Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man was stopped by police while walking along a road after a report of a violent incident involving a vehicle and a fleeing suspect. The man matched the description of the person who fled the scene. Without first giving Miranda warnings, an officer handcuffed him and questioned him briefly at the roadside, where he made limited admissions about a fight. Hours later, at the police station, different officers gave him Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and questioned him further. During this interview, the man made additional incriminating statements. He was later indicted for two forms of second degree murder based on the death of the other individual involved in the incident.The Superior Court partially granted and partially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. It suppressed the initial roadside statements, finding a Miranda violation, and also suppressed statements made after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. However, the court found that the post-Miranda statements made at the police station were voluntary and admissible. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of reckless second degree murder and acquitted him of knowing second degree murder. The defendant also objected to the admission of certain recorded jail calls, arguing they were irrelevant.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the post-Miranda interview statements and the jail calls. The court held that the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, considering the circumstances and the break between interviews. Regarding the jail calls, the court held that even assuming error in admitting certain portions, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Sleeper" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on criminal charges and released on bail. His counsel raised concerns about his competency to stand trial, prompting the trial court to order a competency evaluation as provided by statute. The appointed evaluator, the Office of the Forensic Examiner, informed the court that it could not complete the evaluation within the ninety-day statutory period. The State requested an extension, which the court granted for an additional ninety days. When it became clear that the evaluation would still not be completed on time, the State sought a second extension or appointment of a different evaluator. The court denied the second extension and dismissed the charges, finding that the statutory timeframe was mandatory and permitted only one extension per party.After the trial court (Superior Court) dismissed the case, the State moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The State then appealed, arguing that the statute did not impose a mandatory, jurisdictional deadline for competency evaluations and that dismissal was not required when the deadline was missed, especially if extensions had been granted.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and found that RSA 135:17, I(a) does not set a mandatory deadline for completion of competency evaluations. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “shall” is modified by the phrase allowing either party to request an extension, and nothing in the statute limits the number of extensions a court may grant. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court was not legally required to deny the State’s second extension request or to dismiss the charges for missing the extended deadline. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Cormiea" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted in 2022 on two charges in the northern judicial district of Hillsborough County, New Hampshire. While serving a separate sentence in Pennsylvania in 2023, a detainer was lodged against him for these charges. On December 21, 2023, the defendant signed a request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for final disposition of his pending New Hampshire charges. This request was sent by the Pennsylvania correctional facility to both the Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office and the Superior Court in Nashua (Hillsborough-South), rather than the Superior Court in Manchester (Hillsborough-North), where the charges were pending. The State delayed processing the paperwork, and the defendant was not brought to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period.The Superior Court (Messer, J.) initially granted the State’s motion for a 120-day extension but, upon reconsideration, found the State lacked good cause for the delay. The court determined that the defendant’s request had been adequately served and attributed the delay to the State’s inaction. As a result, the court dismissed the indictments with prejudice after concluding the State failed to bring the defendant to trial within the required period. The State’s subsequent motion to reconsider was denied as untimely.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the 180-day period under the IAD began when the defendant’s request was delivered to Hillsborough-South instead of Hillsborough-North. The court held that under New Hampshire law, service on any superior court within the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction is sufficient to trigger the IAD timeline. The court found that the defendant had complied with the IAD, and affirmed the dismissal of the indictments with prejudice. View "State v. Laforest" on Justia Law

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

A student, E.A., resided in the Pittsfield School District, which operates its own middle and high school. E.A. applied to and was accepted by Prospect Mountain School, an open enrollment public school located outside the district. When Prospect Mountain requested tuition payment from the Pittsfield School District for E.A.’s attendance, the district refused, asserting that because it had not adopted the provisions of RSA chapter 194-D, it was not obligated to pay tuition for students attending open enrollment schools outside its district.E.A.’s parents appealed the superintendent’s decision to the Pittsfield School Board, which denied their request. They then appealed to the New Hampshire State Board of Education. After a hearing, a hearing officer recommended upholding the school board’s decision, reasoning that the district was not required to pay tuition unless it had formally adopted an open enrollment program. However, after oral argument, the State Board rejected this recommendation. The State Board interpreted the statute to require a resident district to pay tuition for students attending an open enrollment school in another district, regardless of whether the sending district had adopted the statute. The Pittsfield School District’s motion for rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and recent legislative amendments. The court held that under RSA chapter 194-D, a sending school district must pay tuition to an open enrollment receiving school in another district, even if the sending district has not adopted an open enrollment program. The court found that the statutory scheme and recent clarifying amendments support this interpretation. The court affirmed the State Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Pittsfield Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a priest while attending a summer camp in the mid-1970s, which was managed by the defendants. At the time of the alleged abuse, New Hampshire law required minors to bring personal actions within two years after reaching the age of majority. The plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file his complaint before the limitations period expired in 1986. Decades later, the legislature amended the relevant statute, RSA 508:4-g, first to extend and then, in 2020, to remove the statute of limitations for personal actions based on sexual assault. The plaintiff filed his complaint in 2023, seeking to take advantage of the amended law.The Superior Court (Leonard, J.) dismissed the complaint, holding that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired in 1986. The court further ruled that applying the 2020 amendment to revive the plaintiff’s claim would violate Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws. The plaintiff’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It assumed, without deciding, that the legislature intended the 2020 amendment to apply retroactively, but held that doing so would be unconstitutional. The court reaffirmed longstanding precedent that a defendant acquires a vested right to a statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has expired, and that this right cannot be abrogated by subsequent legislation. The court declined to overrule this precedent or to adopt a balancing test weighing the plaintiff’s right to recover against the defendants’ vested right. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the dismissal, holding that the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws precludes application of the amended statute to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim. View "Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law

Police responded to a hotel after receiving a report about a missing juvenile. Upon arrival, they found a juvenile matching the description, apparently unclothed under the covers, with visible red marks and empty alcohol containers in the room. The defendant, a 24-year-old man, was present and admitted to meeting the juvenile at a bus stop and consuming alcohol with her, believing she was over eighteen. The officers arrested the defendant for allegedly providing alcohol to a minor and seized his cell phone during a search incident to arrest. Subsequent investigation revealed that the juvenile, who was fourteen or fifteen, had met the defendant online, disclosed her age, and described sexual activity with him. Police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of explicit messages and images, resulting in multiple charges.The Rockingham County Superior Court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the cell phone evidence, during which the State conceded that the arrest was unlawful. The court assumed the arrest and seizure of the phone were unlawful but denied the motion to suppress, finding that the evidence was obtained through an independent source: the search warrant based on information from the juvenile and the missing person investigation, not the arrest itself. The defendant was convicted on all charges after a bench trial on stipulated facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that, even assuming the arrest and seizure were unlawful, the evidence from the cell phone was admissible under the independent source doctrine. The search warrant was supported by information independent of the unlawful arrest, and the police did not exploit the illegality to obtain the evidence. Therefore, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the cell phone evidence. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Several physicians who were employed by an anesthesia practice left their positions and became employees of a hospital with which their former practice had a service contract. The physicians had previously sold their ownership interests in the practice to another entity, and their employment contracts contained restrictive covenants, including non-compete and non-solicitation provisions. After the hospital indicated it might not renew its contract with the practice, the physicians and hospital administrators began discussing future employment arrangements, retaining legal counsel and entering into a common interest agreement. The hospital ultimately sent notice of nonrenewal, and the physicians resigned and signed employment contracts with the hospital. The anesthesia practice and its parent company sued the physicians and the hospital, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. The hospital also sued the practice, seeking to bar enforcement of the restrictive covenants.The Hillsborough County Superior Court (Northern District) issued several orders during discovery, compelling the hospital and physician defendants to disclose certain communications they claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine, and ordering their counsel to sit for depositions. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to privilege applied to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and tortious interference, and limited the application of the common interest doctrine to communications after litigation was pending. It also ordered disclosure of some privileged communications under a theory of necessity.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege does not apply to claims of breach of fiduciary duty or tortious interference with contractual relations. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the common interest doctrine did not apply until litigation was pending, but vacated the orders permitting depositions of counsel and requiring disclosure of privileged communications under a necessity theory, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atl. Anesthesia, P.A. v. Lehrer" on Justia Law

A child was removed from her parents’ care shortly after birth due to concerns about neglect. The mother, who has cognitive disabilities, was unable to provide basic care, resulting in the child’s hospitalization for weight loss. The father, who also has an intellectual disability, did not live with the mother and child and was unable to take custody when the child was discharged from the hospital. Both parents were found responsible for neglect, and the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) was awarded legal custody. The parents were ordered to meet certain conditions, including maintaining safe housing, engaging with mental health providers, and participating in parenting education, while DCYF was required to provide supportive services.The Circuit Court–Concord Family Division held periodic review hearings, finding the parents in only partial compliance with the orders. The mother struggled to care for the child outside of supervised settings and failed to secure appropriate housing. The father also lacked housing and did not fully engage with required services. After twelve months, the court determined that neither parent had corrected the conditions leading to the neglect finding and established adoption as the permanency plan. DCYF then petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights. The trial court granted the petitions, finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts to assist both parents and that termination was in the child’s best interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be asserted as a defense in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The court also found that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings regarding the mother’s failure to correct the neglect conditions, DCYF’s reasonable efforts, and the determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. The orders terminating parental rights were affirmed. View "In re K.O." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a cul-de-sac constructed by the plaintiff in Laconia in the late 1980s. The plaintiff indicated on a 1987 subdivision plan that the cul-de-sac would be built and deeded to the City, and lots were sold based on that plan. However, the cul-de-sac was never formally deeded to the City, though the City maintained it until 2019, and it has been used by the public and public services since its construction. In 2019, the plaintiff sought to remove the cul-de-sac and replace it with a hammerhead turnaround, but the planning board denied this request.After the planning board’s denial, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the cul-de-sac had never been accepted by the City and remained private property. Subsequently, intervenors petitioned the City Council to lay out the cul-de-sac as a public highway under New Hampshire law. The City Council approved the layout, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether there was “occasion” to lay out the road as a public highway. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the intervenors, finding that the plaintiff had dedicated the cul-de-sac for public use and that the public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s private interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that the plaintiff’s dedication of the cul-de-sac created a public easement and vested the public with a right to accept the road, limiting the plaintiff’s rights to use the property in ways that would interfere with public use. The Court also found that the public interest in the cul-de-sac outweighed both the plaintiff’s private interest and the burden on the City, thus satisfying the statutory “occasion” requirement for laying out a public highway. The judgment in favor of the intervenors was affirmed. View "Taylor Community v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law