Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A student, E.A., resided in the Pittsfield School District, which operates its own middle and high school. E.A. applied to and was accepted by Prospect Mountain School, an open enrollment public school located outside the district. When Prospect Mountain requested tuition payment from the Pittsfield School District for E.A.’s attendance, the district refused, asserting that because it had not adopted the provisions of RSA chapter 194-D, it was not obligated to pay tuition for students attending open enrollment schools outside its district.E.A.’s parents appealed the superintendent’s decision to the Pittsfield School Board, which denied their request. They then appealed to the New Hampshire State Board of Education. After a hearing, a hearing officer recommended upholding the school board’s decision, reasoning that the district was not required to pay tuition unless it had formally adopted an open enrollment program. However, after oral argument, the State Board rejected this recommendation. The State Board interpreted the statute to require a resident district to pay tuition for students attending an open enrollment school in another district, regardless of whether the sending district had adopted the statute. The Pittsfield School District’s motion for rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory language and recent legislative amendments. The court held that under RSA chapter 194-D, a sending school district must pay tuition to an open enrollment receiving school in another district, even if the sending district has not adopted an open enrollment program. The court found that the statutory scheme and recent clarifying amendments support this interpretation. The court affirmed the State Board’s decision. View "Appeal of Pittsfield Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a priest while attending a summer camp in the mid-1970s, which was managed by the defendants. At the time of the alleged abuse, New Hampshire law required minors to bring personal actions within two years after reaching the age of majority. The plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file his complaint before the limitations period expired in 1986. Decades later, the legislature amended the relevant statute, RSA 508:4-g, first to extend and then, in 2020, to remove the statute of limitations for personal actions based on sexual assault. The plaintiff filed his complaint in 2023, seeking to take advantage of the amended law.The Superior Court (Leonard, J.) dismissed the complaint, holding that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired in 1986. The court further ruled that applying the 2020 amendment to revive the plaintiff’s claim would violate Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws. The plaintiff’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It assumed, without deciding, that the legislature intended the 2020 amendment to apply retroactively, but held that doing so would be unconstitutional. The court reaffirmed longstanding precedent that a defendant acquires a vested right to a statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has expired, and that this right cannot be abrogated by subsequent legislation. The court declined to overrule this precedent or to adopt a balancing test weighing the plaintiff’s right to recover against the defendants’ vested right. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the dismissal, holding that the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws precludes application of the amended statute to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim. View "Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law

Police responded to a hotel after receiving a report about a missing juvenile. Upon arrival, they found a juvenile matching the description, apparently unclothed under the covers, with visible red marks and empty alcohol containers in the room. The defendant, a 24-year-old man, was present and admitted to meeting the juvenile at a bus stop and consuming alcohol with her, believing she was over eighteen. The officers arrested the defendant for allegedly providing alcohol to a minor and seized his cell phone during a search incident to arrest. Subsequent investigation revealed that the juvenile, who was fourteen or fifteen, had met the defendant online, disclosed her age, and described sexual activity with him. Police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of explicit messages and images, resulting in multiple charges.The Rockingham County Superior Court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the cell phone evidence, during which the State conceded that the arrest was unlawful. The court assumed the arrest and seizure of the phone were unlawful but denied the motion to suppress, finding that the evidence was obtained through an independent source: the search warrant based on information from the juvenile and the missing person investigation, not the arrest itself. The defendant was convicted on all charges after a bench trial on stipulated facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that, even assuming the arrest and seizure were unlawful, the evidence from the cell phone was admissible under the independent source doctrine. The search warrant was supported by information independent of the unlawful arrest, and the police did not exploit the illegality to obtain the evidence. Therefore, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the cell phone evidence. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Several physicians who were employed by an anesthesia practice left their positions and became employees of a hospital with which their former practice had a service contract. The physicians had previously sold their ownership interests in the practice to another entity, and their employment contracts contained restrictive covenants, including non-compete and non-solicitation provisions. After the hospital indicated it might not renew its contract with the practice, the physicians and hospital administrators began discussing future employment arrangements, retaining legal counsel and entering into a common interest agreement. The hospital ultimately sent notice of nonrenewal, and the physicians resigned and signed employment contracts with the hospital. The anesthesia practice and its parent company sued the physicians and the hospital, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. The hospital also sued the practice, seeking to bar enforcement of the restrictive covenants.The Hillsborough County Superior Court (Northern District) issued several orders during discovery, compelling the hospital and physician defendants to disclose certain communications they claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine, and ordering their counsel to sit for depositions. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to privilege applied to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and tortious interference, and limited the application of the common interest doctrine to communications after litigation was pending. It also ordered disclosure of some privileged communications under a theory of necessity.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege does not apply to claims of breach of fiduciary duty or tortious interference with contractual relations. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the common interest doctrine did not apply until litigation was pending, but vacated the orders permitting depositions of counsel and requiring disclosure of privileged communications under a necessity theory, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atl. Anesthesia, P.A. v. Lehrer" on Justia Law

A child was removed from her parents’ care shortly after birth due to concerns about neglect. The mother, who has cognitive disabilities, was unable to provide basic care, resulting in the child’s hospitalization for weight loss. The father, who also has an intellectual disability, did not live with the mother and child and was unable to take custody when the child was discharged from the hospital. Both parents were found responsible for neglect, and the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) was awarded legal custody. The parents were ordered to meet certain conditions, including maintaining safe housing, engaging with mental health providers, and participating in parenting education, while DCYF was required to provide supportive services.The Circuit Court–Concord Family Division held periodic review hearings, finding the parents in only partial compliance with the orders. The mother struggled to care for the child outside of supervised settings and failed to secure appropriate housing. The father also lacked housing and did not fully engage with required services. After twelve months, the court determined that neither parent had corrected the conditions leading to the neglect finding and established adoption as the permanency plan. DCYF then petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights. The trial court granted the petitions, finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts to assist both parents and that termination was in the child’s best interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be asserted as a defense in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The court also found that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings regarding the mother’s failure to correct the neglect conditions, DCYF’s reasonable efforts, and the determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. The orders terminating parental rights were affirmed. View "In re K.O." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a cul-de-sac constructed by the plaintiff in Laconia in the late 1980s. The plaintiff indicated on a 1987 subdivision plan that the cul-de-sac would be built and deeded to the City, and lots were sold based on that plan. However, the cul-de-sac was never formally deeded to the City, though the City maintained it until 2019, and it has been used by the public and public services since its construction. In 2019, the plaintiff sought to remove the cul-de-sac and replace it with a hammerhead turnaround, but the planning board denied this request.After the planning board’s denial, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the cul-de-sac had never been accepted by the City and remained private property. Subsequently, intervenors petitioned the City Council to lay out the cul-de-sac as a public highway under New Hampshire law. The City Council approved the layout, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether there was “occasion” to lay out the road as a public highway. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the intervenors, finding that the plaintiff had dedicated the cul-de-sac for public use and that the public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s private interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that the plaintiff’s dedication of the cul-de-sac created a public easement and vested the public with a right to accept the road, limiting the plaintiff’s rights to use the property in ways that would interfere with public use. The Court also found that the public interest in the cul-de-sac outweighed both the plaintiff’s private interest and the burden on the City, thus satisfying the statutory “occasion” requirement for laying out a public highway. The judgment in favor of the intervenors was affirmed. View "Taylor Community v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

Robert and Mary Morris, a married couple, owned homes in both Connecticut and New Hampshire. In 2017, they took several steps indicating a possible move to New Hampshire, including obtaining New Hampshire driver’s licenses, registering to vote there, and using their New Hampshire address on tax documents. They also made significant estimated tax payments to New Hampshire. However, they maintained strong ties to Connecticut, such as keeping important possessions there, using Connecticut professionals, and spending substantial time at their Connecticut home. Ultimately, they did not relocate to New Hampshire and filed Connecticut resident tax returns for 2017.After an audit, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) determined that the Morrises were New Hampshire residents from June 16 to December 31, 2017, and assessed interest and dividends taxes, penalties, and interest for that period. The Morrises challenged the assessment, first through a petition for redetermination with the DRA, which was denied, and then by appealing to the Superior Court of New Hampshire. The superior court denied their motion for summary judgment and, after a bench trial, upheld the DRA’s determination, finding that the Morrises’ actions demonstrated an intent to establish New Hampshire residency.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the relevant statute and administrative rule were properly applied, and that the Morrises’ conduct evidenced an intent to make New Hampshire their principal place of physical presence for the indefinite future. The court also held that New Hampshire’s tax scheme did not violate the state or federal constitutions, that the Morrises were not entitled to credits for taxes paid to Connecticut, and that the trial court did not err in declining to abate penalties, interest, or award attorney’s fees. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin." on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including second degree assault – domestic violence, kidnapping – domestic violence, criminal threatening, and simple assault – domestic violence, following an incident with his spouse in August 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by financial disputes and prior altercations. During the charged incident, the defendant physically assaulted and threatened the complainant, leading her to obtain a restraining order the next day. While incarcerated, the defendant later attempted to contact the complainant in violation of that order.Before trial in the Superior Court, the State sought to introduce evidence of a prior assault by the defendant in July 2020, the complainant’s acquisition of a restraining order, and the defendant’s subsequent violation of that order. The defendant objected, but the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) admitted all three pieces of evidence, reasoning they were relevant to the defendant’s intent and the context of the relationship. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on one count of simple assault but convicted him on all other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Supreme Court held that the probative value of the July 2020 incident was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the evidence of the restraining order and its violation improperly relied on propensity inferences. The Court further found that these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given their potential impact on the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Moses" on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and sexual assault based on conduct that occurred when the victim was between fifteen and seventeen years old. The defendant, who was significantly older than the victim, met her when she was nine and became a father figure and religious leader in her life, especially as her relationship with her biological father became distant. The victim spent considerable time with the defendant and his family, referred to him as “dad,” and worked for him. The alleged assaults occurred over several years in various locations, but the charges did not include an initial incident in Manchester when the victim was fifteen.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to prevent the State from arguing that his roles as a father figure and religious leader constituted a “position of authority” under the relevant statute, and to exclude evidence of the uncharged Manchester incident. The court denied both motions, allowing the State to present its arguments and evidence. After a twelve-day jury trial with twenty-one witnesses, the jury found the defendant guilty on nine counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and eight counts of sexual assault.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that the statutory term “position of authority” does not require a formal or official relationship, and that roles such as father figure or religious leader can qualify. The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant’s role as a father figure gave him authority over the victim, which he used to coerce her. Even assuming error in admitting evidence of the Manchester incident or in allowing arguments about religious authority, the court concluded any such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt based on the father figure relationship. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law