Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the case involved Gail C. Tremblay, the plaintiff, and the Estate of Donald D. Bald, the decedent, and Allan Bald, the defendants. Tremblay and Donald Bald were engaged and lived together for over ten years but never married. During their relationship, they executed several agreements stating that if they were living together at the time of Bald's death, Tremblay would receive certain properties. Upon Bald's death, Tremblay initiated legal action, arguing that the agreements were enforceable contracts. The defendants disagreed, asserting that the agreements lacked consideration, and the Superior Court sided with the defendants.Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that the agreements are enforceable. The court stated that a valid enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds. While the defendants argued that the agreements lacked consideration because the couple was already living together when the agreements were executed, the court disagreed. The court held that the plaintiff's continued cohabitation constituted a benefit to the decedent, thereby satisfying the requirement for consideration. Furthermore, the court stated that either party's ability to end the relationship prior to the decedent's death did not affect the enforceability of the agreements. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tremblay v. Bald" on Justia Law

The putative intervenors, the Robert T. Keeler Foundation (the Foundation) and Peter Mithoefer, the fiduciary for the Estate of Robert T. Keeler (the Estate), appealed circuit court orders which: (1) denied their motion to intervene in proceedings brought under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) by petitioner, the Trustees of Dartmouth College (Dartmouth), and assented to by respondent, the New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT), to modify the restrictions governing an institutional fund created by a charitable gift pursuant to the last will and testament of Robert T. Keeler; and (2) granted Dartmouth’s assented-to application to modify. On appeal, the putative intervenors argued they had “special interest” standing pursuant to In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266, 274-75 (2019), and that granting the assented-to application was error. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the putative intervenors’ motion to intervene for lack of standing and, therefore, necessarily also affirmed the decision to grant the assented-to application. View "In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the Court announced a new rule intended to compensate plaintiffs who were not in the zone of danger but nevertheless suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the Court applied the Corso standard to allegations involving medical professionals’ negligent misdiagnosis, which resulted in the death of Lisa Chartier. Lisa’s husband, Marc Chartier, brought this action against defendants, Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC (Apple Therapy), Four Seasons Orthopaedic Center, PLLC d/b/a New Hampshire Orthopaedic Center (Four Seasons Orthopaedic), and Dr. Heather Killie. He appealed a superior court order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court found plaintiff alleged he suffered severe emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms from contemporaneously perceiving the sudden, unexpected, and shocking suffering and death of his wife. Under these circumstances, Lisa’s pulmonary embolism constituted the “accident” in line with Corso, and subsequent cases. The Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the basis that Marc’s emotional distress was too attenuated from defendants’ negligent conduct to permit recovery. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion. View "Chartier v. Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Newton appealed his convictions by jury on three counts of exploitation of an elderly, disabled, or impaired adult in violation of RSA 631:9, I(a) (2016) and RSA 631:10 (2016). Defendant became trustee of the Newton Family Trust and retained power of attorney over both the victim (defendant’s mother) and her husband (defendant’s father) in 2014 as a result of their failing health. The Trust created a fiduciary duty in the trustee and specified that the assets and money held by the Trust were to be used only for the benefit of the victim and her husband until their death. The victim’s husband died on December 21, 2015. By July 2017, the New Hampshire Attorney General had launched an investigation into allegations that defendant exploited the victim for large sums of money. Defendant argued the trial court erred when, at trial, it excluded out-of-court statements made by the defendant’s parents and a financial planner. He also appealed the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a hearing to review and reconsider the sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "New Hampshire v. Newton" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Apostoloff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition to validate a purported amendment to the Omega Trust. He contended the court erred in dismissing his petition by finding the grantor did not substantially comply with the terms of the trust regarding amendments, and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the grantor intended to amend his trust. Taking all of the facts alleged in the petition as true, and applying them against the applicable law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the allegations constituted a basis for legal relief. Thus, petitioner has sufficiently pled his case to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re The Omega Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Peter Dodier, appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) order denying the estate’s claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier’s death. The CAB denied the estate’s claim based on its determination that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were compensable, it reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for its consideration of whether the estate was entitled to death benefits. View "Appeal of Estate of Peter Dodier" on Justia Law

Respondent Ryanne Earley appealed a final divorce decree awarding petitioner Wm. Michael Earley part of her interest in an irrevocable life insurance trust established by her parents. She argued the trial court erred by classifying her interest in the trust as marital property subject to equitable division under RSA 458:16-a (Supp. 2020). Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s decision was contrary to RSA 564-B:5-502 (2019), it reversed in part, vacated the remainder of the property division determination, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wm. & Ryanne Earley" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Dow appealed a probate court decision finding he was not a pretermitted heir under his mother’s, Marie G. Dow’s, will. He argued the probate division erred in failing to apply New Hampshire’s pretermitted heir statute to her will, and that, under New Hampshire law, he was a pretermitted heir and, thus, entitled to his intestate share of his mother’s estate. Respondent Leslie Dow, the testator’s ex-daughter-in-law and primary beneficiary of her will, countered that the probate division properly applied Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute to the will in accordance with the will’s provision that “[the] estate is to be administered and enforced according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Following oral argument before a 3JX panel, the case was submitted to the full court for decision. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the probate division’s decision to apply the Massachusetts pretermitted heir statute in determining whether the petitioner was a pretermitted heir under the will, and reversed the probate division’s conclusion that the petitioner was not a pretermitted heir. The Supreme Court held that petitioner was a pretermitted heir under New Hampshire law, as properly applied, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Marie G. Dow" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul O’Neill, acting as trustee of the Lorraine R. O’Neill Revocable Trust – 2004, appealed a probate court order granting a petition for ancillary estate administration of certain New Hampshire real estate. O’Neill argued, among other things, that the probate division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the petition because it was filed on behalf of the estate of a non-New Hampshire decedent, and the petition did not represent that a court outside of New Hampshire had made a judicial determination that the estate was insolvent. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the grant of administration and remanded all remaining issues to the probate division for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Lorraine R. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Defendants Alan Johnson and William Saturley were the former co-trustees of the 2004 David A. Hodges, Sr. Irrevocable GST Exempt Trust and the 2004 David A. Hodges, Sr. Irrevocable GST Non-Exempt Trust (collectively, the 2004 Trusts). In 2017, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a circuit court decision that set aside “decantings” from the 2004 Trusts and removed the Former Co-Trustees. The Court specifically left “for another day the issue of whether [the Former Co- Trustees] are entitled to indemnification for the fees and expenses incurred in this proceeding” because, at that time, the trial court had not ruled upon the issue. In this appeal, the Former Co-Trustees challenged the determination, recommended by a Judicial Referee and approved by the Circuit Court, that, except for attorney’s fees and costs incurred for certain administrative tasks: (1) they were not entitled to be reimbursed from the 2004 Trusts for the post-trial fees and costs they personally incurred to defend the decantings; and (2) they had to reimburse the 2004 Trusts for the fees and costs the trusts incurred to defend the decantings at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hodges v. Johnson" on Justia Law