Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

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In the early morning of September 12, 2020, Brookline Police Officer Torrisi encountered a vehicle stopped in the roadway. Upon approaching, he noticed signs of intoxication in the driver, Roy Rogers, whose license was suspended. After administering field sobriety tests, Torrisi determined Rogers was impaired and attempted to arrest him. Rogers resisted, leading to a prolonged encounter involving another officer and a friend of Rogers who arrived at the scene. Despite resistance, Rogers was eventually handcuffed and taken to the police station, where he agreed to a breathalyzer test, which showed a result of .07. Rogers was initially given a hand summons for operating after suspension and allowed to leave.The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Rogers guilty of driving under the influence and five counts of resisting arrest but not guilty of negligent driving. Rogers moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the officers had promised not to prosecute if his breathalyzer result was under .08. The court denied the motion, stating there was no enforceable agreement and that enforcing such an agreement would be against public policy. Rogers was convicted on the remaining charges, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court held that there was no enforceable agreement not to prosecute, as there was no meeting of the minds between Rogers and the officers. Additionally, the court addressed Rogers' double jeopardy claim, concluding that the unit of prosecution for resisting arrest is each discrete volitional act of resistance. The court affirmed Rogers' conviction for driving under the influence and two counts of resisting arrest but vacated three of the resisting arrest convictions, determining they constituted a single continuous course of conduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Eight former public-school teachers who retired from the Keene School District between 2012 and 2017 sought review of a decision by the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) Board of Trustees. They challenged the board's denial of their petitions for contribution and earnable compensation adjustment, arguing that the board erroneously found they consented to a 120-day delay in payment of early retirement stipends.The NHRS Board of Trustees had denied the petitions based on the finding that the petitioners consented to the delay in stipend payments. The board's decision was influenced by the fact that the petitioners did not file grievances or inquire with the NHRS about the delay at the time of their retirement. The board distinguished these petitioners from others who had successfully challenged the delay through grievances.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners could not have consented to the delay because the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) did not authorize such a delay. The court noted that employees governed by a CBA cannot consent to terms that modify the agreement. The court also found that the petitioners were not at fault for the delay, as they were not informed that the delay would affect their pension calculations and had no reason to challenge the School District's policy at the time. Consequently, the court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petition of Retired Keene School Teachers" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a police officer for the Town of Salem, was involved in an off-duty incident over ten years ago where he drove at 62 mph in a 30 mph zone, refused to pull over for another officer, and avoided spike strips before stopping and laughing off the incident as a joke. An internal investigation found he violated the department's code of conduct for "Conduct Unbecoming an Employee." He accepted responsibility, waived hearings, and took a one-day unpaid suspension in a negotiated agreement with the Salem Police Department (SPD).Years later, following an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) requested the internal investigation report and added the plaintiff's name to the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES). The plaintiff requested removal, citing a court order that his personnel file did not contain Brady/Giglio material. The DOJ denied the request, and the plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the plaintiff's conduct was "potentially exculpatory evidence" under RSA 105:13-d, and that he had received adequate due process.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiff's conduct was not "potentially exculpatory evidence" as it was not relevant to his general credibility and was stale. The court noted that the conduct was over ten years old, the plaintiff had accepted responsibility, and his criminal charges were nolle prossed and annulled. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the plaintiff's removal from the EES was warranted. View "Doe v. Salem Police Department" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Robert and Susan Keller, co-trustees of the MIKA Trust, challenged the reassignment of a parking space by defendants Clement and Martha Dwyer from one condominium unit they owned to another unit they also owned. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief, alleging violations of the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B. The dispute arose after the Dwyers transferred Parking Space 2 from Unit 11 to Unit 20, which they owned, and subsequently sold Unit 11 without an assigned parking space to the plaintiffs.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Harbour Hill Condominium Association and the Dwyers. The court found that the assignment and reassignment of the parking spaces were authorized and properly effected. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that although Harbour Hill’s declaration of condominium was deficient under RSA 356-B:16, I(e) for not designating the unit to which Parking Space 2 was assigned, this deficiency was cured by the condominium instruments, including the floor plan and form warranty deed. These documents, when read together, satisfied the requirements of the Condominium Act.The court also determined that the reassignment of Parking Space 2 complied with RSA 356-B:19, which governs the reassignment of limited common areas. The reassignment was authorized by the condominium declaration and had the consent of all affected unit owners, as required by the Act. The amendment to the declaration, reflecting the reassignment, was approved by a two-thirds majority of unit owners and recorded accordingly. Therefore, the court concluded that the reassignment was valid and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Keller v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

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Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Daniel Richards, filed a complaint against Union Leader Corporation and Robert Azzi, alleging defamation and invasion of privacy — false light. Richards, a father of two children in the Hanover School District, opposed the district's curricular changes focused on equity and anti-racism. He supported legislation (HB 544) prohibiting New Hampshire schools from teaching that children are inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive. Azzi wrote an op-ed in the Union Leader, labeling Richards and others as disseminators of white supremacist ideology and accusing them of favoring the suppression of rights and history.The Superior Court dismissed Richards' complaint, concluding that the statements in the op-ed were non-actionable opinions rather than defamatory facts. The court found that the statements were hyperbolic and did not imply undisclosed defamatory facts. It also declined to recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, ruling that even if such a tort were recognized, Richards' claim would fail because the statements were opinions, not factual assertions.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the Superior Court's decision. It agreed that the op-ed's statements were non-actionable opinions and did not imply undisclosed defamatory facts. The court also declined to recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, noting that it is largely duplicative of existing defamation law and should be addressed by the legislature if deemed necessary. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in its analysis and upheld the dismissal of Richards' complaint. View "Richards v. Union Leader Corp." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, Jane Doe, challenged the Manchester School District's policy regarding transgender and gender non-conforming students. The policy allowed students to keep their transgender status private and required school personnel to use a student's preferred name and pronouns, without disclosing this information to parents unless legally required or authorized by the student. Jane Doe, the parent of a minor child (M.C.) in the district, discovered that M.C. had asked to be called by a different name and pronouns. She requested the school to use M.C.'s birth name and pronouns, but the school adhered to the district policy.The Superior Court dismissed Jane Doe's claims, finding that the policy did not infringe upon a fundamental right and thus did not warrant strict scrutiny. The court applied the rational basis test and concluded that the policy was constitutional. The court also found that the policy was not ultra vires and did not violate federal laws such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or the Protection of Pupil Rights Act (PPRA).The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the policy did not directly interfere with the fundamental right to parent, as it did not prevent parents from obtaining information from other sources or restrict their ability to parent their child. The court agreed that the policy did not infringe on a fundamental right and thus was subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court did not find it necessary to address the plaintiff's facial and as-applied challenges separately, as the policy was found to be constitutional under the rational basis test. View "Doe v. Manchester School District" on Justia Law

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On August 2, 2021, the defendant drove through a red light at high speed in Manchester, New Hampshire, hitting three vehicles and causing significant damage. His car flipped over and landed on another vehicle, leading to a multi-car collision. A paramedic found the defendant unconscious with symptoms suggesting opioid use and administered Narcan. At the hospital, a police officer observed the defendant's lethargy and pinpoint pupils, indicative of opioid influence.The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree assault and reckless conduct. Before trial, he moved to exclude testimony from a paramedic and a victim about signs of opioid use, arguing it was inadmissible expert testimony. The Superior Court allowed the testimony, provided it was based on the witnesses' observations. The jury convicted the defendant on five counts of reckless conduct but acquitted him of disobeying a police officer. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to merge the reckless conduct charges for sentencing, resulting in five separate sentences.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting lay witness testimony about opioid use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's reckless conduct. The court also found that the defendant's argument against the State's closing argument references to opioid use was not preserved for appeal. However, the court agreed with the defendant that the reckless conduct charges should be merged for sentencing, as the statute focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than the number of persons endangered. The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's decision on sentencing and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Van Uden" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law