Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns allegations of sexual abuse committed by the defendant against a complainant when she was between the ages of four and ten during visits to the defendant’s home. The complainant testified that the defendant engaged in multiple acts of sexual assault over several years, including threats to her and her family to ensure her silence. After the complainant disclosed the abuse to her mother, law enforcement became involved, which led to the defendant’s indictment on multiple charges, including pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault, felonious sexual assault, and criminal threatening.In Superior Court, the defendant moved for in camera review of the complainant’s counseling records, which the court partially granted. The State successfully moved to allow the complainant to testify by two-way live video feed from outside the defendant’s presence, arguing that testifying in front of the defendant would cause her trauma and render her unavailable. During the trial, the complainant testified remotely. After the State rested, several charges were dismissed or nol prossed by agreement, and the jury ultimately convicted the defendant on the remaining counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that allowing the complainant to testify remotely, outside the defendant’s presence, violated his confrontation right under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution as interpreted in State v. Warren. The court found that this right requires a face-to-face, in-person meeting between the accused and the witness. The court also held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for one pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault charge involving sexual intercourse, as the complainant’s testimony did not establish that the acts occurred over the required statutory period. The court reversed the conviction on that charge and remanded the remaining convictions for further proceedings, vacating the trial court’s discovery order in part for additional review in light of a recent precedent. View "State v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on neighboring parcels of land in Moultonborough, New Hampshire, near Lake Winnipesaukee. The plaintiff owns Lot 3, which abuts Park Lane, and the defendant is a nonprofit club that owns nearby roadways, paths, and a lakefront beach area reserved for its members. Both parties’ properties originated from a 1959 subdivision, with subsequent conveyances and subdivisions altering the land’s configuration. The plaintiff asserted that Lot 3 retained rights to use the defendant’s roadways and beach area, either through implied or prescriptive easement, based on prior deeds and historical use by Lot 3’s owners.The Superior Court for Carroll County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It determined that Lot 3 was not part of a common scheme of development that would entitle it to membership benefits in the club, including the use of the roadways and beach. The trial court found no express or implied easements in the relevant chain of title for Lot 3 and concluded that the plaintiff had not shown twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and applied de novo review to the legal questions. The court held that Lot 3, by virtue of the deed referencing the 1972 subdivision plan showing Park Lane and Far Echo Road as boundaries, has an implied easement as a matter of law to use those roadways. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding claims to use other roadways and the Lot 200 beach area, finding no implied or prescriptive easement rights for Lot 3. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club" on Justia Law

The case involved a traffic stop in Salem, New Hampshire, where a police officer, upon detecting a strong odor of alcohol in a vehicle, interacted with its passengers. The defendant, seated in the back, became verbally aggressive toward the officer, yelling and cursing. After being ordered out of the vehicle, the defendant stepped toward the officer, pointed at him, and shoved his finger into the officer’s chest. When the officer attempted to arrest him, the defendant pulled away, struggled, and resisted being handcuffed. A portion of this encounter was captured on video by another passenger.Following these events, the defendant was charged in the Rockingham County Superior Court with misdemeanor counts of simple assault and resisting arrest. At trial, the jury was presented with video evidence and heard testimony from the officers involved. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, but the trial court (St. Hilaire, J.) denied these motions. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, leading to the present appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The defendant argued that appellate review of video evidence should be de novo, asserting that the court was in as good a position as the jury to interpret such evidence. The court rejected this argument, holding that video evidence must be reviewed under the traditional standard: all evidence, including video and live testimony, is viewed in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the court found sufficient evidence to support both convictions. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that his conduct was de minimis, noting it was not preserved or plain error. The court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

The respondent was charged with two separate attempted aggravated felonious sexual assaults involving different victims. After being declared incompetent to stand trial, the State dismissed the criminal charges and instead filed civil petitions seeking his commitment as a sexually violent predator under New Hampshire law. The Superior Court held two evidentiary hearings—one in 2023 and one in 2024—to determine whether the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the charged acts, and to assess whether his incompetence affected the outcome of these hearings.The Superior Court (Will, J.) ruled that the applicable statute did not require either party to bear the burden of proving whether the respondent’s incompetence affected the outcome of the hearings. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the acts in both hearings and that his incompetence did not substantially interfere with his ability to assist counsel. After the 2024 hearing, the court alternatively found that even if the respondent’s incompetence had substantially interfered, the State’s evidence was so strong that his limitations could not have had a substantial impact on the proceedings. The respondent appealed these findings, arguing the State should have borne the burden of proof regarding the effect of incompetence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the appeals. It held that the State bears the burden under RSA 135-E:5, II to prove that a respondent’s incompetence did not substantially impact the outcome of the hearing. The court clarified that the State can satisfy this burden either by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent’s incompetence did not substantially interfere with his ability to assist counsel, or by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the strength of its case was such that the respondent’s limitations could not have substantially impacted the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the order from the 2023 hearing and remanded for further proceedings, but it affirmed the order from the 2024 hearing. View "State v. Levier" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who was accused of touching a minor inappropriately during a trip to the store in October 2021. Two months after the alleged incident, the victim made a separate allegation against her father, claiming he had broken her half-sister’s leg, based on a social media post. This accusation was later determined to be false after investigation, with the victim’s mother and a counselor concluding the report was made due to the victim’s misunderstanding and feelings toward her father. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sexual assault and simple assault, with events alleged to have occurred in Gilford and Laconia.The Superior Court (Attorri, J.) presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about her false accusation against her father, arguing it was relevant to her credibility. The initial ruling permitted this, but upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the court excluded the evidence, finding it not probative of the victim’s character for truthfulness because she believed the accusation was true when made. At trial, the State introduced limited evidence regarding the defendant’s alcohol consumption on the day of the alleged assaults. When the jury inquired about the locations of the alleged offenses, the court declined to provide the indictments, instructing the jury to rely on its recollection of the evidence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the false allegation, as it lacked sufficient probative value and risked confusing the jury. The court also ruled that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was proper and that any error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hodgdon" on Justia Law

The defendant owned a house on Farm Island, New Hampshire, near a summer camp with which he had a history of disputes. After hearing a group outside his house at night, he yelled at them and, when unable to reach the police, left a voicemail for the camp, using profane language and stating, “you better get them the f**k out of here or I will shoot them.” He also accused the group of damaging his property. The State charged him with harassment, alleging that his communication constituted a threat to the life or safety of another, made with the purpose to annoy or alarm.The Superior Court of Carroll County held a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced the voicemail, evidence of the contentious relationship between the defendant and the camp, and testimony from camp staff and police. Over the defendant’s objections, the court admitted testimony from a camp director about security measures the camp undertook in response to the message, including ceasing use of part of the island and enhancing security. The defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of the required mental state; the court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant acted with the purpose to annoy or alarm and that the communication constituted a true threat as defined by federal law. However, the court found that admitting testimony about the camp’s security response was error under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403, as its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This error was not harmless. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Owen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a New Hampshire-based corporation, acquired patents and software from a military contractor and sought to adapt the technology for consumer telecommunications. The defendant, a Finnish multinational, manufactures cellular base stations. In 2015, the parties began discussions about integrating the plaintiff’s software into the defendant’s products. By February 2017, negotiations focused on two main points: a fee for integration work and a lump sum for a perpetual software license. On June 6, 2017, the plaintiff alleges both parties orally agreed to a $3 million integration fee and a $20 million license fee. The defendant disputes whether such an oral agreement occurred. The plaintiff continued work based on this understanding. Later, the defendant offered a lower license fee in a draft written contract, which the plaintiff rejected. Eventually, the defendant canceled the project.After cancellation, the plaintiff sued the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a ten-day trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on breach of contract and promissory estoppel, awarding $23 million in damages. The district court, considering the defendant’s statute-of-frauds defense, determined that the core issue was whether the perpetual license agreement could be performed within one year. The court found this, along with other issues, raised novel questions of New Hampshire law without binding precedent, and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the certified questions. It held that, under New Hampshire law, obligations imposed by a perpetual intellectual property license can be performed within one year, because, absent express language to the contrary, the licensor’s obligations are fulfilled upon granting the license. The court declined to answer the other two certified questions, as its answer to the first resolved the determinative legal issue. The case was remanded to the district court. View "Collision Commc'ns v. Nokia Solutions and Networks OY" on Justia Law

After a traffic collision, the defendant exited his vehicle—leaving his ten-year-old child alone inside, where a loaded but unchambered firearm was holstered in the front seat—and confronted the other driver. The defendant smashed the other driver’s window with a baton, then struck and kicked him multiple times after the driver exited his vehicle and fell to the ground. Several motorists witnessed the altercation and contacted authorities. The defendant departed before police arrived, but later called 911 and was arrested. During the arrest, he disclosed the presence of both his child and the firearm in his vehicle.The Superior Court (Edwards, J.) presided over the ensuing jury trial, in which the defendant was convicted of reckless conduct (for leaving his child unsupervised in a car with a gun), second degree assault (for striking with a baton), two counts of simple assault (for kicking), and criminal mischief. The defendant appealed three of these convictions, contending: that there was insufficient evidence for reckless conduct; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense for the second degree assault charge; and that the court wrongly refused a specific unanimity instruction for the simple assault charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the reckless conduct conviction, as no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk to his child. The court held that the self-defense instruction for second degree assault improperly directed the jury regarding the element of deadly force and thus constituted reversible error. Finally, it found that the court's refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction on the simple assault charge was also reversible error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions for reckless conduct, second degree assault, and simple assault, and remanded the latter two for further proceedings. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident caused by the defendant. More than a year after the accident, the plaintiff fell down a set of stairs at a party, fracturing her leg. She alleged that the injuries from the car accident, including a traumatic brain injury, caused ongoing symptoms such as migraines and episodes of syncope (fainting), which she claimed led to her later fall. The defendant disputed both the extent of injuries from the accident and the claim that those injuries caused the subsequent fall, suggesting instead that the plaintiff’s intoxication at the party was a significant factor.After a jury trial in the Rockingham Superior Court, the jury found the defendant liable for the car accident and awarded damages to the plaintiff for those injuries. However, the jury determined that the accident injuries did not cause or substantially contribute to the plaintiff’s later fall down the stairs. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that there were errors in evidentiary rulings and in the conduct of defense counsel, but the trial court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s expert testimony regarding the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content and its role as a contributing factor in the fall. However, the court reversed the trial court’s decision to limit the plaintiff’s cross-examination of the defense’s medical expert and its refusal to strike or provide a curative instruction for defense counsel’s references to missing witnesses during closing arguments. The Supreme Court held that these errors were prejudicial to the plaintiff. The court remanded the case for a new trial on damages for the automobile accident and on both liability and damages related to the subsequent fall. View "Rivas v. Ciecko" on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law