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Petitioner, corporate surety Second Chance Bail Bonds, appealed a superior court order requiring that a $10,000 bond petitioner posted for defendant James Castine be forfeited after defendant violated several bail conditions. On appeal, petitioner argued the trial court erred because it can order forfeiture of a bond only if a defendant fails to appear for a court date, and not for violation of other bail conditions. Alternatively, petitioner argues that the trial court erred by ordering forfeiture of the entire $10,000 bond. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the bond forfeiture. View "Petition of Second Chance Bail Bonds (New Hampshire v. Castine)" on Justia Law

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Defendant Edward Proctor was convicted by jury on one count of violating RSA 632-A:10, I, which prohibited people convicted of certain offenses from "knowingly undertak[ing] employment or volunteer service involving the care, instruction or guidance of minor children." Defendant was previously convicted of sexual assault, and at the time of the events leading to his conviction, was on parole. As a result of his conviction, he was required to report quarterly to the local police department so as to initial or sign a sex offender registration form. By initialing or signing the form, the defendant acknowledged that he could not work in positions involving children, including, but not limited to, providing service as a teacher, coach, daycare worker, scout master, summer camp counselor, guidance counselor, or school administrator. Defendant operated his own landscaping business that provided services such as snow-blowing and yard work. In February 2016, defendant provided snow-blowing services for the neighbor of a juvenile in Hooksett. Initially, defendant hired the juvenile to clear the neighbor’s driveway for him. In May 2016, defendant hired the juvenile to work for him on other jobs. He would pick up the juvenile at the juvenile’s home in Hooksett and drive him to job sites in Deerfield and Northwood. The work involved filling in pot holes, pulling weeds, and laying down bark mulch. Defendant told the juvenile what to do and showed him how to do it. The juvenile’s mother learned that defendant was a registered sex offender and directed her son to cease working for him. Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the statute was unconstitutional was denied. Focusing on the phrase "the care, instruction or guidance of minor children," the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the statute did not preclude a person with a qualifying conviction from knowingly undertaking employment as a landscaper because landscaping is not a service that "by [its] nature provide[s] access to children." As such, the Court disagreed with the State's argument that "the care, instruction or guidance" of a minor with the supervision of a minor, and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Proctor" on Justia Law

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Defendants were all arrested and convicted of violating a Laconia Ordinance prohibiting nudity in public places. They jointly moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing the ordinance violated the guarantee of equal protection and their right to free speech under the State and Federal Constitutions. They further contended that the City of Laconia lacked the authority to enact the ordinance and that the ordinance was preempted by RSA 645:1 (2016). Finally, defendants maintained that the ordinance violated RSA chapter 354-A. Following a hearing, the court denied the defendants’ motion, and subsequently found them guilty of violating the ordinance. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the ordinance merely prohibited those who access public places from doing so in the nude, and made a permissible distinction between the areas of the body that must be covered by each gender. Accordingly, their convictions were affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lilley" on Justia Law

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Respondent, the biological mother of C.O. and G.L., appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the two minor children on the ground that she failed to correct the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding that she neglected both children and abused G.L. She argued the circuit court erred in finding: (1) the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children after it terminated visits with her children; and (2) she failed to correct the conditions that led to the court’s finding of abuse and neglect because one of the circuit court’s conditions, that she accept responsibility for the underlying abuse, violated her constitutional right against self-incrimination. After review of the facts entered in the circuit court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "In re C.O.; In re G.L." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Samuel Rogers appealed a superior court order dismissing his complaint against his son, Joseph Rogers, upon finding that the probate court and not the superior court, retained exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over his cause of action. Plaintiff’s wife died in March 2012 and the parties’ dispute arose after the disposition of her estate. The decedent’s will named defendant as the executor of the estate, which was comprised of, in pertinent part, two properties in Hollis, New Hampshire: plaintiff’s marital home and the decedent’s 50% ownership interest in 94.3 acres of undeveloped land on Rocky Point Road. In her will, the decedent devised one-third of the estate to plaintiff and the remaining two-thirds to defendant. The probate court appointed defendant as the executor of the estate in May 2012. At some point in 2015, plaintiff learned that the Town of Hollis had either offered to purchase or agreed to purchase Rocky Point for $2,500,000, but, for reasons not established by the record, the sale was never consummated. Thereafter, plaintiff discovered his son had commissioned an appraisal of Rocky Point in 2005 which estimated that the value of the property at that time was $1,950,000. These valuations suggested that following the parties’ exchange of property interests, defendant’s interest in Rocky Point would have been worth approximately $975,000. Based on these discoveries, plaintiffs sued his son in 2016 in superior court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and unjust enrichment. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing his father's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, which was within six months of the probate court's issuance of the certificate of appointment in May 2012. Ruling that defendant mischaracterized plaintiff's claims, the superior court denied defendant's motion. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's superior court claims, finding they related the the estate and will, and any misrepresentation of Rocky Point took place during the administration of the estate. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the claims at issue here did not fall within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rogers v. Rogers" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Kenneth Hart appealed a superior court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was incompetent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial and on appeal following his convictions of multiple felonies in February 2000. In 1998, the petitioner was arrested and charged with two alternative counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), one count of witness tampering, and one count of resisting arrest. Prior to trial, the petitioner was provided with court-appointed counsel, but he dismissed three of these attorneys and moved to represent himself at trial. The State objected and, after a hearing on the motion, the Trial Court ruled that “a ‘bona fide and legitimate doubt’ exists as to the [petitioner’s] current competency to stand trial and particularly his ability to clearly and effectively waive his constitutional right to counsel” and ordered that the petitioner submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Upon review of the record of the trial court’s colloquy with petitioner, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the habeas court’s finding and, thus, the trial court’s conclusion, that petitioner understood the implications of waiving his right to counsel and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Thus, petitioner has not met his burden of establishing a fundamental error of law or fact necessary to obtain writ relief. View "Hart v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted a petition in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the Superior Court erred in ordering the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Attorney General, defendants in litigation pending before that court, to produce to plaintiffs in the litigation, the League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and various individuals, the New Hampshire Centralized Voter Registration Database established pursuant to RSA 654:45 (Supp. 2018). The Supreme Court concluded the Database was exempt from disclosure by statute, and therefore vacated the trial court’s order. View "Petition of New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

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Defendant Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan), appealed a superior court order partially granting and partially denying its summary judgment motion as well as a cross-motion filed by plaintiff Joseph Santos. Santos held a personal excess liability policy with Metropolitan that included excess underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. After Metropolitan denied a claim made by Santos for excess UIM benefits after Santos was hurt in a motorcycle accident, he brought this declaratory judgment action. The trial court ruled that Metropolitan was liable to Santos for excess UIM benefits. Metropolitan argued the trial court erred in so holding because Santos’s policy required, as a precondition to receiving excess UIM benefits, that he carry a certain amount of underlying insurance coverage, and Santos did not do so. Santos argued his lack of sufficient underlying coverage allowed Metropolitan to reduce its excess UIM liability but not escape it altogether. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed partial summary judgment. View "Santos v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Defendant Lisa Jacobs appealed both a jury verdict and a permanent injunction issued by the trial court in favor of plaintiffs Lorraine and Peter MacDonald. Defendant seasonally resided in Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire. According to plaintiffs, in 2012 they purchased a vacation home that abuts or was near defendant’s family’s property. Thereafter, defendant began letter-writing campaigns in which she falsely accused plaintiffs of, among other things, a variety of illegal activities. In 2016, plaintiffs sued defendant for defamation. Following a trial, the jury found that defendant’s statements were defamatory and that they were made with malice, thereby warranting the award of special damages. In addition, the trial court, finding defendant’s statements “vast and disturbing,” issued a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from, inter alia, going within a five-mile radius of plaintiffs’ home in Fitzwilliam and from entering plaintiffs’ hometown in Sterling, Massachusetts. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying a mistrial when plaintiffs’ counsel made a “golden rule” argument to the jury; (2) denying her motion for summary judgment because New Hampshire required proof of “actual damages” for defamation; (3) applying an incorrect standard to plaintiffs’ claim for enhanced compensatory damages; (4) determining that defendant’s speech was not of “public concern;” (5) admitting prejudicial other bad act evidence; and (6) “ordering [her] physical removal . . . from her family’s vacation property” in Fitzwilliam and “banishing” her from Sterling. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "MacDonald v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Michelle Clark appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES), Dianne Carpenter, Darrell Gates, Sandra Jamak, Colleen O’Neill, Tara Reardon, and Gloria Timmons, on plaintiff’s claims alleging a violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, and the Public Employee Freedom of Expression Act. She also appealed an order dismissing her claim of wrongful discharge/demotion against DES. As a supervisor, plaintiff was responsible for supervising approximately fifteen employees, including three interns, two of whom were children of two named defendants. Plaintiff became concerned about issues relating to her interns’ hours and responsibilities and their behavior in the workplace. Notwithstanding receiving positive performance evaluations, after voicing concerns, plaintiff became concerned her supervisors altered a review she had prepared for an employee under her supervision because the employee had complained about the interns and Timmons’ management. A second evaluation was negative, and she did not receive a promised promotion. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff received a letter from a DES Human Resources Administrator, informing her that she would be laid off pursuant to a mandatory reduction in force. Prior to her layoff date, plaintiff accepted a demotion to the position of Program Assistant I in lieu of a layoff. Thereafter, plaintiff appealed her demotion to the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) through a grievance representative from her union. In her appeal, she alleged that she was unlawfully demoted in response to raising concerns about the hours and behavior of the interns. In this case before the New Hampshire Supreme Court, plaintiff alleged she experienced various forms of harassment in retaliation for voicing her concerns while she was supervisor: her car was “egged” in the DES parking lot, her home mailbox was smashed, and she received anonymous phone calls and mail at home and at work. As a result of distress from these incidents, plaintiff went on medical leave from December 2011 to February 2012. In addition to her PAB appeal, plaintiff communicated with other state agencies about the intern issues and the harassment she was experiencing: in May 2012, she filed a complaint with the New Hampshire Executive Branch Ethics Committee against Reardon for failing to address misuse of the hiring system, nepotism, and harassment; in June 2012, she filed a whistleblower complaint with the New Hampshire Department of Labor against DES on similar grounds; and, at some point, she participated in an investigation of DES by the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order relating to plaintiff's ongoing-retaliation claim, and remanded the whistleblower protection claim. Plaintiff’s claim under RSA 98- E:4, I, expressly entitled her to injunctive relief as part of her freedom of expression claim, which was also remanded to the trial court. The Court affirmed as to all other respects of the trial court's order. View "Clark v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security" on Justia Law