Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carol Wagner, the plaintiff, claims entitlement to a surviving spousal share from the estate of John Chislett, her former husband. She seeks to rescind a quitclaim deed she granted to the decedent, alleging it was obtained through fraud. Additionally, she challenges the validity of a 1974 Dominican Republic divorce decree obtained by the decedent, asserting it is invalid under New Hampshire law. The defendants, Sally Chislett, Kevin Chislett, and Wai Kwan Chislett, contest her claims.The Circuit Court (Kissinger, J.) ruled against the plaintiff, determining that her rescission action was barred by the statute of limitations and that her challenge to the divorce decree was barred by laches due to her forty-seven-year delay in raising the issue. Consequently, the court dismissed her claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statute of limitations for actions involving real property, RSA 508:2, applied to the plaintiff's rescission claim, which had expired. The court also agreed with the lower court's application of the doctrine of laches, finding that the plaintiff's delay in challenging the divorce decree was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had remarried in reliance on the divorce decree and waited nearly five decades to contest its validity, during which time both her second husband and the decedent had died.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision effectively barred the plaintiff from claiming a surviving spousal share from the decedent's estate. View "Wagner v. Chislett" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in New Hampshire, challenged the administration of the Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT), arguing that it violated the state constitution by allowing property-wealthy towns to retain excess funds and by setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places. They sought a permanent injunction to discontinue this funding scheme, claiming it resulted in disproportionate tax rates.The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds and setting negative local education tax rates violated Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court enjoined the state from permitting these practices and treated its order as a final decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It concluded that the legislature's decision to allow communities to retain excess SWEPT funds was an exercise of its spending power and did not violate the constitution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that setting negative local education tax rates in certain unincorporated places violated Part II, Article 5, and affirmed this part of the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's injunction remedy, stating that resolving the constitutional issue of setting negative local tax rates is the responsibility of the other branches of government. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Rand v. State" on Justia Law

James Dunbar was serving a suspended sentence for criminal mischief and was on probation for being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. A protection order prohibited him from contacting the victim in any form. Despite this, Dunbar posted messages on his public Facebook page that referred to the victim and her deceased husband using aliases similar to their names. Some posts included threats and were intended to notify the victim. Facebook users saw these posts and informed the victim, who then viewed them.Dunbar was arrested and charged with violating the protection order and stalking. He was found not guilty on all charges. However, his probation officer alleged that these actions violated the terms of his probation, and the State moved to impose his suspended sentence. The Superior Court found that Dunbar's Facebook posts violated the protection order, thus violating his probation and suspended sentence terms. The court imposed a portion of his suspended sentence and sentenced him to twelve months in the house of corrections, all suspended, for the probation violation. Dunbar's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court held that Dunbar's Facebook posts constituted indirect contact with the victim, violating the protection order. The court also determined that the posts were true threats and not protected by the First Amendment. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's decision that Dunbar violated the terms of his probation and suspended sentence, and upheld the imposed punishments. View "State v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kristen Trombly and Christopher Patria, purchased a used vehicle from City Cars, LLC. Shortly after the purchase, they experienced issues with the vehicle's transmission. They contacted the dealership, which directed them to a repair shop that added transmission fluid. Despite this, the transmission problems persisted, and another dealership recommended replacing the transmission at a significant cost. The plaintiffs acknowledged buying the car "as is" but sought assistance from the defendant, who offered a partial refund, which the plaintiffs rejected, demanding a full refund or repair.The plaintiffs filed a complaint in July 2022, alleging a violation of the implied warranty of merchantability under New Hampshire's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Circuit Court (Ryan, J.) found in favor of the plaintiffs, determining that the vehicle was not merchantable and that the implied warranty had not been disclaimed. The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by assessing the vehicle's merchantability based on its condition after the sale rather than at the time of sale. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, stating that the implied warranty of merchantability applies to the condition of the goods at the time of sale. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that the transmission was faulty when the vehicle was sold. Consequently, the trial court's finding of non-merchantability was deemed erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. View "Trombly v. City Cars, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, the City of Nashua approved a bond resolution to construct a performing arts center. Due to financing complications, the City formed two non-profit corporations to take advantage of a federal tax credit. In 2020, NPAC Corp., a private, for-profit corporation, was formed to aid in the tax credit process. NPAC is wholly owned by one of the non-profits, which is owned by the City. Laurie Ortolano requested NPAC's public records related to the center, but NPAC claimed it was not subject to the Right-to-Know Law (RSA chapter 91-A). Ortolano then filed a complaint seeking access to these records.The Superior Court dismissed Ortolano's complaint, agreeing with NPAC that it was not a public entity subject to RSA chapter 91-A. The court also dismissed the claims against the City, reasoning that the relief sought was derivative of the claim against NPAC. Additionally, the court denied Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint to allege constitutional violations because she failed to attach a proposed amended complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the City, finding that Ortolano's complaint did not state an independent claim against the City. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against NPAC, ruling that the trial court erred by not applying the "government function" test to determine if NPAC was a "public body" under RSA chapter 91-A. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendment did not cure the defect in the original pleading.The case was remanded for the trial court to apply the "government function" test to determine whether NPAC is subject to the Right-to-Know Law. View "Ortolano v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce between Clayton LeGault, Jr. (Husband) and Lisa LeGault (Wife). The key issue is the division of marital assets, specifically the treatment of Husband's defined benefit pension plan, which he had been contributing to for six years before the marriage. The parties separated in May 2022, and both filed for divorce. Wife proposed a division of assets that included her receiving 100% of her 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan, as well as 50% of the marital portion of Husband's pension. She also sought an offset of other assets to account for the premarital portion of Husband's pension.The Circuit Court (Manchester) divided Wife's 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan equally and applied the Hodgins formula to divide Husband's pension. The court acknowledged Wife's argument that RSA 458:16-a, I, which includes all property acquired prior to the marriage as subject to distribution, might conflict with the Hodgins formula. However, the court felt bound by precedent and did not separate the premarital portion of the pension for division or offset by other marital assets. The court's final decree awarded Wife a significant portion of the marital estate, including half of the marital portion of Husband's pension.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court clarified that RSA 458:16-a, I, includes all property, including premarital portions of pensions, as subject to equitable distribution. The court held that Hodgins provides a default rule for pensions earned entirely during the marriage but does not address pensions with premarital portions. The court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure the premarital portion of Husband's pension is considered in the equitable distribution of assets. View "In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jessica Warren, was convicted of driving after suspension or revocation, with death resulting, under RSA 263:64, V-a, following a jury trial in the Superior Court. On September 5, 2018, Warren, whose license was suspended, drove a minivan in Concord, passing a delivery truck that blocked a bike lane. Her minivan collided with a bicyclist, who died from the collision, and then veered into the opposite lane, hitting a curb and another vehicle.In the Superior Court, Warren requested a jury instruction that required the State to prove she knowingly committed the act that violated a rule of the road. The court, however, issued an instruction that did not require the State to prove any mental state regarding the "unlawful operation" element. Warren objected, but the court overruled her objection, and the jury convicted her.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. Warren argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the "knowingly" mens rea applied to the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. The State contended that the statute omits a culpable mental state and that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable to the "unlawful operation" element. The Supreme Court agreed with the State that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable but concluded that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mental state for the "unlawful operation" element. The court held that the trial court erred by not including this mens rea element in its jury instruction.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction and remanded the case, holding that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mens rea for the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Gene L. Zarella, who is charged with four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Following his indictment, Zarella sought the production of the complainant's confidential counseling and hospitalization records for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court granted these motions and reviewed the records, finding them discoverable. Zarella then moved for in camera review of additional records from various private counseling, mental health, and medical care providers. The trial court granted these motions as well.The complainant, joined by one of the counseling providers, moved to intervene and quash the orders for production, citing statutory privileges and the complainant's constitutional right to privacy under Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution. The Superior Court (Ignatius, J.) granted the motion to intervene but denied the motion to quash, applying the standard from State v. Gagne, which allows in camera review if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the records contain material and relevant information.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Part I, Article 2-b of the State Constitution abrogates the application of the Gagne standard to records held by private organizations, as established in State v. Cressey. The court held that to obtain in camera review and disclosure of confidential or privileged records held by private organizations, the defendant must follow the procedures outlined in RSA 173-C:5 for records privileged under RSA chapter 173-C or demonstrate an essential need for the records for those privileged under RSA 329-B:26 and RSA 330-A:32. The court also mandated that notice and an opportunity to object must be provided to the individual whose records are sought. The court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Zarella" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

In August 2019, law enforcement began investigating the Bradley family following a referral from the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families. The investigation revealed that one of the children had recorded an audio conversation between the defendant, Deborah Ann Bradley, and her husband, Kenneth Bradley, discussing inappropriate behavior by Mr. Bradley. The recording was found on an iPad during a search of the Bradleys' home. The defendant was later charged with multiple counts, including accomplice to falsifying physical evidence and tampering with witnesses.The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to exclude the audio recording, concluding that the spousal privilege under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 504 did not apply to the recording itself, only to testimony about confidential marital communications. The court reasoned that the rule does not bar the introduction of the recording or testimony about it.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the spousal privilege in Rule 504 precludes only testimony about confidential marital communications and does not extend to other types of evidence, such as audio recordings. The court emphasized that the plain language of Rule 504 limits the privilege to testimony and does not support a broader interpretation that would exclude all evidence related to marital communications. The court declined to make its ruling prospective only, as it was based on the plain language of the rule and did not alter the scope of the privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law