Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Port City Air Leasing, Inc. (Port City) leases land and buildings at Pease International Tradeport for aircraft-related services. Pease Aviation Partners LLC, doing business as Million Air Portsmouth (Million Air), proposed to lease adjacent land to build a similar facility and applied for a permit to dredge and fill wetlands to construct an access road. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) issued the permit in June 2022. Port City filed an administrative appeal with the New Hampshire Wetlands Council (Council), arguing that the permit issuance was unlawful and unreasonable. Million Air intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming Port City lacked standing.The Hearing Officer ruled that Port City lacked standing because it was not a "person aggrieved" under RSA 482-A:10, I, which includes the applicant and those entitled to notice by mail under RSA 482-A:8 and RSA 482-A:9. The Hearing Officer determined that Port City was not an "abutting landowner" entitled to notice. Port City's motion for reconsideration and rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Council's decision. The court held that Port City is not a "landowner" under RSA 482-A:9 because its lease does not grant interests equivalent to fee ownership. Consequently, Port City is not a "person aggrieved" with standing to appeal under RSA 482-A:10, I. The court also rejected Port City's due process claims, concluding that the absence of an administrative remedy does not violate its state or federal due process rights, as Port City still has potential legal remedies for any injuries. The court affirmed the dismissal of Port City's appeal. View "Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

The case involves five severely developmentally disabled men who require intensive care in a residential treatment setting and receive services through New Hampshire’s developmental services system. These services were provided by the Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. (JRC) in Massachusetts, funded by federal Medicaid home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver funding. In 2022, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) informed the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that JRC was not an approved HCBS provider, and funding for services at JRC would cease. DHHS committed to funding the services with state funds temporarily, but this was not extended beyond September 2, 2022.The petitioners appealed to the DHHS Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU), arguing that the termination of funding without an alternative placement amounted to a termination of their services. The Commissioner initially ordered DHHS to continue funding during the appeals. However, in March 2023, the Commissioner granted summary judgment to DHHS, ruling that the services were not terminated but required to be provided in a qualified facility. The Commissioner also ruled that RSA chapter 171-A prohibits DHHS from using state funds for services that do not comply with the federal Settings Rule.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners had a right to appeal the termination and non-renewal of their service contracts with JRC. However, the court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that RSA chapter 171-A prohibits DHHS from using state funds for services provided by a provider that does not comply with the federal Settings Rule. Thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of DHHS. View "Petition of Mason" on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

The case involves improvements made by Robin and Phyllis Gelinas to their condominium unit, which expanded into the limited common area. Plaintiffs Anthony and Rosemarie Moda and Anthony and Olga Alba sued the defendants, Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condominium Association and the Gelinases, seeking a declaratory judgment, costs and attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed, a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s conclusion that provisions of the Fernwood declaration of condominium waived the requirements of RSA 356-B:19, I concerning the assignment and reassignment of limited common area.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court found that the Fernwood declaration did not expressly provide a waiver from the requirement of RSA 356-B:19, I. The court concluded that the Gelinases' expansion into the limited common area required compliance with RSA 356-B:19, I, which necessitates the consent of all adversely affected unit owners. The court also disagreed with the trial court's finding that all unit owners were adversely affected as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moda v. Fernwood at Winnipesaukee Condo. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The defendant, Matthew Clark, is charged with a felony count of criminal threatening with a deadly weapon. The complainant recorded a conversation with the defendant without his consent, in which he made potentially incriminating statements. The complainant later reported the incident to law enforcement and provided them with the recording.The defendant moved to suppress the recording, arguing it was made without his consent in violation of RSA chapter 570-A, which he claimed required suppression of any such recording. The State objected. The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only for felony violations of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court determined that the complainant's recording constituted a misdemeanor violation since she was a party to the communication, and thus, suppression was not warranted.The defendant moved for reconsideration, reasserting his argument that any violation of RSA chapter 570-A requires suppression. The trial court denied the motion and certified three interlocutory questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court held that suppression under RSA 570-A:6 is required only when the information is part of or derived from a communication intercepted in violation of the felony provision of the Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Law. The court clarified that a one-party recording can be either a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the mental state of the person making the recording. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the complainant's recording constituted a felony violation due to her subsequent disclosure to law enforcement. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The petitioner, K.S., sought certiorari review of orders issued by the Circuit Court in proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C. K.S. argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including denying her access to information she claimed she had a right to, relying on a "reasonable efforts" standard instead of the child's best interest, not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in a residential treatment program, denying her request to be placed with her father, and denying her request to involve her grandmother in family therapy and other meetings.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had filed petitions alleging neglect by K.S.'s parents, leading to K.S. being placed in various out-of-home settings. Eventually, the court granted DCYF legal custody of K.S. and issued a dispositional order finding that returning K.S. to her parents was not in her best interest. K.S. was hospitalized and later placed in a residential treatment program. The court approved these placements and denied K.S.'s requests for reunification with her father and for additional discovery.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that many of K.S.'s arguments were moot due to changes in her circumstances, such as her father's surrender of parental rights and her subsequent placements. The court also held that the trial court did not violate K.S.'s due process rights by not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in an institutional setting, as the established procedures provided sufficient safeguards. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, concluding that it did not act illegally or unsustainably exercise its discretion. View "Petition of K.S." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Monadnock Rod and Gun Club, reoriented its outdoor shooting range from an east-west to a south-north direction without obtaining site plan approval from the Town of Peterborough. This reorientation encroached on a neighboring property. Subsequently, the Town amended its zoning ordinance to require shooting ranges to be enclosed, indoor facilities. The primary issues are whether the Club’s shooting range was a lawful nonconforming use when the Town amended its zoning ordinance and whether state law prohibits the enforcement of the amended ordinance.The Superior Court found that the Club had trespassed onto the neighboring property and awarded damages to the property owners. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Town for zoning ordinance violations related to the south-north range. The Club applied for site plan review for an expanded east-west range, but the Town’s code enforcement officer determined that neither the east-west nor the south-north ranges were grandfathered as nonconforming uses. The Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) affirmed this decision and denied the Club’s application for a special exception. The planning board subsequently denied the Club’s site plan application. The Superior Court affirmed these decisions and denied the Club’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Club’s south-north range was not a lawful nonconforming use because it was constructed without site plan approval. Therefore, it could not qualify as a lawful nonconforming use when the zoning ordinance was amended. The court also upheld the ZBA’s denial of the special exception application, concluding that the ZBA correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant a special exception for an illegal nonconforming use. Additionally, the court found that the Town’s zoning ordinance was not preempted by state law and that the Club’s constitutional arguments were not preserved for review. View "Monadnock Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Peterborough" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Shane and Maura Pelissier, insured their automobile through GEICO General Insurance Company. They sought underinsured motorist benefits four and a half years after a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured driver. GEICO moved for summary judgment, citing a policy provision requiring lawsuits for underinsured motorist benefits to be filed within three years of the accident. The trial court denied the motion and transferred three interlocutory appeal questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The trial court found that the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable because it could require insureds to file suit before a justiciable cause of action exists. It also found that using the date of the accident as the triggering event for the limitations period was contrary to public policy and that there was a material factual dispute regarding the plaintiffs' ability to discover the tortfeasor’s policy limits before the limitations period expired. The trial court denied GEICO’s motion for reconsideration but granted an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the contractual limitations provision violated public policy. The court held that the provision was unenforceable because it could force insureds to file suit before their cause of action for underinsured motorist benefits had accrued, thus restricting their ability to recover damages. The court noted that the provision contravened the public policy underlying New Hampshire’s uninsured motorist statute, RSA 264:15, which aims to place insured persons in the same position as if the offending motorist had adequate liability insurance. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part, did not address the second interlocutory question, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pelissier v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co" on Justia Law