Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email.The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law

Three siblings became co-beneficiaries of their late mother’s revocable trust, which was to be divided equally among them. The trust included two properties in New Hampshire: a longstanding family home and an adjacent parcel, as well as a nearby home that one sibling, acting as trustee, had purchased for their mother using her funds. After their mother’s death, the trustee resided at the newly acquired property, funded renovations with trust assets, and did not pay rent. Disputes arose among the siblings over how to distribute the real estate, prompting the trustee to file a petition for partition. One sibling counterclaimed, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the trustee.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division reviewed the petition and counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the court awarded the family home and adjacent parcel to the sibling who requested it, and the renovated property to the trustee. The court calculated the value of the renovated property to include both improvements funded by the trust and the period of rent-free occupancy. It found the trustee had breached fiduciary duties by refusing to distribute property and by prioritizing personal interests over the trust’s beneficiaries, ordering him to reimburse the trust for all litigation-related attorney’s fees and costs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the probate court’s rulings. It held that the probate court acted within its broad equitable powers in distributing the properties as it did, and that its findings were supported by the record. The Supreme Court further concluded that the probate court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims, since they directly concerned the administration and distribution of trust assets. Finally, the Supreme Court determined that specific challenges to the remedy ordered for breach of fiduciary duty were either waived or not preserved for appellate review. View "Moffat v. Srebro" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was the biological father of a young girl who died while in his care. In 2019, after the defendant and his family became homeless, the child began to have toileting accidents, prompting the defendant to repeatedly hit her. On December 7, 2019, after several such incidents, the defendant struck the child multiple times in the head, after which she died. The defendant then concealed her body for several months, moving it between various locations and ultimately disposing of it. Subsequently, the defendant misled others about the child’s whereabouts, claiming to have returned her to her mother, who had not seen her since April 2019.The Hillsborough County Superior Court joined the charges for trial, including second degree murder, second degree assault, falsifying physical evidence, witness tampering, and abuse of a corpse. The defendant later moved to sever the second degree assault charge, arguing that new information from a prosecution witness changed the circumstances, but the court denied the motion. Various evidentiary motions were also filed, some granted and some denied in part. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the trial court erred by failing to sever the second degree assault and second degree murder charges, as the strong evidence of the prior assault could have improperly influenced the jury’s decision on the weaker murder charge. The court held that this error was not harmless with respect to the murder conviction but was harmless regarding the assault conviction. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the second degree murder conviction, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law

Law enforcement obtained and executed search warrants for two residences and a vehicle associated with the defendant based on an affidavit by a police detective. During the searches, various items were seized, including firearms and drugs. The defendant was later indicted on several drug-related offenses, including conspiracy to sell a controlled drug, possession with intent to sell, sale of a controlled drug, and being a drug enterprise leader. The State moved to join all these charges for a single trial, and the court granted joinder for the drug charges. Before trial, the defendant sought to suppress evidence from the searches, claiming the affidavit contained material misrepresentations, but the court denied this motion without a hearing.The Superior Court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s ownership and possession of firearms, as well as firearms found with drugs in a co-conspirator’s vehicle, ruling that this evidence was intrinsic to the drug offenses. At trial, the State presented testimony about the defendant’s general firearm possession and specific firearms, as well as evidence and testimony about his drug-related activities. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the trial court erred in admitting general evidence of the defendant’s firearm ownership and possession as intrinsic to the drug charges, holding that such evidence was inadmissible because its connection to the charged offenses was too attenuated. However, the court concluded that evidence of firearms found with drugs in a co-conspirator’s vehicle was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence. The court also determined that the trial court did not err in declining to dismiss the sale of a controlled drug charge for insufficient evidence, but vacated the order joining that charge with the others, remanding for further consideration. The defendant’s convictions were reversed, the joinder order vacated in part, and the case remanded. View "State v. Cherry" on Justia Law

A state trooper was hired in 2016 and terminated in 2019 after an internal investigation found he had altered his timecard to accommodate an additional extra-duty detail shift, violating department policy. The termination was also based on his conduct during the investigation. After his termination, the employee moved out of state and did not return to his position even after subsequent legal proceedings.The employee appealed his termination to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB), which found the termination was not warranted by the conduct and was unjust. The PAB reinstated him with a twenty-day suspension without pay and found him credible, though it noted poor judgment and time management. The Division of State Police appealed the reinstatement to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which affirmed the PAB’s decision. After reinstatement, the parties disagreed over whether the employee was entitled to back pay and benefits. The PAB clarified that the reinstatement included back pay, less mitigation and the suspension period. A further dispute arose over whether this back pay should include expected overtime; the PAB ultimately awarded the employee anticipated overtime back pay based on an average of prior overtime earnings. The Division’s motion for rehearing was denied, prompting this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the PAB had authority under RSA 273-D:3, V to award overtime back pay as part of “salary loss suffered.” The court held that the statute limits mandatory reinstatement awards to fixed compensation (“salary”) and does not include speculative amounts like overtime. Therefore, the PAB lacked authority to award overtime back pay. The Court reversed the PAB’s decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Appeal of N.H. Div. of State Police" on Justia Law

Metro Treatment of New Hampshire, L.P. operates outpatient opioid treatment clinics licensed by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire is a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) responsible for arranging healthcare services for Medicaid-eligible patients, including some treated by Metro. The parties’ relationship was governed by an ancillary services agreement. Following an audit of Metro’s patient records, AmeriHealth determined that Metro had violated certain state administrative rules and sought to recoup $36,722.27 in alleged Medicaid overpayments. After Metro appealed through the contractual process, AmeriHealth reduced the recoupment amount and advised Metro it could seek further review through a State Fair Hearing as provided by statute.Metro then filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of DHHS, but argued that the AAU lacked jurisdiction over payment disputes between MCOs and providers. The AAU issued a written decision concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII to hear appeals arising from determinations that Medicaid payments were inappropriately made and should be recouped. The AAU denied Metro’s motion for reconsideration and stayed further proceedings pending Metro’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the AAU has jurisdiction in this dispute. The court held that the AAU does possess jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII because Metro is a provider licensed by DHHS and the statute provides for appeals by such providers. The court rejected Metro’s argument that the statute or administrative rules limited jurisdiction only to disputes involving direct departmental actions. The decision of the AAU was affirmed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of Metro Treatment of N.H." on Justia Law

Two insurance companies, Century Indemnity Company (CIC) and The Home Insurance Company (Home), both issued policies to a common insured covering the same risks. CIC also served as a reinsurer for Home. After Home became insolvent in 2003, it entered liquidation proceedings under New Hampshire’s Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. In 2023, the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner, as Home’s liquidator, settled Home’s liability to the insured for a specified amount, enabling the insured to assert a Class II claim against Home’s estate. However, because Home’s assets were insufficient, the insured would not receive the full settlement amount.CIC, anticipating that it might have to pay the insured for the shortfall between Home’s settlement amount and the actual distribution from Home’s estate, filed a contingent contribution claim against Home. CIC sought to offset this contribution claim against its reinsurance obligation to Home. The Liquidator disallowed CIC’s contribution claim, arguing that Home’s liability was satisfied by the allowed claim, regardless of the amount actually paid. The parties submitted to a referee the question of whether CIC’s contribution right should be based on the full settlement amount or only on the distributions made. The referee concluded that the settlement amount was controlling. CIC moved to recommit the referee’s order, but the Merrimack County Superior Court denied this motion, adopting the referee’s reasoning.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered whether the statutory scheme abrogated common law rules on contribution and whether CIC’s contribution rights should be based on the settlement amount or actual distributions. The court held that the Act provides a comprehensive scheme that abrogates inconsistent common law principles. It concluded that CIC’s contribution rights are determined by the settlement amount, not the actual distributions. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Two Dartmouth College students were arrested in Hanover, New Hampshire, prompting Valley News to file a Right-to-Know request to obtain their arrest records. After months of email exchanges between the Town of Hanover, Valley News, and the students’ attorney, Hanover decided not to release the records, citing ongoing criminal prosecution despite the students’ attorney assenting to disclosure. Hanover based its refusal on exemptions derived from prior case law, specifically the Murray exemptions, which mirror certain provisions of the federal Freedom of Information Act regarding law enforcement records.Hanover initiated an action for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court, seeking a ruling on whether it was legally required to release the arrest records in light of the pending prosecutions. Valley News counterclaimed, seeking an order for disclosure with redactions. The Superior Court ordered Hanover to disclose the records and awarded Valley News attorney’s fees and costs. Upon Hanover’s motion to reconsider, the court upheld the disclosure order but reversed the award of fees and costs, reasoning that Hanover had made a good faith effort in navigating unsettled law. Neither party appealed this order. After Hanover released the records, Valley News moved to reopen the case for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, which the Superior Court denied, finding Hanover neither knew nor should have known its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that Valley News’s motion was timely and that, under the Right-to-Know Law, Hanover knew or should have known that at least some of the records, especially publicly available information, were not exempt from disclosure. The court found that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance and that Hanover’s blanket denial was improper. The court reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for an award to Valley News. View "Town of Hanover v. Valley News" on Justia Law