Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

The defendant, David Zuzelo, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of New Hampshire on one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and one count of AFSA alleging a single act of penetration. The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss both AFSA charges due to insufficient evidence and by denying his motion to preclude the admission of evidence pertaining to the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics.The Superior Court had denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the State had failed to introduce sufficient evidence supporting either the pattern AFSA charge involving touching of the complainant’s genitalia or the AFSA charge alleging penetration. The trial court also denied the defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics, arguing that this evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that while there was sufficient evidence to support the single-act penetration AFSA conviction, there was insufficient evidence to support the pattern AFSA conviction. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s alleged behavioral changes and characteristics and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the court reversed the defendant’s pattern AFSA conviction and reversed and remanded his single-act penetration AFSA conviction. View "State v. Zuzelo" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Newfound Serenity, LLC, sought to develop a seasonal recreational vehicle park and applied for site plan approval from the Town of Hebron's Planning Board. The Planning Board denied the application, citing seven reasons. Newfound Serenity appealed this decision to both the Housing Appeals Board (HAB) and the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA). The HAB dismissed the appeal as untimely, while the ZBA overturned four of the Planning Board's reasons for denial, upheld one, and stated it lacked authority to address the remaining two. Newfound Serenity then filed a complaint in superior court, seeking review of both the Planning Board and ZBA decisions. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, based on the HAB's initial dismissal.The Superior Court agreed with the Town's argument that Newfound Serenity had effectively bifurcated its initial appeal, with the ZBA reviewing zoning ordinance-related reasons for denial and the HAB reviewing reasons outside the ZBA's jurisdiction. The Town argued that since the HAB dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as untimely, and the plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal, the Planning Board’s decision on those issues became final. Therefore, even if the superior court were to reverse the ZBA’s decision, such a reversal would be moot because the Planning Board’s denial based on the two other reasons would remain effective. The Town also argued that because the plaintiff appealed the Planning Board decision in part to the HAB, the plaintiff waived its right to bring an action in superior court.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that the dismissal of the complaint was inconsistent with the statutes governing appeals from planning board decisions. The court found that the plaintiff's initial appeal to the HAB was not late, but premature, as the ZBA had not yet resolved the issues. The court held that the dismissal of a premature appeal by the HAB while the ZBA appeal was pending did not foreclose the plaintiff from pursuing its complaint in superior court. View "Newfound Serenity, LLC v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

The defendant, Christopher A. Small, was convicted on four charges, including aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) by sexual intercourse with a minor, AFSA by digital penetration of a minor, and two counts of pattern AFSA. The charges stemmed from incidents where Small sexually assaulted a minor victim, starting with inappropriate touching and escalating to touching the victim's vagina. The defendant was indicted on four counts of AFSA, including a pattern of touching the victim's genitalia and a pattern of touching the victim's breasts.During the trial in the Superior Court, the victim testified that the defendant's inappropriate behavior began with cuddling and escalated to touching her chest and vagina. At the close of the State's case, the defense moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing that there was no testimony to indicate that the victim was specifically referring to her breasts when she described it as her chest. The court denied the motion, stating that the jury could find that her testimony referred to her breasts. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the defendant argued that the record only established that he may have touched the victim's breasts, which was not sufficient to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State countered that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant committed AFSA by touching the victim's breasts. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, stating that a rational jury could reasonably infer that the defendant touched the victim's breasts as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of pattern AFSA. View "State v. Small" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Commerce Park Condominium Association (Association) and Little Deer Valley, LLC (declarant), concerning the conversion of convertible land into a new structure, Building C, within the condominium. The declarant had recorded a declaration of condominium in 2005, reserving the right to create and build Building C on convertible land within five years. In 2010, shortly before the five-year deadline, the declarant recorded an amendment to the declaration and a new site plan, asserting that this action converted the convertible land. However, the Association contended that the amendment merely extended the declarant's right to convert for another five years, but did not actually convert the land.The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Association, holding that the Condominium Act required the declarant to physically construct Building C for conversion to occur. The court reasoned that since the declarant did not engage in any substantial construction of Building C before the extended deadline of May 9, 2015, its right to do so expired at that time. The court also concluded that the declarant's attempt to begin construction well after the May 9, 2015 deadline would be contrary to the Condominium Act's purpose to protect buyers and establish reasonable expectations among the parties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that to convert convertible land, the Condominium Act required the declarant to file "appropriate instruments" within the five- to ten-year statutory deadline but did not require the declarant to physically construct Building C. The court also concluded that the declarant properly converted the convertible land when it filed the amended declaration and new site plan in 2010. Therefore, the declarant retained its statutory right to build Building C upon conversion. View "Commerce Park Condo. Ass'n v. Little Deer Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case of Kierran Pierce, who appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and attempted AFSA. Pierce argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge at the close of the State's case. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did indeed err in denying the request for a mistrial. The court found that a statement made during the trial, indicating that Pierce had allegedly touched multiple children inappropriately, was highly prejudicial and should have resulted in a mistrial.However, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge, as they found sufficient evidence to prove guilt. The court reasoned that, despite alternative explanations presented by the defendant, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was attempting to commit an act of sexual assault.The Supreme Court also briefly addressed the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a view of the residence where the alleged sexual assaults occurred. The court did not make a definite ruling on this issue, suggesting instead that the parties might wish to develop these facts further in any subsequent trial. The case was ultimately reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the City of Claremont received a request for the disclosure of governmental records related to former police officer Jonathan Stone. Stone appealed a decision from the Superior Court ordering the City to disclose thirteen internal affairs investigation reports and four sets of correspondence between the New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council (PSTC) and the City.Stone argued that the City violated a 2007 Stipulated Award when the City Manager sent a letter to a journalist responding to the request for certain government records. He also argued that the City Manager's letter incorrectly indicated the number of sustained reports that the City located pertaining to him, and that the City violated the Stipulated Award when it did not destroy certain internal affairs reports.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the 2007 Stipulated Award did not prohibit the disclosure of the requested records and that Stone waived any argument that the records would otherwise be exempt from disclosure. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to disclose the records. View "Stone v. City of Claremont" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Candice K. Harvey, challenged the decision of the Superior Court affirming the Town of Barrington Planning Board's approval of a subdivision on a lot adjacent to her property. The lot was previously subdivided into two lots, one owned by the plaintiff and the other retained by the owners, David and Glenda Henderson. The Hendersons sought a variance to subdivide their lot into two residential lots and gain access via an easement over the plaintiff's lot. The plaintiff protested that the easement was initially meant for accessing only one lot, not two. The Superior Court affirmed the Planning Board's decision, validating the Zoning Board of Adjustment's authority to approve variances and amend subdivision plans under New Hampshire law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the decision of the Superior Court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Planning Board's approval of the subdivision application. The Court held that the easement, as specified in the plaintiff's deed and the 2006 plan, is to be used for a single lot and one buildable location only. Therefore, the Planning Board was precluded from approving the new plan absent legal access to the back lot consistent with RSA 674:41. The court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the Zoning Board of Adjustment or the Planning Board could modify the terms of the easement. The court also rejected arguments that the rule of reason should be applied to interpret the language of the easement, stating that the language was clear and unambiguous. View "Harvey v. Town of Barrington" on Justia Law

In this case, Alexandra Gamble (Mother) and Sean Rourke (Father) are divorced and have three children. They had a final parenting plan approved by the 10th Circuit Court-Portsmouth Family Division, which considered Father's residence in Costa Rica and Mother's in New Hampshire. However, Father later decided to reside in New Hampshire. As a result, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, arguing that due to the change in residences, it would be in the children’s best interests to modify the parenting schedule.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the decision of the lower court to modify the parenting plan, citing that the lower court exercised its discretion sustainably. The Court held that the trial court correctly interpreted the parenting plan when it ruled that modification was appropriate under RSA 461-A:11, I(g). This statute allows for modification of a parenting plan if changes in the distances between the parents' residences affect the children's best interest.Mother's argument that her due process rights were violated because the trial court considered grounds not raised by Father was rejected. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not base its decision on these factors. Instead, it found that Father met his burden to modify the parenting plan under RSA 461-A:11, I(g), which was the ground Father had indeed raised.The Supreme Court also rejected Mother's argument that the trial court violated her procedural due process rights by making changes to the parenting plan that were not sought in Father's petition. The Court concluded that the trial court had statutory authority to make these modifications once it found that a statutory predicate circumstance is satisfied, as per RSA 461-A:11, I. View "In re Rourke & Rourke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in a case where the defendant, Jean M. Maxi Jr., was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: attempted felonious sexual assault (FSA) and certain uses of computer services prohibited. Maxi appealed, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The defendant also argued pro se that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the appellate defender failed to consider his research or argue a double jeopardy violation under the U.S. Constitution.The court found that, as charged, the two offenses required different evidence to prove different elements and did not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The court also dismissed the defendant's pro se arguments as insufficiently developed for review. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision and affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for both charges. View "State v. Maxi" on Justia Law