Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was convicted of capital murder in 2008 and sentenced to death. Following this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court conducted a mandatory appellate review of the conviction and sentence, including a comparative proportionality review as required by state statute. The court affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. In 2016, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court, later amended, challenging his conviction and sentence. In 2019, New Hampshire repealed the death penalty, but the repeal applied only to persons convicted of capital murder on or after the effective date of the act.After the repeal, the petitioner further amended his habeas petition in the superior court, arguing that the legislative change rendered his sentence unconstitutional and seeking a renewed comparative proportionality review of his death sentence. The Warden moved to dismiss, asserting that the Supreme Court had already conducted such a review and was not authorized to do so again. The Superior Court stayed its ruling on the motion to dismiss, determining that the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the statutory proportionality review, and the petitioner subsequently sought original jurisdiction in the New Hampshire Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed whether the petitioner was entitled to a renewed comparative proportionality review under RSA 630:5, X and XI(c). The court held that the statute authorizes only a single automatic comparative proportionality review as part of the mandatory appellate process and does not permit successive reviews. The court found that the repeal of the death penalty did not apply retroactively to the petitioner. Therefore, the petition for a successive comparative proportionality review was dismissed. View "Petition of Addison" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a domestic violence incident with a former romantic partner with whom he continued to live as a roommate. On September 18, 2022, after drinking heavily, the defendant assaulted the victim by choking, hitting, and threatening her. The victim, fearing further violence, submitted to sexual acts. After the defendant fell asleep, the victim left, sought medical attention, and reported the incident to police. The defendant was arrested and, while detained pending trial, communicated with the victim numerous times, encouraging her to lie and withhold information from authorities, and discouraging her from testifying.The Hillsborough-northern judicial district Superior Court conducted a jury trial. The jury acquitted the defendant of some charges but convicted him of aggravated felonious sexual assault-domestic violence, stalking-domestic violence, indirect criminal contempt, witness tampering, criminal restraint, second degree assault-domestic violence, and simple assault-domestic violence. The defendant appealed these convictions.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the aggravated felonious sexual assault convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence to find the victim was confined and did not freely consent to the sexual acts due to fear provoked by prior assaults. The court reversed the stalking and indirect criminal contempt convictions, concluding that the bail statute in effect at the time did not authorize no-contact orders for detained defendants, rendering the evidence insufficient for those charges. The court found no double jeopardy violation regarding multiple witness tampering convictions, determining that each attempt to influence the victim constituted a separate offense. Other double jeopardy claims were rejected due to insufficient demonstration of plain error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the remaining convictions and reversed the stalking and contempt convictions. View "State v. Sales" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of selling a controlled drug, fentanyl, which resulted in the death of the victim. The facts established that on the day of the incident, the victim persistently attempted to contact the defendant through Facebook Messenger, arranging a ride to Rochester and repeatedly messaging and calling the defendant. After meeting with the defendant near his home, the victim returned to the car, ingested a substance, and quickly exhibited overdose symptoms. The victim later died from fentanyl toxicity, and a bag containing fentanyl was found in his wallet.After indictment by a Strafford County grand jury, the defendant was tried in the Superior Court. During trial, the defendant’s counsel highlighted deficiencies in the police investigation, particularly regarding the driver who transported the victim. In response, the State sought to admit evidence that the defendant had Facebook communications about drug sales with third parties, which had previously been excluded under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The trial court admitted a summary of these communications, finding them relevant under the “specific contradiction” doctrine to rebut a claim of an incomplete investigation. The jury found the defendant guilty.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting this evidence and whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The court held that the trial court had erred by admitting the evidence under the specific contradiction doctrine, as there was no misleading advantage created by the defense and the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the error was not harmless and reversed the conviction. However, the court also concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, allowing for retrial. The case was reversed and remanded. View "State v. Trueman" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over a deed transferring a one-half interest in a farm from a mother to her son, Peter, without consideration, while she was alive. After the mother’s death, her estate, left to four children in equal shares, was inventoried; the contested property was listed as belonging to Peter due to the earlier transfer. David, another son and a beneficiary, objected, claiming that the mother lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she executed the deed. The estate administrator declined to pursue the claim, believing litigation costs would outweigh the benefit. David then initiated a separate action to invalidate the deed and impose a constructive trust, seeking to restore the property interest to the estate.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division held a trial and ruled in favor of David, finding that Peter had unduly influenced the mother and that she lacked capacity at the time of the transfer. The probate court invalidated the deed, deferred ruling on the constructive trust, and awarded attorney’s fees to David. Peter’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and subsequently moved in probate court to vacate all orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the probate court declined to address the motion, noting the issue was already raised on appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction over David’s claims. The court found that the claims, concerning an inter vivos property transfer, did not have the direct connection to estate administration or distribution required for probate court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the probate court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

An employee was injured while working for BAE Systems, Inc. on January 7, 2020 and was also employed concurrently by another employer. ESIS, Inc., the insurer for BAE, paid workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s combined weekly wages from both jobs, as required by statute. In 2020 and 2022, ESIS submitted memoranda of payment to the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which included handwritten notes referencing the combined wages.After more than 100 weeks had passed since the injury, ESIS applied for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries for the additional compensation paid due to the employee’s concurrent employment. The Fund coordinator denied the claim, stating ESIS had not provided proper notice of a possible claim against the Fund within 100 weeks of the injury, as required by RSA 281-A:55-a, II. ESIS requested a hearing at the New Hampshire Department of Labor, where the hearing officer upheld the denial, finding that the memoranda of payment did not constitute notice of a possible claim. ESIS appealed to the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB), which reversed the hearing officer, concluding that the memoranda gave sufficient notice.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the CAB’s decision under RSA 541:13, which grants deference to the CAB’s factual findings unless there is an error of law or the order is unjust or unreasonable. The court held that the memoranda of payment, even with handwritten notes about combined wages, did not provide the Commissioner with notice of a possible claim against the Fund as required by RSA 281-A:55-a, II. The court reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer did not provide timely notice and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement from the Fund. View "Appeal of Comm'r of Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

A parent corporation headquartered in Massachusetts, together with its affiliated companies, forms a "water’s edge combined group" for New Hampshire business profits tax purposes. One group member realized a substantial capital gain in 2017 from selling a business division, while the parent company incurred a significant capital loss in 2020 from selling a subsidiary. The group attempted to use the parent’s 2020 capital loss as a carryback to offset the 2017 capital gain of another member, thereby reducing its overall tax liability in New Hampshire.The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) audited the group’s returns and denied the requested refund, reasoning that state law only permits a capital loss carryback to offset the same entity’s prior gains, not the gains of a different group member. After the DRA’s Hearings Bureau upheld this assessment, the group appealed to the Merrimack County Superior Court. The Superior Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of the taxpayer group, concluding that the relevant statutes allowed a combined group to offset one member’s capital loss against another’s gain. The court also found that certain administrative rules conflicted with the statute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Superior Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under RSA chapter 77-A, each member of a water’s edge combined group must calculate its net income, including capital losses and gains, separately, in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, before the group’s net incomes are combined. Thus, a capital loss incurred by one group member cannot be used to offset a capital gain realized by another member. The court also found no constitutional violation and ruled that the administrative rules were consistent with the statute. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hologic, Inc. v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin." on Justia Law

Advent Medical Products, Inc., founded in 2004 by Randall Fincke, sought to develop and market manual and automatic defibrillators. After obtaining FDA clearance for some products in 2010, Advent began soliciting investments primarily through Fincke’s brother in New Hampshire. From 2012 to 2017, thirteen investors purchased securities, typically a promissory note, call option, and put option, without the company registering these securities as required under New Hampshire’s Uniform Securities Act. Product development was delayed due to regulatory changes requiring more stringent FDA approval, battery defects, enforcement actions in Massachusetts, and the COVID-19 pandemic.The New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation initiated an administrative proceeding alleging illegal sales of unregistered securities and misrepresentation of material facts to investors between 2010 and 2016. After a hearing, the Bureau’s director found the respondents liable for both violations, imposed a $345,000 fine for 138 violations, ordered rescission of the investments totaling $480,000, awarded $60,000 in costs, and issued a permanent injunction against offering or selling securities in New Hampshire. The director subsequently denied motions to reconsider.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the director’s orders, applying a standard that only errors of law or unjust/unreasonable orders by a clear preponderance of evidence would warrant reversal. The Court reversed the director’s findings that the respondents misrepresented material facts, determining that omissions about Fincke’s prior lawsuits were permissible and statements about product readiness were not proven false when made. The Court also reversed findings related to certain exemptions and extraterritorial sales, vacated the imposed penalties and injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed that joint and several liability and the award of investigative costs were appropriate. The director’s orders were affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Appeal of Advent Medical Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Two children were removed from their home after the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) received reports of neglect and abuse by their legal guardians, the paternal great-grandparents. The father, who lived in the home, was found responsible for neglect due to his failure to protect the children from abuse and the unsanitary conditions of his living space. Following removal, the court established objectives for the father to correct the neglect, including maintaining sobriety, obtaining appropriate housing, and prioritizing the children's needs. DCYF provided referrals and assistance to help the father meet these objectives.After several review hearings, the father showed substantial compliance, particularly in bonding with the children and engaging in treatment and counseling, but he failed to secure adequate housing. At a permanency hearing, he was granted a 90-day extension to resolve housing issues and cooperate with an Interstate Compact home study for placement in Vermont. During the extension, the father regressed—he canceled visits, relapsed into substance use, delayed paperwork, and faced criminal charges, leading DCYF to shift from supporting reunification to seeking termination of parental rights. The trial court found that despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts, the father failed to correct the neglect conditions and that termination was in the children's best interests.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the father did not correct the conditions of neglect within twelve months, plus the extension, and that DCYF made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. The court also determined that termination of parental rights served the children’s best interests, supported by evidence of their improved well-being in a stable foster home. The trial court’s findings were upheld as supported by the record and not erroneous as a matter of law. View "In re H.H." on Justia Law

The case centers on an insurance dispute involving the extent of uninsured or underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in a personal liability umbrella policy. In 2000, the insured applied for a $1 million umbrella policy and expressly rejected UIM coverage by checking a waiver box and signing a statement indicating this rejection would apply to future renewals and replacement policies unless a written request was made to add coverage. In 2001, the insured increased the umbrella policy’s liability limit to $5 million but did not sign a new UIM waiver at that time. Over the following years, the policy was renewed annually, and changes were made to covered vehicles and drivers. In 2021, after the plaintiff was injured in an accident involving the insured’s covered vehicle, she sought UIM coverage from the umbrella policy, but the insurer denied the claim based on the original 2000 waiver.The Hillsborough-northern judicial district Superior Court granted summary judgment to the insurer, concluding that the initial UIM rejection applied to subsequent renewals and the increased liability limit, thus barring UIM coverage for the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that under the applicable version of RSA 264:15, I, the insured’s act of increasing the policy limits constituted a new “purchase” of insurance that triggered the statutory requirement for UIM coverage unless expressly waived at that time.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed in part, holding that under the 1991 version of RSA 264:15, I, the increase of $4 million in umbrella coverage constituted a new purchase of insurance, requiring automatic UIM coverage absent a contemporaneous waiver. Because the insured did not execute a new waiver when increasing the limits, UIM coverage in that amount attached. However, the initial waiver remained effective for the original $1 million coverage. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this holding. View "Royce v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email.The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law