the officer, pointed at him, and shoved his finger into the officer’s chest. When the officer attempted to arrest him, the defendant pulled away, struggled, and resisted being handcuffed. A portion of this encounter was captured on video by another passenger.Following these events, the defendant was charged in the Rockingham County Superior Court with misdemeanor counts of simple assault and resisting arrest. At trial, the jury was presented with video evidence and heard testimony from the officers involved. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, but the trial court (St. Hilaire, J.) denied these motions. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, leading to the present appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The defendant argued that appellate review of video evidence should be de novo, asserting that the court was in as good a position as the jury to interpret such evidence. The court rejected this argument, holding that video evidence must be reviewed under the traditional standard: all evidence, including video and live testimony, is viewed in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the court found sufficient evidence to support both convictions. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that his conduct was de minimis, noting it was not preserved or plain error. The court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law