Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a traffic collision, the defendant exited his vehicle—leaving his ten-year-old child alone inside, where a loaded but unchambered firearm was holstered in the front seat—and confronted the other driver. The defendant smashed the other driver’s window with a baton, then struck and kicked him multiple times after the driver exited his vehicle and fell to the ground. Several motorists witnessed the altercation and contacted authorities. The defendant departed before police arrived, but later called 911 and was arrested. During the arrest, he disclosed the presence of both his child and the firearm in his vehicle.The Superior Court (Edwards, J.) presided over the ensuing jury trial, in which the defendant was convicted of reckless conduct (for leaving his child unsupervised in a car with a gun), second degree assault (for striking with a baton), two counts of simple assault (for kicking), and criminal mischief. The defendant appealed three of these convictions, contending: that there was insufficient evidence for reckless conduct; that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense for the second degree assault charge; and that the court wrongly refused a specific unanimity instruction for the simple assault charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the reckless conduct conviction, as no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk to his child. The court held that the self-defense instruction for second degree assault improperly directed the jury regarding the element of deadly force and thus constituted reversible error. Finally, it found that the court's refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction on the simple assault charge was also reversible error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions for reckless conduct, second degree assault, and simple assault, and remanded the latter two for further proceedings. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident caused by the defendant. More than a year after the accident, the plaintiff fell down a set of stairs at a party, fracturing her leg. She alleged that the injuries from the car accident, including a traumatic brain injury, caused ongoing symptoms such as migraines and episodes of syncope (fainting), which she claimed led to her later fall. The defendant disputed both the extent of injuries from the accident and the claim that those injuries caused the subsequent fall, suggesting instead that the plaintiff’s intoxication at the party was a significant factor.After a jury trial in the Rockingham Superior Court, the jury found the defendant liable for the car accident and awarded damages to the plaintiff for those injuries. However, the jury determined that the accident injuries did not cause or substantially contribute to the plaintiff’s later fall down the stairs. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that there were errors in evidentiary rulings and in the conduct of defense counsel, but the trial court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s expert testimony regarding the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content and its role as a contributing factor in the fall. However, the court reversed the trial court’s decision to limit the plaintiff’s cross-examination of the defense’s medical expert and its refusal to strike or provide a curative instruction for defense counsel’s references to missing witnesses during closing arguments. The Supreme Court held that these errors were prejudicial to the plaintiff. The court remanded the case for a new trial on damages for the automobile accident and on both liability and damages related to the subsequent fall. View "Rivas v. Ciecko" on Justia Law

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021.The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

Two entities formed a limited liability company in 2012 to operate a high-end hair salon in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. One party contributed financial resources and business expertise, while the other, an established stylist, provided day-to-day management and became the public face of the business. In 2016, they amended their operating agreement to clarify their roles, contributions, and restrictions, including a provision that neither member could transfer their interest in the company without majority approval from disinterested members. The agreement required the stylist to devote all her business time to the company and prohibited competition during membership but was silent on withdrawal by a member.In 2022, after unsuccessful buyout negotiations, the stylist gave notice of her withdrawal from the company. The remaining members sued for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and sought a declaratory judgment requiring the stylist to continue dedicating her business time to the company. The Superior Court for Rockingham County granted in part and denied in part the stylist’s motion to dismiss, ruling her withdrawal was valid under the operating agreement and the New Hampshire Limited Liability Company Act. As a result, claims relying on her continued membership were dismissed, though the breach of contract claim for pre-withdrawal conduct was initially preserved. The plaintiffs withdrew the remaining contract claim, and the dismissal orders were finalized for appeal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that the operating agreement did not prohibit member withdrawal and that withdrawal was not a “transfer” requiring approval under the agreement. The court determined that the stylist retained her economic interest but lost membership rights upon withdrawal, consistent with the statute. The court further found no viable claim for damages or wrongful conduct, as the withdrawal did not breach the agreement or applicable law. View "Peregrine Interests LLC v. Todd" on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while walking along a road after a report of a violent incident involving a vehicle and a fleeing suspect. The man matched the description of the person who fled the scene. Without first giving Miranda warnings, an officer handcuffed him and questioned him briefly at the roadside, where he made limited admissions about a fight. Hours later, at the police station, different officers gave him Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned him further. During this interview, the man made additional incriminating statements. He was later indicted for two forms of second degree murder based on the death of the other individual involved in the incident.The Superior Court partially granted and partially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. It suppressed the initial roadside statements, finding a Miranda violation, and also suppressed statements made after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. However, the court found that the post-Miranda statements made at the police station were voluntary and admissible. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing second degree murder. The defendant also objected to the admission of certain recorded jail calls, arguing they were irrelevant.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the post-Miranda interview statements and the jail calls. The court held that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, considering the circumstances and the break between interviews. Regarding the jail calls, the court held that even assuming error in admitting certain portions, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Sleeper" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on criminal charges and released on bail. His counsel raised concerns about his competency to stand trial, prompting the trial court to order a competency evaluation as provided by statute. The appointed evaluator, the Office of the Forensic Examiner, informed the court that it could not complete the evaluation within the ninety-day statutory period. The State requested an extension, which the court granted for an additional ninety days. When it became clear that the evaluation would still not be completed on time, the State sought a second extension or appointment of a different evaluator. The court denied the second extension and dismissed the charges, finding that the statutory timeframe was mandatory and permitted only one extension per party.After the trial court (Superior Court) dismissed the case, the State moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The State then appealed, arguing that the statute did not impose a mandatory, jurisdictional deadline for competency evaluations and that dismissal was not required when the deadline was missed, especially if extensions had been granted.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and found that RSA 135:17, I(a) does not set a mandatory deadline for completion of competency evaluations. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “shall” is modified by the phrase allowing either party to request an extension, and nothing in the statute limits the number of extensions a court may grant. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court was not legally required to deny the State’s second extension request or to dismiss the charges for missing the extended deadline. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Cormiea" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted in 2022 on two charges in the northern judicial district of Hillsborough County, New Hampshire. While serving a separate sentence in Pennsylvania in 2023, a detainer was lodged against him for these charges. On December 21, 2023, the defendant signed a request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for final disposition of his pending New Hampshire charges. This request was sent by the Pennsylvania correctional facility to both the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and the Superior Court in Nashua (Hillsborough-South), rather than the Superior Court in Manchester (Hillsborough-North), where the charges were pending. The State delayed processing the paperwork, and the defendant was not brought to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period.The Superior Court (Messer, J.) initially granted the State’s motion for a 120-day extension but, upon reconsideration, found the State lacked good cause for the delay. The court determined that the defendant’s request had been adequately served and attributed the delay to the State’s inaction. As a result, the court dismissed the indictments with prejudice after concluding the State failed to bring the defendant to trial within the required period. The State’s subsequent motion to reconsider was denied as untimely.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the 180-day period under the IAD began when the defendant’s request was delivered to Hillsborough-South instead of Hillsborough-North. The court held that under New Hampshire law, service on any superior court within the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction is sufficient to trigger the IAD timeline. The court found that the defendant had complied with the IAD, and affirmed the dismissal of the indictments with prejudice. View "State v. Laforest" on Justia Law

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

A student, E.A., resided in the Pittsfield School District, which operates its own middle and high school. E.A. applied to and was accepted by Prospect Mountain School, an open enrollment public school located outside the district. When Prospect Mountain requested tuition payment from the Pittsfield School District for E.A.’s attendance, the district refused, asserting that because it had not adopted the provisions of RSA chapter 194-D, it was not obligated to pay tuition for students attending open enrollment schools outside its district.E.A.’s parents appealed the superintendent’s decision to the Pittsfield School Board, which denied their request. They then appealed to the New Hampshire State Board of Education. After a hearing, a hearing officer recommended upholding the school board’s decision, reasoning that the district was not required to pay tuition unless it had formally adopted an open enrollment program. However, after oral argument, the State Board rejected this recommendation. The State Board interpreted the statute to require a resident district to pay tuition for students attending an open enrollment school in another district, regardless of whether the sending district had adopted the statute. The Pittsfield School District’s motion for rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and recent legislative amendments. The court held that under RSA chapter 194-D, a sending school district must pay tuition to an open enrollment receiving school in another district, even if the sending district has not adopted an open enrollment program. The court found that the statutory scheme and recent clarifying amendments support this interpretation. The court affirmed the State Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Pittsfield Sch. Dist." on Justia Law